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ABSTRACT
REMAKING CHINESENESS: THE TRANSITION OF INNER ASIAN GROUPS IN
THE CENTRAL PLAIN DURING THE SIXTEEN KINGDOMS PERIOD AND
NORTHERN DYNASTIES
Fangyi Cheng
Victor H. Mair
This dissertation aims to examine the institutional transitions of the Inner Asian groups in
the Central Plain during the Sixteen Kingdoms period and Northern Dynasties. Starting
with an examination on the origin and development of Sinicization theory in the West
and China, the first major chapter of this dissertation argues the Sinicization theory
evolves in the intellectual history of modern times. This chapter, in one hand, offers a
different explanation on the origin of the Sinicization theory in both China and the West,
and their relationships. In the other hand, it incorporates Sinicization theory into the
construction of the historical narrative of Chinese Nationality, and argues the theorization
of Sinicization attempted by several scholars in the second half of 20th Century. The
second and third major chapters build two case studies regarding the transition of the
central and local institutions of the Inner Asian polities in the Central Plain, which are the
succession system and the local administrative system. In the first case study, through
applying the crown prince system, the Inner Asian rulers reached the centralization of
authority, which was different from and even more centralized than the Han tradition. In
the second case study, the polities of the Sixteen Kingdoms Period and Northern
Dynasties largely followed the Inner Asian political tradition and the Inner Asian groups
iv!
!

also remained as units inside the polities. The two case studies show the transition of the
institutions of the Inner Asian polity in the Central Plain. The transition is neither a oneway change from Inner Asian institutions to Han and Jin institutions nor a simple
hybridity. For different institutions, here the succession system in the central government
and the administrative system in the local level, the dynamics for the transition are also
not the same. This dissertation approaches the Chinese history with articulating not only
what these Inner Asian groups took from the Chinese tradition, but also what they
contributed to the institutional changes in Chinese history, which reshapes our
understanding of what we call “Chinese” institutions, in other words, Chineseness.
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction
The Sixteen Kingdoms period and Northern Dynasties are known for the
invasions of Northern China by Inner Asian peoples, mainly from the Northern steppe
zone, usually described in Chinese historical records as wuhu luanhua (
disordering China), siyi luanhua (
(
Yuan’s (

, five hu

, four yi disordering China), or yidi luanhua

, yi and di disordering China).1 The Sixteen Kingdoms period began with Liu
) proclamation of the Han (

) state in the year 304 CE, and ended with the

unification of northern China by the Northern Wei in 439.2 This marked the beginning of
the Northern Dynasties period (439 – 589), which lasted until the replacement of the
Northern Zhou by the Sui, who later unified China. Nearly all the ruling groups of
Northern China between 304 and 589 were Inner Asian, and non-Han peoples comprised
more than half of the population of Northern China during the Sixteen Kingdoms
period.3 As a period of division and fragmentation, the Sixteen Kingdoms and Northern
Dynasties have been the object of less scholarly attention, particularly in the Western
academic world, than major dynasties like the Han and Tang, despite the pertinence of at
least two significant aspects of the period to topics that have enjoyed broad interest in the
field of Chinese studies. The first of these is the notion of Sinicization, relevant because
of the general view that the Inner Asian ruling groups of this period, especially the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Jin shu
(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996), vol.56, 1529-1534.
Because of the complex implications of the word “China”, here “China” is mainly used as a geographic
term to roughly refer to the territory of today’s People’s Republic of China.
3
Wang Xiaowei, “Shiliuguo shiqi Zhongyuan Yi-Han renkou bili”
, in
Lishi jiaoxue
, 1995, no.7, 15-18.
2
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Xianbei, merged into the Chinese population.4 The second aspect, not unrelated, pertains
to the "eventual" unification under the Sui that followed this period. Why was China
unified after this period of division? Was it inevitable? What dynamic lay behind the
integration? One of the answers for these questions is also related to the theory of
Sinicization.
Although the Sixteen Kingdoms period and Northern dynasties are often treated
as evidence for the validity of Sinicization theory, the notion of Sinicization has been
challenged and hotly disputed in the Western academic world. The corresponding
Chinese word for Sinicization is usually hanhua

, but this translation is not optimal

due to the mismatch between the “Han” of the Chinese word, which can refer also to Han
Chinese or the Han ethnicity, and the “sino-/sini-” of “Sinicization,” which refers more
broadly to China. The alternative huahua

, which matches the English word more

closely, is preferred by such scholars as Ping-ti Ho and Chen Yuan, the latter of whom
uses huahua in the title of his book discussing the Sinicization of foreigners from the
Western Regions (Xiyu

) during the Yuan Dynasty.5 Although the character “hua

” inside the two terms had the meaning of civilizing non-Sinitic people since very early
in Chinese context, neither term, however, carries the meaning of Sinicization before the
beginning of the Republic of China in 1912.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4

Sinicization theory is very common in numerous works of Chinese and Japanese scholarship, such as Lü
Simian, Liangjin Nanbeichao shi
(Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chuban gongsi, 2009), 623-627;
Kawamoto Yoshiaki
, ‘‘Kozoku no kokka’’
, in Gi-Shin Nanbokuchō Zui-Tō jidai shi
no kihon mondai
(Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 1997), 98–106.
5
Ping-ti Ho, In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski’s “Reenvisioning the Qing”, The
Journal of Asian Studies, vol.57, no.1 (Feb., 1998), p.152; Chen Yuan, Yuan Xiyuren huahua kao
, Shanghai guji press, 2000.
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Since the 1940s, however, many Western scholars have questioned or outright rejected
the Sinicization theory as a “Han nationalist interpretation of China's past.”6 New
approaches to Inner Asian rulers in China, such as "conquest dynasties" and "New Qing
history," have been brought up in the Western academic world.7 Yet these approaches
deal primarily with later dynasties, such as the Liao, Jin, Mongol, and Qing, and Qing
history remains the chief battleground of the academic debate about Sinicization and
other theories. In Mainland China and Taiwan, on the other hand, the theory of
Sinicization is still embraced by a large number of scholars today,8 and the debate about
the "New Qing History" has recently expanded into severe political attacks by mainland
Chinese commentators condemning it as a “New Imperialist” approach to history.9
Though the flames of war have yet to reach the study of the Sixteen Kingdoms and
Northern Dynasties, questions concerning the theory of Sinicization will ultimately still
have to be answered for this period as well. Can the Sixteen Kingdoms and Northern
Dynasties period yet serve as an example of Sinicization? If not, how can the transition of
the Inner Asian ruling groups be described? A few scholars have already attempted

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6

Evelyn S. Rawski, “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in
Chinese History”, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol.55, no.4 (Nov., 1996), 842.
7
Karl A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-Sheng, History of Chinese Society. Liao (907-1125), Philadelphia 1949;
Jennifer Holmgren, “Northern Wei as a Conquest Dynasty: Current Perceptions, Past Scholarship”, Papers
on Far Eastern History 40 (1989), 1-50; Albert Dien, “A New Look at the Xianbei and their Impact on
Chinese Culture”, in George Kuwayama (ed.), Ancient Mortuary Traditions of China: Papers on Chinese
Ceramic Funerary Sculptures (Los Angeles, CA: Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 1991), 40-59.
8
E.g. Ping-ti Ho and Chen Yuan, mentioned earlier; see also Jing-Shen Tao, The Jurchen in Twelfthcentury China: A Study of Sinicization, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967; Ch’i-Ch’ing Hsiao,
Lun Yuandai Mengguren zhi hanhua
, Mengyuanshi xinyan
, Taibei:
Yunchen wenhua, 1994, p.221.
9
Li Zhiting, “’New Qing History’: An Example of ‘New Imperialist’ History”, Contemporary Chinese
Thought, 47:1 (2016), 5-12.
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answers.10 More fundamental questions regarding the notion of Sinicization, meanwhile,
go unasked and unanswered on both sides of the broader debate: when was Sinicization
first conceived in the West and China? Do scholars who use the theory do so with the
same understanding and definition? Is hanhua

or huahua

in the Chinese

context the same as Sinicization in the Western context? More importantly, do mainland
Chinese and Taiwanese scholars embrace the theory solely out of nationalism? If not,
should Western academia reexamine the Sinicization theory accordingly? My dissertation
will consider these questions.
Another key factor in discussing this period, which I will also deal with in my
dissertation, is the tradition of “grand unification (dayitong

)” in Chinese history.

The Sixteen Kingdoms and Northern Dynasties period was the first time in Chinese
history that the Central Plain (Zhongyuan

) was conquered by Inner Asian peoples

who ruled over both Han Chinese and Inner Asian subjects. China was fragmented during
this period, but was subsequently unified by a northern regime in which the descendants
of those Inner Asian rulers remained. In many interpretations, the Sixteen Kingdoms
Period and Northern Dynasties are treated as a “detour” in Chinese history, with China
ultimately returning to its “normal route of development” after the Northern Dynasties.
The "detour" is seen as corresponding to the process of the Sinicization of Inner Asian
groups, which in this interpretation yielded a solid social and intellectual foundation for
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10

Chin-Yin Tseng, for instance, has drawn inspiration from the “New Qing History” in interpreting the
material culture of the Tuoba Xianbei during the Northern Wei Pingcheng period (398-494 CE) by using
the notion of “dual presence.” Tseng argues that the people and the agency of material forms in the Tuoba
Northern Wei have two different identities for the Chinese people and Eurasian steppe people, suggesting a
new angle from which to read material culture during the Northern dynasties. Chin-Yin Tseng, The Making
of the Tuoba Northern Wei: Constructing material cultural expressions in Northern Wei Pingcheng Period
(398-494 CE), BAR International Series 2567, 2013, 12-15.
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the later unification of China. Another representative interpretation is the
“Southernization theory” first advanced by Tang Zhangru, who argues that the whole
empire was southernized from the mid-Tang onwards.11 In other words, although the
Tang directly inherited the legacy of the Northern dynasties, this was gradually replaced
by the influence of the Southern dynasties. Both interpretations emphasize the
assimilation of Inner Asian ruling groups via the absorption of "Chineseness" during the
period of division. In light of the increasing questioning and rejection of the theory of
Sinicization theory mentioned earlier, however, these interpretations must also be
reevaluated. Did people during this time foresee the re-unification of China? Was the
unification inevitable, or could disunity have become the new “natural state” of China
had things gone differently? What was the dynamic behind the integration? These
questions require a rethinking of the tradition of "grand unification" in Chinese history.
To address the questions from the two aspects mentioned above, my dissertation
builds two case studies to reveal different strata in the transition of Inner Asian peoples. I
examine the responses of Inner Asian rulers and community members during the
transition, and consider how their responses may have varied according to their differing
identities. Confronted with different options from the sedentary civilization, did they
accept willingly and unquestioningly? Did they hesitate between different options, or just
take one option unconsciously? What factors might have motivated their final decision?
Besides the introductory chapter, this dissertation comprises four other chapters.
The second chapter, "The Evolution of Sinicization," traces the history and usage of the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11

See Tang Zhangru, Weijin Nanbeichao Suitangshi sanlun
daxue press, 1992), 486; Mou Fasong, “Luelun Tangdai de Nanchaohua qingxiang”
, Zhongguoshi yanjiu
, 1996, no.2, 51-64.
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(Wuhan: Wuhan

theory of Sinicization in Eastern and Western scholarship, and will discuss the
intellectual trends underlying the different ways in which the theory has been applied. As
mentioned above, the earliest use of Sinicization seems to have been in the West, with
such foundational sinologists as Paul Pelliot and Édouard Chavannes playing major roles,
and with early reports about the assimilation of Kaifeng Jews in China lending apparent
support to the idea.12 With the expanding influence of western Sinology in China, and the
contemporary rise of nationalism, the theory of Sinicization was quickly picked up by
early 20th century Chinese scholars such as Chen Yuan. Nationalism alone, however,
cannot explain the popularity of the theory in the Chinese academic world: Chinese
traditional concepts, such as the yi

/xia

dichotomy and the concept of tianxia (

,

All-under-Heaven) in Confucianism also played an important role, as did the Marxian
and other views of social evolution, all of which were taken as evidence for the
proposition that "barbarians" naturally would become – and would want to become –
“Sinicized.” I follow this by discussing criticisms of Sinicization since the 1950s. I
conclude by discussing to what extent the theory of Sinicization remains valid in the field
of Chinese studies, and how it might best be applied or avoided in future research.
In each of the following three chapters, I build two case studies to examine the
transition of Inner Asian groups in different layers. In the third chapter, also I discuss
how Inner Asian rulers in Northern China adopted a vertical crown prince succession
system after their migration into Northern China. I begin by examining the institution of
crown princes as recorded in Chinese canonical texts in order to discuss the motivations
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12

Donald Daniel Leslie, The Survival of the Chinese Jews: The Jewish Community of Kaifeng, Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1972, 103-108.
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underlying the institution and the usual roles of crown princes in this context. A
discussion of the succession system in the Inner Asian tradition follows: although the
institution of the crown prince was to some extent new to Tuoba Xianbei rulers, it was
the Tuoba Xianbei who officially adopted this system for themselves. Key questions to be
discussed in this section include: Why did the Tuoba rulers accept and try to apply this
new succession system? What advantages did the new system present to them? How did
they come gradually to use this institution differently from the typical Chinese way?
What influence did this new institution exert upon nomadic rulers and later dynasties?
The fourth chapter deals with the transition of the community structures of Inner
Asian people. Nomadic groups were usually reorganized after migration to sedentary
areas, either by the government or by themselves. In this chapter, I first examine the
concepts of “tribes (bu

)” and “clan (zu

)” in the nomadic tradition during the

Sixteen Kingdoms and Northern Dynasties, based on materials from both received
historical records and anthropological field work. Next, I discuss the concepts of
“household (hu

)”, “village (cun

)” and “county (li

)” in the Chinese tradition, and

the strategy of the government to reorganize the nomadic people in Chinese territory. Of
particular interest will be the question of how the nomadic groups were reorganized after
entering the Central Plain, and whether this reorganization was entirely along Han
Chinese lines or retained features of pastoral tradition. The relationship between hu and
Han in local society is discussed and fleshed out using excavated inscriptions from
Buddhist steles and epitaphs from the Sixteen Kingdoms and Northern dynasties.
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In final chapter, which is the concluding chapter, I consider the findings drawn
from the case studies presented in the preceding chapters and discuss the ways in which
these conclusions may be brought to bear in reconsidering the theory of Sinicization and
the tradition of "Grand Unification." It is my hope that the discussion will shed new light
on the content and role of nationalism in the construction of Chinese history and even the
ethnic conditions in today's China.
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CHAPTER 2 The Evolution of “Sinicization”
Sinicization (alternatively known as Sinicisation, Sinofication, or Sinification) is
usually interpreted as the process by which all non-Han or non-Sinitic people who
entered the Chinese realm, no matter whether as conquerors or conquered, eventually
were inevitably assimilated as Chinese.13 As an important concept used in the study of
Chinese history, Sinicization theory is discussed not only in almost all topics related to
the non-Sinitic groups in Chinese territory, but also is in the core of some debates, such
as the those about the New Qing History and “Conquest Dynasties.” In these debates,
Sinicization theory always is questioned, or even radically rejected, by many Western
scholars and is treated as a “Han nationalist interpretation of China's past.”14 To the
contrary, the Sinicization theory is embraced by a large number of scholars from
Mainland China and Taiwan, and the debate even leads to severe political criticism of the
New Qing history by attacking it as the “New Imperialist” history.15 Behind these
arguments and debates, perhaps because of its seemingly “obvious” character, scholars
usually do not give a clear or consistent definition for Sinicization.
Many questions about Sinicization still remain unasked. Among these questions
are some that are basic and significant for the debate. When was Sinicization theory first
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13

Here the definition of Sinicization is paraphrased from Evelyn Rawski’s article. In her article, she says
“Sinicization—the thesis that all of the non-Han peoples who have entered the Chinese realm have
eventually been assimilated into Chinese culture.” Evelyn S. Rawski, “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning
the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History," The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 55,
no.4 (Nov. 1996), 842.
14
Evelyn S. Rawski, 1996, 842.
15
Li Zhiting (2016) “New Qing History: An Example of 'New Imperialist' History," Contemporary Chinese
Thought, 47:1, 5–12.

9!
!

mentioned in the West and in China? Do all scholars use this theory with the same
understanding and definition? Is Hanhua

or Huahua

in the Chinese context the

same as Sinicization in Western context? More importantly, is nationalism the only
reason for scholars from Mainland China and Taiwan to embrace the Sinicization theory?
In other words, why is there emphasis on the significance of Sinicization in Chinese
history? Have Western scholars offered a better interpretation than Sinicization? All these
questions will be discussed in this chapter.
We begin with a chronological analysis of the application of Sinicization theory
from the end of 19th century until the early 21st century. The analysis includes the
contexts, definitions and contents of Sinicization theory. Next will be an examination of
the variety of conceptualization behind the usages of the Sinicization theory. Following
will be a discussion of ethnicity in early Medieval Chinese history.

2.1 Early use of Sinicization in the Western Context

As a frequently used concept, the morphology of the word “Sinicization” is quite
simple; the word is comprised of the root “Sinicize” and suffix “-ization." The root
“Sinicize” means somebody or something modified under Chinese influence; the suffix “ization” denotes the process, act or result of something, in this case Sinicizing. Words
with a similar combination are abundant in English, such as Romanization and
Westernization. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, both Sinicize and
10!
!

Sinicization first appeared in The Athenaeum, a British literary magazine at the end of
19th century, and they often are used to describe the Chinese influence on Japanese
language and religion.16
In the early 20th century, “Sinicization” first was used in academic articles to
describe the Chinese impact on the languages and customs of cultures surrounding
China.17 When W. Perceval Yetts discussed the communication between China and the
West in 1926, he even used “Sinicization” to describe the intellectual history of Europe in
the 17th and 18th century, writing: “Indiscriminate admiration for Chinese notions and
things, or those supposedly Chinese, became the vogue. This Sinicization of intellectual
Europe reached its acme during the eighteenth century, and it has influenced our arts to
an extent hard to estimate.”18 Therefore, it is almost certain that in the beginning, the
words “Sinicization” or “Sinicize” served as descriptive terms for Chinese influence,
including Chinese notions, language, and material culture, on cultures outside of China.
An example of this influence would be the language and religion in Japan, and art in
Europe. In other words, when first used, Sinicization had no direct connection with ethnic
identity, nor did it carry the connotations of universality (“all”) and meritability (“must”).

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16

In OED, 2nd edition (1989) OED Online version March 2016. Examples such as “1889 Athenæum 28
Sept. 414/2, While the civilization of Japan becomes every year more and more Westernized, her language
becomes more and more Sinicized.” “1898 Athenæum 26 Nov. 747/3, Shinto might have become a
religious and ethical system, but its development was arrested by Sinicization and Buddhism.”
17

William Elliot Griffis, Don C. Seitz and Homer Lea, "Japan and the United States," The North American
Review, vol. 197, no. 691 (Jun. 1913), p. 729.
18
W. Perceval Yetts, "Contact between China and the West," The Burlington Magazine for Connoisseurs,
vol. 48, no. 276 (Mar, 1926), p. 122. The term “Chinoiserie” was also probably first used in the 16th and
17th Century.
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As an alternative form of Sinicization, Sinification did not bear the same meaning.
According to the OED, the word “Sinification” first appeared in 1900 with the same
definition as Sinicization. In actuality, it had been in use already in 1899 with the
meaning of “managed/administered by the Chinese instead of foreigners.” This was in
reference to the process of the Chinese government and people gradually taking over the
control of foreign settlements, railways and other organizations inside China.19 Further,
when Noël Williamson talked about the gradual control of Tibet by the Chinese, he said
“Events have been taking place of late which are likely to increase interest in this section
of the Lohit valley. I refer to the Sinification of Tibet, and if reports in the public press be
true, it is only a matter of months, not years, before the Rong, instead of forming a part of
Tibet, will become a Chinese province.”20 From these early usages of Sinification, it is
clear that Sinification referred to the political control or governance by the Chinese
government or people.
Although Sinicization did not obtain the meaning of “becoming a Chinese by
assimilation or acculturation,” work by a prominent Sinologist of the mid-19th century,
Sir Henry Yule, already reflected a similar assumption, albeit without using the word
"Sinicization." In the end of his “Dedication and Preface” in Cathay and the way thither:
Being a collection of medieval notice of China, published in 1866, Yule said:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19

See “The Proposed Sinification of the Settlements,” The North-China Herald and Supreme Court &
Consular Gazette (1870–1941) [Shanghai] 20 Mar 1899:474; Gilbert McIntosh, “The Christian Literature
Society Moves Forward,” The Chinese Recorder (1912–1938) [Shanghai] 01 Dec 1923: 746.
20
Noël Williamson, “The Lohit-Brahmaputra between Assam and South-Eastern Tibet, November, 1907,
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The empire (refering to China) which has a history coeval with the
oldest of Chaldæa (10–6 century BC) seems to be breaking up. It has
often broken up before and been reconsolidated; it has often been
conquered, and has either thrown off the yoke or absorbed its
conquerors. But they derived what civilization they possessed from
land which they invaded. The internal combustions that are now
heaving the soil come in contact with new and alien elements of
Western origin. Who can guess what shall come of that chemistry?21

While talking about China’s fate after its contact with Western civilization, Yule looked
back at Chinese history, and emphasized that the empire of China either had “thrown off
the yoke or absorbed its conquerors” while being conquered. According to Yule, how did
China absorb its conquerors? In the preliminary essays of the same book, he gave an
example about the Khitan:
The Khitan empire subsisted for two centuries, in Northern China and
the adjoining regions of Tartary. The same curious process then took
place which seems always to have followed the intrusion of Tartar
conquerors into China, and singularly analogous to that which followed
the establishment of the Roman emperors in Byzantium. The intruders
themselves adopted Chinese manners, ceremonies, literature, and
civilization, and gradually lost their energy and warlike character. It
must have been during this period, ending with overthrow of the
dynasty in 1123, and whilst this northern monarchy was the face which
the Celestial Empire turned into Inner Asia, that the name of Khitan,
Khitat, or Khitaï, became indissolubly associated with China.22

Here, Yule interpreted the intruders as being “absorbed” and adopting “Chinese manners,
ceremonies, literature and civilization” and eventually losing “their energy and warlike
character." Later Yule also expressed a similar idea about the Jurchen in the Jin
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21

Cathay and the way thither: Being a collection of medieval notice of China, translated and edited by
Colonel Henry Yule, C.B., vol. I, “Dedication and Preface” vii–viii, London: Printed for the Hakluyt
Society, M.DCC.LXVI. 1866.
22
Ibid. pp. vii, xi, 147–148.

13!
!

dynasty.23 How was “their energy and warlike character” related to the Khitan or Jurchen
identity? Does losing them mean the Khitan and Jurchen were absorbed? Does this
absorption equal assimilation by the Chinese and the loss of their original ethnicity?
Henry Yule did not provide answers to these questions. Instead of constructing a
sophisticated social theory, his “absorption theory” was closer to a description based on
his impression from reading Chinese history than a serious consideration of ethnicity.24
This way of describing Chinese history was used in the works of the small
community of early European Sinologists, such as Édouard Chavannes and Paul Pelliot.25
In Haute Asie, when Pelliot mentioned the change of the Khitan people after they
conquered China, he said
Mais il en advent des Khitan comme de tous les nomads qui se fixaient
en vainqueurs sur le sol de la Chine et que, par un choc en retour, la
civilization chinoise conquérait bientôt. Au bout de quelques
generations, les Khitan s’étaient policés, chinoisés.26

The last sentence is translated as “After a number of generations the Khitan were
civilized, Sinicized” by Witfogel and Feng.
Here, Pelliot calls the acceptance of Chinese culture as “civilized and Sinicized,”
which implies that he considered Inner Asian peoples like the Khitan and Jurchen to have
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Ibid. p. 148.
The general statement of “absorption theory” was in accordance with the Confucian idea that the
superiority of “Chinese” culture and the foreigners/Barbarians can be and should be civilized. Meanwhile,
it is also about the civil and military (wenzhi
) theory.
25
Later in 1915, the book Cathay and the way thither was reprinted with editing and annotating by another
French sinologist Henri Cordier. In the end of his preface for the second edition, he expressed his gratitude
to those friends who helped him, including Sir Aurel Stein, Ed. Chavannes and Paul Pelliot. In Cathay and
the way thither: Being a collection of medieval notices of China, dedication and preface xiii, vol. 1, 1915.
26
Paul Pelliot, Haute Asie, Paris 1931, 21–22.
24

14!
!

been “uncivilized” before “la civilization chinoise conquérait bientôt.” After that, they
became Chinese since they were absorbed into Chinese civilization. Compared to Henry
Yule, this further statement gives a more explicit interpretation of the “absorption
theory,” which served as the major target that Karl Witfogel and Feng Chia-Sheng argued
against in their monumental 1949 work about the Liao Dynasty.27 From Yule’s
description to Pelliot’s statement, absorption theory served as a depiction of Chinese
history without further regard for the social history or ethnicity of those Inner Asian
intruders inside China; in Pelliot’s writing, however, this “absorption” gradually became
similar to “assimilation”. One reason for this should be that in the early stages of
Sinology, anthropological and sociological theories had not been adopted to any
significant degree. For a long time, philology remained the main method for approaching
this issue, especially among European Sinologists such as Pelliot and Chavannes.
It is necessary to mention, however, that already in the early 20th century,
anthropology had a role in China studies; this was led by Berthold Laufer, an
anthropologist, who was educated in Germany and migrated to the U.S. in 1898. During
1901–1904, he led the Jacob H. Schiff expedition to China and acquired a comprehensive
ethnographic collection for the American Museum of Natural History (AMNH).28 In a
letter to his mentor Franz Boas at AMNH written in 1903 during the expedition, Laufer
says, "I shall conquer China. . . [for] the anthropologist. China, no longer the exclusive
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domain of travelers and sinologues, both narrow-minded and one-sided in their
standpoints and researches, China to all who have anthropological interests."29
Among the large number of publications by Laufer, one article published in 1917
mentions the Lolo people of southwestern China who did not have family names before
contact with the Chinese. He calls a group of Lolo “Sinicized Lolo” because they adopted
Chinese surnames. 30 This is one of the earliest examples in which “Sinicize” is used
directly to describe the ethnic groups living inside Chinese territory. By adopting Chinese
surnames, the group of Lolo had been acculturated into Chinese. Laufer describes them
as “Sinicized Lolo.” As an anthropologist, Laufer’s use of “Sinicized” starts to connect to
the concept of ethnicity in anthropology and ethnology, and it clearly diverts the use of
“Sinicize” and “Sinicization” into another context and field. Both orientations, i.e.,
Sinicization in Sinology and anthropology, have been projected in the contemporary
Chinese intellectual world.

2.2 Early use of Sinicization in China in the early 20th century

The Chinese word for Sinicization is usually the above-mentioned Hanhua

.

This translation is not optimal due to the confusion between the Han of the Chinese word,
which can refer also to Han Chinese or the Han ethnicity, and the “sino-/sini-” of
“Sinicization,” which refers more broadly to China. The alternative huahua

, which
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matches the English word more closely, is preferred by such scholars as Ping-ti Ho and
Chen Yuan, the latter of whom uses huahua in the title of his book discussing the
Sinicization of foreigners from the Western Regions (Xiyu
Dynasty.31 Although the character “hua

) during the Yuan

” in the two terms has had the meaning of

“civilizing non-Sinitic people” since very early in a Chinese context, neither term carried
the meaning of Sinicization before the beginning of the Republic of China in 1912.
Possibly the earliest use of Hanhua and Huahua in a Chinese text occurred in
1923; the two words, however, appeared in very different contexts. Huahua was related to
the European Sinology mentioned earlier, and Hanhua was influenced directly by
Western explorers’ fieldwork in China.

2.2.1 Huahua in early Chinese Context
As mentioned above, Huahua was used by Chen Yuan in his famous 1923 book,
Yuan Xiyuren Huahua kao (

Research on the Sinicization of the People

from Western Regions of Yuan Dynasty),32 and it was also possibly the first appearance of
Huahua. Before delving into the meaning of Huahua, it is important to point out that Hua
and Yi

constitute the Chinese-barbarian dichotomy.33 In his book, Chen Yuan does
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not give a clear definition of Huahua but only states that “as for the meaning of Huahua,
its acquisition is judged by whether it may eventually be acquired, and if only Chinese
)”34 Here, Chen discusses

have it. (

the content of Huahua; in other words, what people should learn from Chinese to be able
to be considered as being Sinicized (Huahua). For Chen Yuan, the answer was
Confucianism, Daoism, Chinese Buddhism, Chinese literature, art, rituals, customs, and
female education.35 Then, what was the ultimate goal of Huahua? Chen did not present a
clear answer, but he revealed some ideas about it in his writing. In his discussion about
why he chose to study the people of the Western Regions instead of the Khitan, Jurchen
or others, he says,
Since the issue discussed in this volume is limited to the Western
Region of the Yuan dynasty, therefore, Mongolians, Khitans and
Jurchens are not included here. It is also because the Mongolians and so
on were culturally naïve, and therefore their assimilation by Chinese
was by no means surprising. As for countries like Japan, Korea, the
Ryukyus, and Annam, they long ago adopted Sinitic written language
and institutions, and therefore, their “Huahua” was also not surprising
at all.

36

Based on this statement, it is clear that Chen’s “Huahua” means “assimilated by
Chinese (tonghua Huazu

)." In other words, by learning any one or any
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combination of those unique Chinese cultural practices listed above, any people can be,
and will be, “assimilated” by Chinese. In another place in Chen’s book, he also tries to
differentiate “Huahua” from “guihua (

, submission)” and “Huaxue (

, learning

from Chinese)." He says,
And there are peoples in the Western Regions who have long been
living in the Han habitations and submitted to China, yet from the
aspect of Chinese culture nothing special about them could be
commemorated. For example, in the geography section of The Book of
Han, there is a prefecture named Qiuci State. Yan Shigu
commented,“ because people from the Qiuci State who submitted to
China dwelled here, so the place was named after it.”……Similar cases
are numerous; from these we understand that the submissions of people
from the Western Regions to China have been common ever since
ancient times. Because they made no contributions to Chinese culture,
nothing much about them was worth recording. And there are those
who excel at Chinese language and have learned widely about Chinese
classics, such as the Western Region monks in Biographies of Eminent
Monks, who translated sutras; and Jesuit priests during the end of Ming
and early Qing. Instead of “assimilating to Chinese” Huahua
),
we should call them “learning from Chinese” (Huaxue
).

·

“
”……

37

According to Chen Yuan, Hanhua was not equal to guihua because those people
who submitted to Chinese rule had not necessarily learned Chinese cultural practices, nor
did they make any contribution to Chinese culture. As for those Buddhist monks from the
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Western Regions and Jesuit missionaries in China, although they had learned the Chinese
language and classics, they were not Sinicized (Huahua), because they still insisted on
their own religion and did not practice those learned from China.
In his first chapters, Chen Yuan also supplies three examples from pre-Yuan to
show the implication of Huahua. One of the three people, Pu Shoucheng

, was a

Song official with a great reputation, recorded in a gazetteer. Chen emphasizes, however,
that being an important Song official did not mean that Pu was assimilated (Hanhua), and
Pu was included in the book only because he was a very good Chinese poet.
As for the reason why Huahua was true for the people from the Western Regions,
Chen Yuan states,
The peoples of the Western Regions were, on the one hand, extensively
influenced by Indian, Jewish, Greek and Arabic civilizations; on the
other hand, they watched one slice of Chinese civilization (this refers to
the Qara Khitan/Western Liao), no wonder they strongly desired to be
personally on the scene. The Yuan army first unified the Western
Regions, then conquered the Central Plain. Among the people of the
Western Region, soldiers, captured personnel, and traders all flooded
into the Central Plain. The constitution and civilization that they always
wished to experience suddenly were unfolded before their eyes.
Besides, in the Yuan dynasty, the Semu people were allowed to live
freely among other people. Therefore, the constitution and civilization
were spread through generations. As a result, many of the people from
the Western Regions liked and believed ancient Chinese classics, the
Book of Odes, Book of Documents, Book of Rites and the Book of Music.
The purpose of this volume is precisely to commemorate such a
flourishing golden age.

/
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38

According to Chen, the Western Regions people came to China, learned Chinese culture
and participated in Chinese cultural performances mainly because they admired Chinese
civilization, and the Mongol conquest created the possibility of travel for them.
Meanwhile, as mentioned above, when Chen discussed the reason he chose not to study
the Mongols, Khitan and Jurchen, saying that their assimilation (Huahua) by the Chinese
was because their civilizations were primitive (youzhi

), which is different from why

Western Region people were assimilated. Both reasons, however, imply the
sophistication of “Hua” culture.
Therefore, the definition of Huahua in the context of Chen Yuan’s book was that
people who admired Chinese culture had been assimilated by coming to China, learning
the language, performing some type of Chinese cultural practices, and even making some
contributions to Chinese culture. They then can be considered as “Hua (

Chinese)."

Because of these circumstances, most of the people discussed in Chen’s book were Yuan
officials and well educated. After excluding the six females in the book who could not be
officials in the Yuan government, of the other 127 people described by Chen Yuan,39 78
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(61.4%) were Yuan officials, and 55 (43.3%) belonged to families having held high
official positions for generations. In other words, the lofty requirement of Chen’s Huahua
set limitations on the people who could be considered as being assimilated (Huahua) by
the Chinese. The limitations not only were on the number of people but also on their
social status and family background.
In his famous rebuttal to Evelyn Rawski’s address, Ping-ti Ho implied a possible
connection between the “Sinicization” or “Absorption” theory in French Sinology and the
early usage of “Huahua

” by Chen Yuan. Ho said that he suspected that “it was

under Pelliot’s inspiration that Ch’en Yüan, president of the leading Catholic Fujen
Univeristy, who was in close touch with French sinology with the help of research
assistants, published his famous study of the Sinicization of Western and Central Asians
during Mongol times in 1935.”40 Considering the influence and popularity of French
Sinology during the early Republican era in China, Chen Yuan’s interest in Central Asian
people during Mongol times might have been from following the research of European
Sinology, especially French Sinology.
The strong influence of French Sinology during that time also can be found in
other records. For example, Fu Sinian

claimed that the center of Sinology during

that period was in Paris, and he wanted to bring the center back to China by building the
Institute of History and Philology at the Academia Sinica. Chen Yuan also mentioned this
concept. Another famous scholar, Chen Yinke, also emphasized the influence of Paul
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Pelliot on his own research. 41 Ideas on Chen Yuan's definition of Huahua, however,
cannot be found in contemporary French Sinology, especially Paul Pelliot’s work. So
Chen Yuan’s concept of “Huahua

” in his academic writing appears to have arisen

from his own thinking based on textual sources and social background, which will be
discussed below.

2.2.2 Hanhua in Early Chinese Context
As for Hanhua, possibly the earliest two cases were related directly to the Western
explorers’ fieldwork in Southwest China. Before coming to the context of its usage, it is
necessary to point out that although the term Han refers to the largest nationality known
as Han Chinese in modern China, Han had different implications in diverse periods in
Chinese history. For example, in the Jin Dynasty, the Jurchen rulers called the former
Liao people who were under their rule as Hanren

or Yanren

(People of the

Yan [region]), but called the former Northern Song people inside Jin territory as Nanren
.42 Therefore caution should be used when applying the term Hanhua in different
dynasties.
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The earliest possible instances of using Hanhua appear in Shun Pao

, an

influential newspaper founded in 1872. The term was used to describe the Western
explorers’ fieldwork in southwest China. In an article titled “Hanzu yu feihanzu (
, Han Ethnic group and Non-Han Ethnic groups)” published in 1923, it reads,
Westerners who traveled to the borderland of Dian (Yunnan) and Shu
(Sichuan) returned and wrote books. In their books, they talked about
the diversity of the ethnicity of these areas. While most ethnic groups
were assimilated by Chinese, Tibetans were the hardest to assimilate.
Not only were they exceptional in not changing with Han influence, but
moreover, Chinese who entered Tibet had to follow their customs; only
then could they remain peacefully. On one hand, it is because Tibetans
have a tough personality; on the other hand, it is because of the power
of religion. Because Tibetans commonly believed in Buddhism, it was
easier for them to be Sinicized than for them to be Europeanized. If the
Republic of China could finally be revitalized, there was no reason to
worry about them turning to “others.”

43

Both “Hanhua” and “tonghua” (assimilation) appear in this article, and it is clear that
Hanhua here meant assimilation by the Han people through following Han customs. The
author also stated that these points about Hanhua came from “Xiren” (

), or

Westerners).
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In addition, there are other cases with similar contexts. One is from the contemporary
United States ambassador’s speech after he travelled in southwestern China.44 The
similarity between these cases is that they are about the relationship between Han and
other ethnic groups in Southwestern China, namely the Chinese borderland, and the
customs are considered as the most important ethnic characteristic. Here, the customs
included the clothes, diet, housing and family structure in the case of the Miao ethnic
group.45 This context of Hanhua was close to Berthold Laufer’s usage of “Sinicized” in
his article about the Lolo people, also in southwestern China.46 Based on the connection
with the Western explorers in the earliest cases, one may conclude that the concept of
Hanhua in its early context was borrowed directly from the West; particularly from the
Western anthropologists who did fieldwork in southwest China, such as Laufer. As
mentioned above, Laufer’s use of “Sinicized” started to connect to the concept of
ethnicity in anthropology and ethnology, and this might have been projected into the
intellectual world of the Republic of China.

2.3 Huahua and Hanhua in Constructing a National History of the Chinese
Nationality (Zhonghua minzu
)
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," in Shun Pao, Jan. 21st, 1924, no.18286,
, in Jingbao fukan
, 1924,

With the weakening of the Qing regime in its late period, there were two different
ideas about how to rebuild the Chinese state. One of them was espoused by the
revolutionaries, such as Zhang Taiyan

, Zou Rong

and Liu Shipei

.

They wanted to construct Han nationalism in China. These revolutionaries considered the
Manchu rulers to be barbaric invaders riding roughshod over the Han Chinese, so their
regime needed to be overthrown.47 They still believed, however, that the Manchu had
already been assimilated already by the Chinese. For instance, Zhang Taiyan said:
Some may say if so then the Manchus are also minorities, and have
already been slightly assimilated to us; why cannot they be considered
the same as the Chinese. I answer: the reason that the assimilation of
different nations is acceptable is because sovereignty is on our side and
enables us to absorb them. The assimilation of the Manchu is not
achieved by our pacifying and ruling, but because of their humiliating
and overthrowing us. These two ways cannot be compared. It is like the
example of marriage and plunder. If a woman is sent to us through
marriage, then she will be assimilated by us; if they occupy our palace
and beds through plundering, they also could be assimilated by us. It is
absolutely clear, however, who is the enemy and who is a relative. I
used to say the reason that we should drive the Manchus out is also
because they overthrew our country and took away our sovereignty. If
we defeated the enemy, and the Manchu Khan left Wanping and went
to Huanglong Prefecture, then we can accept their submission and
assimilation, and consider them the same as the Japanese and Thai
people. Before our sovereignty was recovered, however, it could not be
used as an example.
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What Zhang emphasized was that the initiative of assimilation was more
important than cultural assimilation itself. The sovereignty of the Han nation should have
the power to control the process of assimilation. Even if the Manchu people had been
assimilated culturally by the Chinese, they still should not have been treated as Chinese
(Zhongguo

). Therefore, the Han Chinese could not accept them as rulers. This point

of view was against the culturalism in classic Chinese thought. Joseph R. Levenson
pointed out that “the civilization, not the nation, has a moral claim on man’s allegiance”
in classic Chinese doctrine.49 In other words, as Hao Jing

(1223–1275) from the

Yuan Dynasty had said, “Those who can carry out the dao of China (Zhongguo

),

)50 From the revolutionaries’

are the rulers of China.” (

perspective, however, this was even worse that those “barbaric” rulers who carried out
the Chinese way, as Liu Shupei said,
Alas, when barbarians entered our China, they occupied our earth,
mountains and rivers, stole our young men, women and property. They
borrowed for a long time and never returned, without realizing that
these were not their belongings. How pathetic. The most pathetic of all
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was that they stole the wisest doctrine of our deceased emperors. Alas,
the ethics and rites of barbarians were different from that of the central
mainland. Their construction of ritual codes and production of music
were, in fact the source of their weakness. Their abandonment of the
barbarian customs and adherence to Chinese culture did not prove that
they truly respected the doctrine of the sages. It was only a way of
using Chinese law to deal with the Chinese land. They did this under
the name of defending the doctrine (dao) ---- who on earth were they
deceiving?

51

Because those foreign rulers really did not understand the Chinese way, they just used
Chinese methods to manipulate the Han Chinese people.
Toward the end of the Qing dynasty, the more urgent task became how to reunite
all the people who formerly had been under the rule of the Qing government. Besides the
political thought of the Chinese republic of five races (wuzu gonghe

, the five

races include Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Hui and Tibetan), historical research also
reflects this political necessity.52 In 1910, Liang Qichao
an article “Zhongguoshi xulun (

(1873–1929) published

[Discussion of Chinese History])” about

how researchers should deal with Chinese history. In the fifth section, on “race"
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(renzhong

),53 he states that there are more than ten races in Chinese history. Six

races are the most obvious and relevant ones; the Miao
Mongolian

, Xiongnu

, Han

, Tibetan

,

peoples.54 Meanwhile, Liang

and Tungus

emphasizes that even though he has listed six races, it still was very hard to distinguish
one from the other. He says,
Different races and nations, however, were generated separately. Their
population was amazingly great. Moreover, their mixed inhabitation
has a long history. They intermarried with each other. Their ancestry
also mingled together. Nowadays, if we intend to divide the boundary
between some races or nations, it is not easy. Not to mention, the
nomadic people who constantly migrated followed no customary
pattern. If we, as people who live thousands of years after, try to
identify the nomadic nations recorded in history with today’s nations
one by one, it is either a silly deed or an absurd fallacy. Therefore,
nowadays people use six nations to describe all the peoples who
appeared in Chinese history, which cannot avoid the criticism for being
arbitrary and carelessly omissive.

,

,

,

,

,

,
,

,

,

,
,
55

,

From this point, if the bloodlines of all these different races already had been
mixed during the long history of China, the so-called Han race should not be accentuated
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since “even our Han race, was actually from the same ancestor? Or just arose separately?
This is also an undecidable question. (

,

,

,

)."56 Therefore, all these different peoples that Liang listed should be
treated within Chinese history, as their own history was also a part of Chinese history.
For this purpose, since the late 1920s, Huahua and Hanhua were adopted widely in the
field of Chinese history but with a different context from the earliest ones discussed
above.
After the early appearance of Huahua and Hanhua, other scholars repeatedly used
both terms. Huahua still was employed mainly for research on the people from the
Western Regions in different dynasties. Such publications included: Tangdai Huahua
Fanhu kao

by Feng Chengjun

Chang’an yu Xiyu wenming

first published in 1929; Tangdai
by Xiang Da

1933; and Suitang Xiyuren Huahua kao

first published in

edited by He Jianmin

and including Kuwabara Jitsuzou's

and Feng Chengjun’s articles published

in 1936.57 Meanwhile, Hanhua mainly was used for the Inner Asian groups who built
regimes in Northern China, such as those described in Nüzhen Hanhua kaolue
by Song Wenbing

first published in 1934 and Liaoren Hanhua kao
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in 1935.58 It is also necessary to point out that in these works,

by Mao Wen

both Hanhua and Huahua were used frequently and were interchangeable.59
In Feng Chengjun’s article, he begins his argument by stating that all the
nationalities with a long history are “zazhong
the “Hanzhong

(mixed/hybrid nation)” and so were

."60 Apparently his point followed Liang Qichao’s idea about the
.”61 Then, Feng gave his description and definition of Huahua. Unlike

“Hanzhong

Chen Yuan, he did not emphasize the superiority of the unique Chinese culture, but the
“Han nation (Hanzhong

),” stating that:

Xianbei, which was discussed below [in this article], had already been
Sinicized in the Tang dynasty. Except for a small number of people
with the surnames from the north of Daizhou (
), Xianbei people
were in fact no different from other Tang people. From this aspect, the
extent to which Yuan Zhen
was a Chinese was no less than
today’s so-called Han ( ) people. On the other hand, the
differentiation between today’s so called Manchu people and Han
people could in fact be ignored. The Han ethnic group is like a vast
ocean, while Xianbei, Turks, Khitan, Jurchen, Mongol, and Manchu are
like streams. Since all these rivers run into the sea, how can we
distinguish between river water and sea water?

[

]
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62

Feng’s description of “Huahua” here accentuated the superiority of the “Han
nation,” which absorbed all the other small ethnic groups as an ocean absorbs all the
small rivers and makes them indistinguishable inside the ocean. It is more or less like the
“absorption theory” in French Sinology mentioned above, and this type of description
appeared in later Chinese historical writing again and again. As for Feng’s definition of
Huahua, he also talked about the cultural practice as Chen Yuan had done, but he did not
establish such high requirements as Chen. He said, “when the ancient people in our
country judged if a person was Hua or Yi, it was decided based on whether this person
practiced rituals and possessed moral codes.”63 And for the Tang Dynasty, he stated, “as
for the characteristics of Han people in the Tang Dynasty, it is not about the blood
relationship, but ethnic characteristics. People who share ethnic characteristics are Han
even though they are of different races. People who don’t share ethnic characteristics are
considered as Yi and Di even if they are Han.”64 Here the common ethnic characteristics
(zhongxing

), means “commonality of thoughts, emotions and interests,” and the

chief ethnic characteristics of Han Chinese are “loyalty and filial piety,”65 which,
according to Feng, were considered to be the foundation of Chinese society. Therefore,
for Feng, the requirement of Hanhua was not as high as Chen, but they still shared part of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62

Ibid., p.132.
Ibid., p. 135. The Chinese is “
64
Ibid. The Chinese is “
.”
65
Ibid. The Chinese is “
63

.”

” and “

32!
!

.”

the definition. Feng emphasized the “code of ritual and ethics (

),” but for Chen

Yuan, the code of ethics was not unique to Chinese people; so he stressed the significance
of those special cultural practices by Chinese people including ritual, Chinese literature,
art, religion and so forth.
While Feng focused on the “Hanhua” of the commoners of the non-Sinitic groups
in Chinese history, similar arguments have been made for the ruling classes during the
Khitan Liao and Jurchen Jin Dynasties. In Song Wenbing’s article dealing with the
“Hanhua” of the Jurchens, he first stated the reason for Hanhua,
From ancient times to the present, there has been a natural law for two
or more than two nations to assimilate each other. The minority were
assimilated by the majority. The ones with relatively low culture were
assimilated by the ones with relatively high culture. Such has become
the general rule of social evolution. The population of Jurchen was
much less than that of the Song people, and they were more uncivilized
than the Song people. Therefore, the former was assimilated by the
latter with a higher culture. Such has become a convention in social
evolution and seldom are there exceptions.

. 66

According to Song, it was natural law in the social evolution/development that a minority
will be assimilated by a majority, and people with low culture will be assimilated by
those with high culture. Therefore, it was unavoidable that the Jurchen were assimilated
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66

Song Wenbing, 1939, p. 173.

33!
!

by the people of Song. The Hanhua discussed by Song Wenbing includes the institutions,
customs, literature and other aspects of civilization.
By directly adopting the term Hanhua into the argument about the Jurchen,
however, this term cannot fit fully in the context of the Jin Dynasty. First, the Jurchen in
the Jin Dynasty were the ruling class; even though they were a minority, their social rank
should have had an impact on the Hanhua. In Song Wenbing’s argument, he even
compares the population of the Jurchen to the Song, and it is unclear if the Song refers to
the Southern Song population or original Northern Song population. Certainly, different
populations in two different states did not mean necessarily that the one with the larger
population would assimilate the other since these were two separate states with different
regimes.
Meanwhile, as mentioned above, the term “Han” had different meanings during
different periods. When Song Wenbing used “Hanhua,” the “Han” he was referring to
would have been the concept of the Han nation in the Republic era. It is anachronistic,
however, to use “Hanhua” for the Jurchen of the Jin Dynasty. These problems also can be
found in other researchers' discussions of the Hanhua of other dynasties, such as the Liao
Dynasty.
The content of Hanhua in Mao Wen’s article about the Hanhua of the Khitan
people in the Liao Dynasty is similar to Song Wenbing’s. He argues this topic from four
aspects—the Hanhua of the emperors, imperial concubines, other Khitan clans and the
Liao institutions. So in his argument, Hanhua included respecting Confucianism,
34!
!

appointing Han officials/literati, studying Confucian classics, learning and speaking
Chinese, creating language, building cities, marrying Han people, using the Han political
system, wearing Han style clothes, applying Han law, and so forth. By stating these facts,
he concluded that “in the Liao Dynasty, emperors, empresses and imperial concubines,
officials and commoners, decrees, regulations and insitutions, all of them had attained
Hanhua.”67 In the discussion at the end of his article, Mao said,
The Chinese nation is, in fact, a flexible colossus. After the Han people
and Liao people came into contact with each other, the Liao people
were assimilated by the Han like iron being melted by a furnace. This is
for certain, but the fact that the fire in the furnace also has changed
constantly should be remembered. Moreover, the Liao people rose from
the North, and the nations in the northwest and northeast all were
dominated by them. Their Hanhua also made Chinese civilization
spread to the nations in the northwest and northeast.

68

69

Mao's metaphor compared the Han to a furnace. To some extent, this is similar to
Feng Chengjun’s comparison of the Han nation to an ocean and other ethnic groups to the
rivers. The concept of Chinese Nationality (Zhonghua minzu

) in this quotation,

however, makes Mao’s argument slightly different from Feng Chengjun’s. The Han
nation in Feng’s context kept absorbing other ethnic groups without changing itself. In
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Mao’s context, however, during the course of Chinese history, the so-called “Chinese
Nationality” had absorbed all the other ethnic groups around China by melting them into
China. This made them indistinguishable so they became part of the Chinese Nationality;
and unlike the Han, the “Chinese Nationality” itself also had changed from time to time.
Mao also made a further statement that “Chinese civilization (Huaxia wenming
)” had been transmitted to the ethnic groups in northwest and northeast China through
the Hanhua of the Khitan people.

2.4 Nationalism behind the Huahua and Hanhua Theory

One important reason that Evelyn S. Rawski rejected the Sinicization theory was
that she considered it a “Han nationalist interpretation of China's past.”70 This point can
be justified to some degree since some hint of nationalist influence can be found in the
early usages of Hanhua and Huahua.
As discussed above, famous Chinese historians, such as Chen Yuan and Fu Sinian,
felt a sense of competition with the European Sinologists and tried to bring the “center of
Sinology” back to China. Moreover, when Chen Yuan wrote his book about the Huahua
of the people from Western Regions during the Yuan Dynasty, he also emphasized the
superiority of Chinese culture by admiring which Chinese cultural practices those people
chose to learn. Chen also stated that “this book was written during the time when the
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Chinese were despised the most, and when people advocated complete westernization, I,
therefore wrote a book like this.”71 So by arguing for the assimilation of the people from
the west by the superior and admirable Chinese culture, Chen tried to make the readers
proud of being Chinese and of their own culture. This is precisely the reason he used
Huahua instead of Hanhua in his book and chose people from the Western Regions
instead of Northern zone for his subject matter.
As for the early cases of using Hanhua, anxieties over losing the borderlands of
the Republic of China can be found in many places. In one of the earliest examples, the
Hanhua of Tibet are discussed because the author worried that Tibet might be
Europeanized (Ouhua

) and seek support from Europe. So the author wanted the

Republic of China to become more powerful and have more influence on Tibet by way of
Hanhua.72 This idea was the same as Sun Yat-sen’s interpretation of nationalism in the
) in early 1920s.73 Meanwhile, in a

Three People’s Principles (sanmin zhuyi

1935 article, Mao Wen argued that the Khitan people had become an indistinguishable
part of “Chinese Nationality.” He emphasized that Chinese civilization had been
transmitted to northwest and northeast China by the Khitan people. Therefore, in the end
of the article, he claimed,
Who says that the Northeastern people would finally end up as
barbarians? Among the descendants of Jishou,74 there were those who
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revitalized in different eras. We need only to rub our eyes and wait for
them.

75

From this statement, it is clear that what really concerns Mao Wen is that northeastern
China, which was occupied and controlled by the Japanese at that time, might be lost to
the barbarians (Yidi

). By arguing that the ancestor of the Northeastern ethnic groups

was the Khitan people who already had become part of the Chinese Nationality, their
descendants along with their territory should also be part of China and no longer
controlled by the Japanese.
With the gradually more severe threat of the Japanese against China in the 1930s,
and in response to Japanese politicians and scholars theory of “preserving China” or
“carving up China," 76 the unity of “Chinese Nationality (Zhonghua minzu

)"

was more and more accentuated. The construction of a history for Chinese Nationality
became significant and urgent.77
In 1931, after the Mukden Incident on September 18, the government of the
Republic of China made a course in the General History of China mandatory for college
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students.78 With the beginning of the full-scale invasion of China by the Japanese was
marked by the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July of 1937, Gu Jiegang

published

an article titled “The Chinese Nation is one (Zhonghua minzu shi yige
),” which was supported by many Chinese scholars.79 In this article, he began with the
statement of “All the people of Chinese belong to the Chinese Nation --- within the
Chinese Nation we should no longer differentiate any other nationalities --- from now on
everybody should exercise caution on using these two characters: minzu (

,

nationality)."80 Then he continued to argue that all the different cultures inside China
were the culture of “Chinese Nationality,” and so were the people inside China.81 By
means of this theory, Gu wished to unite all the people inside China to fight against the
Japanese. During this time, several works regarding general Chinese history and ethnic
history also were published; one of the most famous was the Outline of National History
(Guoshi dagang,

) finished in 1939 and published in 1940 by Qian Mu

.

Although Qian’s book was a general history about China, the Inner Asian peoples
did not play an important role in his book. For example, he only spent one chapter on the
Liao and Jin Dynasties, and their relationship with the Song, but three chapters on the
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Song Dynasty. For the Inner Asian peoples in the Outline of National History, for
instance, when he discussed the Northern Dynasties, he said,
At the time, China invited the barbaric groups of five Hu people into
the heartland. Since then, these barbarian groups have been influenced
by Chinese traditional culture. Therefore, although these people seized
the opportunity to revolt, they already had been sharing the same
powerful current of culture with the Chinese. Such a powerful current
of culture irrigated the vitality of their life, and thus permeated their life.
The division, upsurge, alternation and revitalization of these barbarians
were affairs that only equaled the fluctuation inside Chinese society
itself.

,
,

,
,

,

,

,
82

So the argument is that those Inner Asian groups were “nurtured” by Chinese traditional
culture and are included into the Chinese Nationality through the process of “Hanhua,"
which Qian mentioned a number of times in his book. Without giving a clear definition,
the Hanhua in Qian’s context is similar to Mao Wen and Song Wenbing’s mentioned
earlier. According to Qian Mu, the transformations inside and brought about by the Inner
Asian peoples are all just fluctuations inside Chinese society, which is similar to Gu
Jiegang’s argument.

2.5 Besides Nationalism, What Else?
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From the end of the Qing Dynasty and the beginning of the Republican Era, the
theoretical structure of the history of Chinese Nationality gradually was built. Later on, a
number of scholars made adjustments to the interpretation of Chinese Nationality, but the
base of this theoretical framework continues even into the 21st Century.83 For example,
instead of emphasizing the Han people, some scholars paid more attention to the elements
brought by other people inside Chinese civilization. When Chen Yinke

argues

about the success of the Tang empire, he states that “With the barbarian blood of valor
and vigor was injected into the decadent body of Central Plains culture, moribund
conventions were removed and a new vitality was reborn. By developing and carrying
forward [the new vitality], then [the Tang] was able to distinctively create an
unprecedented prosperity.”84 In this statement, the “Barbarian blood of valor and vigor”
refers to the nomadic people and culture during the Sixteen Kingdoms and Northern
Dynasties. In his research on this period, besides Hanhua, he also uses another term
“Huhua (

barbarianization)” to describe how the Han people in Northern China were

affected by nomadic culture. Young-tsu Wong also put the Huhua together with Hanhua
and Yanghua (

foreignization) in his article discussing the multi-ethnic China. Later

in Mainland China, the main theory about the Chinese Nationality is the “Plurality and
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Unity (duoyuan yiti

)” theory by Fei Xiaotong

nationalities (minzu

, who argues that plural

) form the unity of Chinese Nationality both in historical and

modern China. Yao Congwu

also discusses the Chinese Nationality in the context

of Chinese history. In an article regarding the expansion and continuity of Chinese
history published in 1957, he mainly emphasizes the significance of Confucianism.85 Yao
went to Taiwan in 1949 where he continued his teaching and research. One of his
students is Jing-shen Tao

, who has done the research on the Sinicization of the

Jurchen people in Jin Dynasty. In all these and earlier researches, the stable base of this
theoretical framework of the Chinese Nationality includes that all the peoples inside
China belong to Chinese Nationality; the hybrid Chinese Nationality is also a changing
historical entity defined by different peoples from different dynasties. So the category of
“Chinese Nationality” can unite (or eliminate differences between) all the historical and
present peoples inside the Republic of China and People’s Republic of China to form an
egalitarian identity as a member of “Chinese Nationality." The Hanhua theory, in Mao
Wen's, Song Wenbing's and Qian Mu’s contexts discussed above, has played a significant
role in the formation of Chinese Nationality during the historical development.
Subsequently, later scholars both in Mainland China and Taiwan continuously adopted
Hanhua, some scholars attempting to assign it a more accurate and new interpretation
based on different social theories.
When Yao Congwu described the expansion and continuity of Chinese history, he
interpreted it as a process of the peoples from the borderland accepting the Confucianism
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of the Central Plain.86 He also accentuated the Great Harmony (datong

) of

Confucianism in Chinese history. So Young-tsu Wong summarized the Hanhua in Yao’s
context as specifically referring to Confucianization (Ruhua

).87 Based on Yao’s

discussion about the Hanhua of the Khitan, Jurchen and Mongols in the Liao, Jin and
Yuan Dynasties, however, the meaning of Hanhua was more than just Confucianization.88
Ping-ti Ho’s interpretation of “Sinicization” also was considered as Confucianization by
some scholars89 because he argued that the essential dynamic of Sinicization ultimately
was derived from the “man-centered Sinitic religion with ancestor worship as its core,”
which was fundamentally different from the Western religions.90 Ho also emphasized
“the open-mindedness and large-heartedness of Chinese” as another reason for the
success of Sinicization in ancient China.91 These two characteristics, however, should not
be considered merely as Confucian ideology, and Ho himself actually differentiated
between Confucianization and Sinicization in his writing.92
After 1949, scholars from Mainland China tried to put Hanhua in the context of
Marxism. They interpreted Hanhua with the Marxist theory about the stages of history.
Concerning about barbarian invasion and conquest in history, Frederick Engels stated that,
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Every conquest by a more barbarian people disturbs of course the
economic development and destroys numerous productive forces. But
in the immense majority of cases where the conquest is permanent, the
more barbarian conqueror has to adapt himself to the higher “economic
situation” as it emerges from the conquest; he is assimilated by the
vanquished, and, in most cases, he even has to adopt their language.93

In standard Chinese Marxist historiography, China had entered into the stage of
feudalism from the Western Zhou period (ca. 1046-771 BCE) and stayed in that stage
until the First Opium War (1840).94 The population of the Central Plain is usually in a
“higher economic situation” than the people from the borderland, who usually are
considered as fixed in the stage of slave society or even “primitive communism.” In this
context, some scholars from Mainland China interpret Hanhua as “Feudalization” of the
people from the borderland who either had gone to the Central Plain or interacted with
people from the Central Plain.95
There were also scholars trying to define Sinicization from the social scientific
aspect, such as Jing-shen Tao, who, as mentioned above, was a student of Yao Congwu
before he enrolled in the Ph.D. program at Indiana University. In his book The Jurchen in
Twelfth-century China: A Study of Sinicization, he considered Sinicization equal to
assimilation. About assimilation, he states,
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The term assimilation is used in this study in the sense of F. C.
Anthony Wallace’s statement that ‘in assimilation, the subordinate
group attempts to abandon its existing inadequate culture by entering
into the society of the dominant group and accepting its culture, almost
in toto (retaining only token vestiges of their distinctive culture traits).’
The term so defined includes both acculturation and integration. The
concept of Sinicization is employed in this study in the same sense as
assimilation.96

According to Tao, Sinicization means assimilation, which implies that the dominant
group in a society assimilates the subordinate group. Tao’s use of Sinicization and
assimilation is one reason that some scholars criticized his book, since in the Jin Dynasty,
the Jurchen was the politically and militarily dominant group.97 Later, in the Chinese
edition of his book and in his response to a book review by John Dardess, Tao translated
and interpreted the “dominant group” as the culturally dominant group,98 which was not
the same as in the original context of referring to Anthony Wallace. With this
modification, his definition of Sinicization became similar to Song Wenbing’s discussion
of the Jurchen’s Sinicization—people with “higher” culture will be assimilated by the
people with “lower” culture.99 Tao’s definition also was adopted by Hsiao Ch’i-Ch’ing
in his discussion of the Sinicization of Yuan Mongols.100
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The three different types of interpretation of the Sinicization/Hanhua theory,
however, were not successful. In their works, Yao Congwu and Ping-ti Ho interpret
Sinicization/Hanhua as Confucianization, but Confucianization itself cannot cover the
content of Sinicization/Hanhua in their writing, as discussed above. The interpretation of
Feudalization also was questionable because the adoption of the stages of Chinese history
in Marxism was problematic, especially the concept of Feudalism.101 Jing-shen Tao’s
interpretation of Sinicization, using theories from social science, also incurred much
criticism in the Western academic world, especially in the United States.102
The main reason for the unsuccessful interpretation of Hanhua/Sinicization with
different theories, was that these scholars’ understanding and use of Hanhua/Sinicization
still fell in the basic framework of the history of Chinese Nationality, constructed since
the end of the Qing Dynasty. Since the historical narrative of Chinese Nationality still
was dominant in both places, this was common for scholars in Mainland China and
Taiwan like Tang Zhangru and Yao Congwu. As for Jing-shen Tao and Ping-ti Ho,
although they both had received their doctoral education in the United States, and Tao’s
book about the Jurchen’s Sinicization and Ping-ti Ho’s rebuttal first were written and
published in English, their usage of Sinicization still should be understood as Hanhua in
the context of the history of Chinese Nationalism. It is clear from this that Tao included
political centralization, political institution, intermarriage and changing of surname,
literature and art, and religion as the content of “Sinicization.” This is similar to the
writing of earlier scholars, such as Song Wenbing and Mao Wen. Even Tao occasionally
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uses a phrase like “the fusion of Chinese and Jurchen cultures” and “Sino-Jurchen
synthesis” without giving an explicit explanation; but actually he reinforces on the
theoretical frame of Chinese Nationality.103 That is also why Ho, in the beginning of his
rebuttal to Rawski’s speech, stated:
To reduce the potential for misunderstanding, I should state explicitly
that Chinese civilization certainly changes over time, in part because of
internal developments and in part because contacts with the very
peoples who become sinicized also expand the content of what it can
mean to be Chinese. While there are certain elements of Chinese
thinking and behavior that have an extremely long historical pedigree,
Chinese culture takes on distinctive characteristics in different
historical periods as the culture is itself transformed.104

In Ho’s explanation, Chinese civilization and Chinese culture changed over time through
internal development and contact with “Sinicized” people. Those people had expanded
the content of being Chinese. It is clear that Ho’s argument was the same as the basic
theoretical framework about Chinese Nationality. Therefore, in his argument, the Manchu
identification should not have excluded other forms of identity and been included in the
Chinese Nationality; in other words, one can be Manchu and Chinese at the same time.105
Apparently, in Ho’s context, Chinese represented not only Han Chinese but the entirety
of Chinese Nationality. Therefore, at the end of his rebuttal, he mentioned his preference
for the word "Huahua" instead of "Hanhua."
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The attempts to theorize a definition for Hanhua/Sinicization were not successful.
Hanhua/Sinicization should not be considered as “feudalization” or “assimilation," and it
is also more than “Confucianization." How then should the Hanhua theory in the context
of Chinese Nationality be understood and interpreted? At this point, we should return to
the Hanhua theory itself to seek the answer.

2.6 Culturalism behind Hanhua Theory106

Although the Hanhua theory seems to be applied differently by historians, who
also have made distinct interpretations of Hanhua, there are still some common
characteristics in their discussions of Hanhua. First of all, the content of Hanhua in the
context of Chinese Nationality is always broad and vague. In the earliest case, Chen Yuan
emphasized the significance of culture in the process of Huahua. Then when Mao Wen
and Song Wenbing argued about the Hanhua of the Khitan and Jurchen, Hanhua included
respecting Confucianism, hiring Han officials/literati, studying Confucian classics,
learning and speaking Chinese, creating language, building cities, marrying Han people,
using the Han political system, wearing Han-style clothes, applying Han law, practicing
ritual according to the Classics, learning Chinese literature and art, and so forth. In Jingshen Tao’s argument, he also included political centralization, political institutions,
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intermarriage and changing of surname, literature and art, and religion as the substance of
“Sinicization." Many topics were included in the Hanhua theory, and the boundary of
Hanhua’s content is unclear. All the different aspects of Hanhua, however, generally can
be summarized as learning and adopting so-called “Chinese culture.” Here the concept of
“Chinese culture” also was vague and had different characteristics depending on the
period.107
Why was Chinese culture, nevertheless, so significant in the process of Hanhua?
It was because these scholars held the notion that culture as the main standard to
differentiate Chinese from non-Chinese always existed in pre-modern China. For instance,
in his 1939 article, Feng Chengjun states that “when the ancient people in our country
judged if a person was Hua or Yi, it was decided basing on if this person practiced the
ritual and moral code;”108 in other words, anybody can become Chinese by learning and
practicing the Chinese “ritual and ethical code." In 1940, when Chen Yinke discussed the
Barbarization and Sinicization (Hanhua) in the Northern Dynasties, he said,
In sum, in the history of Northern Dynasties questions between Hu and
Han without exception are in fact questions between barbarization and
Sinicization, rather than the division between races of Hu ( ) and Han
( ). In other words, it is more related to culture than to race. Such is
what was called “provide education for all people without
discrimination (youjiao wulei
).”
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109

In this statement, Chen Yinke more specifically points out that in the Northern Dynasties,
culture was more important than race, and the Hu-Han dichotomy was based on culture.
Qian Mu and other scholars applied this point to all the dynasties in pre-modern China,110
and Joseph R. Levenson111 later called this way of interpreting Chineseness as
culturalism. Therefore, through contact with and learning Chinese culture, which was the
main subject matter of Hanhua, non-Chinese people could become Chinese.
The discussion about Hanhua in the context of Chinese Nationality also implies
the cultural superiority of Han. In Song Wenbing’s article about the Hanhua of the
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Jurchen people, he specifically pointes out that Han culture was relatively high culture,
and the Jurchen culture was relatively low culture, which was the main reason that they
were “Sinicized (Hanhua)."112 There were also other metaphors mentioned above
implying that Han cultural superiority; such as comparing Han culture to the ocean and a
furnace; and likening other cultures, such as the Khitan, Xianbei and Jurchen, to small
rivers merging into the ocean and iron melting in the furnace. So the non-Sinitic peoples
were Sinicized because Chinese culture was better than their own. They inevitably were
attracted to or involved in the process of Hanhua, even when the non-Sinitic peoples were
the ruling class.
Han cultural superiority was also an important part of the cultural interpretation of
Chineseness, such as the existence of “bestiality” in Chunqiu discourse argued by Yuri
Pines.113 One more important aspect of Hanhua discourse is that in most cases, it was not
important to the researchers if those “Sinicized” people considered themselves as
“Chinese." What was more important to them was that the people had contact with and
learned Chinese culture, which already fulfilled the requirement of Hanhua in the context
of Chinese Nationality. So Hanhua also can be considered as a Sino-centric interpretation
of Chinese history.
As an historical interpretation by modern scholars, the Hanhua theory contains a
cultural interpretation of Chinese history. As a significant part in the discourse on
Chinese Nationality, Hanhua theory, on one the hand, provides a method to construct the
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“historical myth” of the continuity of Chinese history in terms of culture regardless of
dynastic change. On the other hand, however, because of the role of Hanhua theory in
constructing the history of the Chinese Nationality problem, it can be argued that China
as the Chinese Nationality was not held together as a modern nation-state, but still mainly
is bonded by cultural identity brought from the culturalism rooted in traditional China
instead of racial or ethnical identity.

2.7 Discussion

The research on the different contexts and interpretations of Hanhua theory
provides an opportunity to engage in some criticism of Hanhua in the Western academic
world. As mentioned above, since the1920s, Hanhua theory in the context of Chinese
Nationality has flourished in China. Later it appeared in the West through the works of
Jing-shen Tao and Ping-ti Ho. The basic conclusion of Hanhua theory, that the Chinese
absorbed the non-Chinese regardless of their status as rulers or not, a belief that already
was held by the early European Sinologists, received both acceptance and criticism in
Western academic writing.114 The criticism about Hanhua or Sinicization usually targeted
the Chinese scholars discussed above,115 so Hanhua instead of Sinicization would be
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employed in this discussion by me. Among these criticisms, however, scholars have
different opinions, even understanding of the Hanhua theory.
In 1973, John W. Dardess wrote that Sinicization “involved not only the loss of
national or linguistic identity but also a most un-Confucian denial of the facts of ancestry.
In the Yuan period, it carried an additional burden of the loss of caste as well.” Therefore,
he used “Confucianization” to replace “Sinicization,” and Confucianization only means
"the adoption by outsiders, even Chinese outsiders, of a certain system of ethical and
political behavior."116
Later, Peter Bol noticed that the term Sinicization/Hanhua covered topics
including the political process and ethnic transformation, and obscured the distinctions
between them. So he tried to distinguish “the adoption of the institutions and value
structures of imperial government” from “the social transformation of the Jurchens as an
ethnic group originally distinct from the Hans.”117 Further, he restricted Sinicization to
refer to the adoption of Han customs (Hanren fengsu
He used “civilization (wen

, shangwen

, wenzhi

) by non-Han peoples.118
)” to indicate the shift in

cultural practices of the Jurchen people.119
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Both Dardess and Bol noticed the broad and vague content covered by Hanhua,
and therefore try to split it and give distinct terms for different parts of Hanhua’s
content.120 As discussed above, Hanhua in the context of Chinese Nationality covers
many topics, and thus it fails to distinguish between different aspects such as politics and
customs within the transition of the non-Chinese people. Therefore, as Dardess and Bol
suggest, Hanhua theory in the context of Chinese Nationality has problematic analytic
value, and should be applied with caution and clear restriction to its content.
In Evelyn Rawski and Pamela Crossley’s discussions of Hanhua, both define it as
people being assimilated by Chinese culture. Mark Elliot, however, describes it as people
being assimilated by the Chinese.121 Although “Chinese culture” is highlighted in both
Rawski’s and Crossley’s definitions of Hanhua, their understanding of Hanhua is
basically the same as Elliot’s, and even as Dardess and Bol’s. In Rawski’s and Crossley’s
papers, they try to track the implications and assumptions behind Hanhua theory. Rawski
consideres Hanhua “a twentieth-century Han nationalist interpretation of China's past.”122
Compared to Rawski, Crossley’s analysis is more detailed and provocative. She states:
The barest implications of "sinicization" were that Chinese culture was
somehow autochthonous, rigid and exclusive, and in contact with other
worlds either obliterated or was obliterated. Secondarily, it was implied
that through nothing much more subtle than the sheer charisma of
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Chinese culture, peoples were attracted to China and its society from
elsewhere and, no great obstacle withstanding, were consumed in the
flames of Hanhua.123

As discussed above, the Hanhua theory has been adopted in the construction of
the history of Chinese Nationality since the early 20th century. Therefore, Rawski’s
comment is reasonable although Ping-ti Ho tried to argue that the Hanhua theory
originated with the European Sinologists. Rawski’s criticism would be more sensible if
she had used “Chinese nationalist” instead of “Han nationalist.” This is because Hanhua
mainly is applied to construct the history of Chinese Nationality rather than Han ethnicity
to unite all the peoples inside China. These “Chinese nationalist” scholars usually argue
the hybridity of Han people, and even try to dispute the existence of Han ethnicity.124
Meanwhile, as argued above, the implication of Hanhua theory is more than
nationalism; in other words, nationalism alone will not be enough to interpret Hanhua in
the context of Chinese Nationality. With more detailed analysis, Crossley’s discussion of
Hanhua, however, introduces more controversy. Although, according to Crossley, “the
sheer charisma of Chinese culture” implied by Hanhua was more or less demonstrated by
the Han cultural superiority argued earlier, the Hanhua theory itself still will not lead
necessarily to an “autochthonous, rigid and exclusive” use of Chinese culture. On the
contrary, as mentioned above, Hanhua in the context of Chinese Nationality tried to be
inclusive and flexible, and to connect different peoples with different cultural
backgrounds inside Chinese territory. As Ping-ti Ho suggests, culturalism behind Hanhua
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theory would not “obliterate” the other patterns of culture and forms of identity inside the
Chinese Nationality.125
Crossley also suggests that some Chinese scholars, who use the terms like
tonghua

(assimilation), xianghua

(submission and civilization) and ronghe

(fusion), should not be considered Sinicizationists since they give more definitive
expression to cultural exchange in Chinese history.126 Chen Yinke and Xiang Da are
listed as the examples because of their discussion about “alien exploitation of Chinese
political instruments and Central and Inner Asian impact upon the cultural traditions of
the Northern Qi, Sui and Tang regimes."127 As a matter of fact, in many works about
Chinese Nationality by Chinese scholars discussed above, terms like tonghua and
xianghua are interchangeable with Hanhua; ronghe, however, is a different term to
express the process of Hanhua.
Chen Yinke also used the term Hanhua in his works as mentioned above, and his
Hanhua theory should likewise be understood in the context of Chinese Nationality. He
paid special attention to the influence of “barbarian” culture in the Tang empire,
especially inside the ruling group. For instance, he put forth the famous theory of
“Guanlong group (Guanlong jituan
(Guanzhong benwei zhengce

)” and “Guanzhong-based policy
)." According to this theory, the Xianbei

generals from the Six Frontier Towns of Northern Wei played the major role in the
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Western Wei, Northern Zhou, Sui, and Tang dynasties.128 When Chen argued about the
success of the Tang empire, he stated that “With the barbarian blood of valor and vigor
injected into the decadent body of Central Plains' culture, moribund conventions were
removed and a new vitality was reborn. By developing and carrying forward [the new
vitality], then [the Tang] was able to distinctively create an unprecedented prosperity.”129
In this statement, the “Barbarian blood of valor and vigor” refers to the Inner Asian
peoples and cultures during the Sixteen Kingdoms and Northern Dynasties. In his
research, besides the Hanhua, Chen also made another argument for “barbarization
(Huhua

),” describing how the Han people in Northern China were affected by

nomadic culture.130 Chen Yinke’s argument about the Hanhua and Huhua, however,
should be understood in the context of the history of Chinese Nationality. The culturalism
brought up in Chen’s argument is the key to understanding both Hanhua and Huhua.
Although Hanhua theory plays an important role in maintaining the concept of
Chinese Nationality, it has limited and problematic analytic value. By applying the
Sinicization or Hanhua theory to every dynasty, the historical interpretation becomes a
deterministic narrative. As a reaction to the flourishing of Hanhua theory in China and its
adoption by some Western scholars, with misinterpretations and criticism about Hanhua,
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the ethnicity of the non-Chinese peoples in Chinese history is emphasized more and more
in the works of Western scholars as represented by the New Qing historians. This
research, however, does not explain why and how the non-Chinese peoples adopted
Chinese culture after entering the Central Plain.
Hanhua theory often makes scholars focus on the result of the transition of the
non-Chinese people and neglect the process of the transition. Therefore, in the following
chapters, I present two case studies to explore the process of the transition of nonChinese people. I will offer answers to a series of questions: How should we interpret the
transition of the Inner Asian peoples who entered the Central Plain—as the ruling group
or as commoners? How and why did they choose to adopt or refuse some customs and
institutions from Chinese tradition? What did they bring into the Chinese entity? These
two cases are about the transition of the succession system and local organization of the
non-Chinese peoples from the Sixteen Kingdoms and Northern Dynasties, which is a
classic example for the Hanhua interpretation.

CHAPTER 3 Why a Crown Prince?
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In the Sixteen Kingdoms period and Northern Dynasties, for the first time in
Chinese history since the Zhou Dynasty, the Central Plain was occupied and ruled by
peoples from Inner Asia. Many scholars consider this period as a classic model for
Hanhua theory. One main reason is that the rulers from Inner Asia all claimed they had
succeeded legitimately from the Jin or Han Dynasty based on the Five Phases theory.131
This claim also was followed with other measures, such as adopting Chinese political
institutions into their own polities, one of the main arguments in Hanhua theory, to
support the statement of legitimacy. As a significant part of the political system, the
institution for succession not only regulated the transition of supreme power, but also
demonstrated the power distribution in the court. This succession system, more
specifically, the crown prince system, in the central governments is discussed in this
chapter.
In comparison to the succession system of the Inner Asian polities, the crown
prince system was a distinctive type of succession, which commonly was applied during
the Han and Jin Dynasties. Later, after the Inner Asian peoples had built regimes in
northern China, the crown prince system also was adopted by them. In this chapter, the
assessment of the two different succession traditions in Inner Asian and China raise
several questions. A discussion of the adoption of the crown prince system in the Sixteen
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Kingdoms and Northern Dynasties will help to answer these questions. The succession
system of the nomadic groups in Western Eurasia also will be compared with adoption of
crown prince system by the Inner Asian peoples in northern China.

3.1 Two Succession Traditions
Unlike the founder of a dynasty both in China and Inner Asia, who usually would
have had charismatic qualifications for leadership, the descendants of the founders
needed to have a different way to legitimize their own enthronement. A succession
system is applied to serve this purpose. The succession traditions in the Inner Asian
polities, such as the Xiongnu, and in the Central Plain, the Han Dynasties, will be
described to show the differences between them. Then discussion will focus on the
succession system during the Sixteen Kingdoms period and Northern Dynasties.

3.1.1 Succession Traditions in Inner Asia
In the Inner Asian tradition, the succession system functioned on two different
social levels, the tribal level and supratribal level. Although the latter is the main subject
of this chapter, the tribal policy can be considered as a microcosm of a supratribal polity;
in addition to the succession system, its institutions, practices and even myth of origin
and so forth are all integrated into the supratribal polity. In the tribal level, the chief
usually is elected. Sometimes this happens peacefully. At other times, however, this is
based on the principle of tanistry, which emphasizes murder and warfare during the
60!
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succession. This type of succession plays a significant role in Turkish, Mongolian, and
Manchu politics.132 After a chief’s death, , the chieftaincy does not automatically pass
down according to any principle of seniority, but rather through election to the most
competent member from the chiefly house. This power transition can be either patrilineal
or lateral. In patrilineal succession, the chieftaincy would go to the son from the father. In
a lateral succession, on the other hand, the chieftaincy passes to the deceased chief’s
eldest brother, and eventually to the next generation after passing on to the youngest
brother of the deceased . Therefore, these two contradictory ways of succession can
justify any result from the election.133
Although the electoral principles also applied to the supratribal level, the
succession process of the supratribal polity is less straightforward than on the tribal level.
First, there is a distinction between the founder and his descendants and their paths to
power.134 The founder convinces his competitors through mythical or real competition
with them of his suitability. The mythical aspect usually is not part of the process of the
power transition of his descendants. The successors also are elected,135 sometimes
peacefully and sometimes based on tanistric principles. In addition to the election,
however, first all the candidates and other elite members consider whether the supratribal
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political structure should be continued. So at the ruler’s death, the supratribal polity
might disintegrate, as occurred in the Southern and Northern Xiongnu, and Western and
Eastern Türkic Empires. Then one of the candidates could increase his authority by
reuniting the tribe with violence or whatever means necessary.136 Between the death of
the old ruler and enthronement of the new one, one or more regents usually are appointed
to enforce the integration of the state, which is fragmented because of the succession
struggle. In Mongol tradition, the regent could be the ruler’s principal wife, the youngest
son of the principal wife or senior male in the ruling lineage.137
Similar to the tribal level, the supratribal succession can be either patrilineal or
lateral but usually within the founder’s lineage.138 Taking the Xiongnu Empire as an
example, in the early period, it was mainly patrilineal succession. The lateral system,
however, played a major role later; in the second half of the Xiongnu Empire, there was a
hybrid system of patrilineal and lateral.139
During the process of succession, the position of leadership is contested, and
usually the most competent candidate would be the winner of the contest, The winner
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Joseph Fletcher, 1986, 24.
Ibid.
138
Some scholars err in thinking that the Inner Asian succession institution implied lateral succession as
contradictory with the primogeniture in the Han Dynasty, and even consider the records about the
patrilineal succession in the Xiongnu Empire unreliable. See Chen Linguo
, Zhonggu beifang minzu
shi tan
, Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2010, 6; Li Ping
, Beiwei Pingcheng shiqi
, Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2000, 6.
137

139

Joseph Fletcher, “Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire,” in Eucharisterion:
Essays Presented to Omeljan Pritsak (Harvard Ukrainian Studies 3/4), ed. I. Ševčenko and F. E. Sysyn.
Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian Research Institute Harvard University, 1979–1980, 240; Wu Mu
,
Xiongnu chanyu jicheng zhidu tubian de tantao
, Neimenggu daxue xuebao,
2004, no.1, vol.36, 11–16; Li Mingren
, Zhongguo gudai junzhu jichengzhi zhi yanjiu
, Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 2013, 17–34.
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would be recognized and supported in the meeting for the election. Meanwhile, besides
the capability of the candidates, there are several elements that can impact on the result of
the election; for instance, the endorsement or designation of the former ruler is important.
The influence of the former ruler is not only from his own prestige, but also from
political measures he may have applied to secure his preferred successor.
In the Xiongnu Empire, the eldest son of the Chanyu

usually had 10,000

cavalrymen and controlled the eastern part of the empire.140 Then he usually became the
successor of the Chanyu because of his significant role in the political structure. On
occasion, however, the Chanyu himself could be threatened by his preferred and powerful
candidate. In the early period of the Xiongnu Empire, the transition of the supreme power
was comparatively peaceful by following the former Chanyu’s choice. It is partly because
the Xiongnu ruler “obtained his booty peacefully from the Chinese government” brought
by the Heqin

policy of the Han Dynasty, “so a peaceful system of succession served
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In the Biography of Xiongnu in Shiji and Hanshu, the term “taizi
” appears several times. But it
usually refers to the eldest son of the Chanyu, and is often associated with the diplomatic practice of
sending Chanyu’s eldest son as hostage to the neighboring states when Xiongnu was not powerful enough.
One of the examples is Modu (
). He was kept as a hostage by the Yuezhi (
) as Chanyu’s eldest
son (taizi). This identity, however, could not secure his role as a successor to the Chanyu, so he chose to
kill his father so as to be able to replace him. Later, in a conversation between the Han envoy Yang Xin
and the Chanyu, Yang asked for Chanyu’s “eldest son (taizi)” as hostage if the Xiongnu wanted to make
peace with the Han by marriage. Chanyu disagree, and said “Now you want to go back to the ancient
tradition to make my eldest son as hostage, it is not far away from failure. (
.)” It shows that sending the eldest son as hostage is the “ancient” diplomatic method of the
Xiongnu. Through the diplomatic activity of the Xiongnu, the Xiongnu court might have gotten to know
about the crown prince system among the Han. Shiji
, juan 110, 2913; Hanshu
, juan 94, 3773;
Tomas Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China 221 BC to AD 1757, Cambridge, MA,
Oxford, UK : Basil Blackwell, c1989.p.42.
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the Xiongnu best.”141 It is also because the successor’s role as the Left Wise King
increased his own prestige and secured an advantageous position in the contest.
The Inner Asian succession tradition usually requires an election to legitimize a
new the ruler. Therefore, an Inner Asian ruler’s leadership requires approval from a
relatively small group of electors, and this usually is based on the electors’ own interest.
It is reasonable to argue that the decisive factor during the power transition is consensus
rather than violence. The installation of a great khan by military proclamation seldom
occurred.142 In the peaceful or tanistric process of succession involving almost all
members of ruling class,143 the successor needed to prove himself the best- candidate.
The qualifications of the candidate can be enhanced by the designation of the former ruler
and also the designee’s prominence in the government.

3.1.2 Succession Traditions in Han Dynasty
In the Han Dynasty, one of the emperor’s sons traditionally ascend to the throne
at the death of the emperor. During his lifetime, the emperor usually appointed one of
them as the heir apparent, entitled “crown prince” (Taizi

or Huangtaizi

).

The crown prince often was the eldest son of the empress. There was a strict distinction
between the emperor’s principal wife, who was his empress, and his other concubines.144
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Joseph Fletcher, 1979–1980, 240. The Heqin policy refers to the Han government marrying princesses
to the Chanyu to build marriage alliance with the Xiongnu.
142
ibid.
143
Joseph Fletcher pointed out that the succession struggle in nomadic politics tends to involve everybody,
which can politicize the society and personalize the monarchy, and it “reinforced the continuance of
ecologically unnecessary supratribal polities.” Joseph Fletcher, 1979–1980, 240; Joseph Fletcher, 1986, 24.
144
T’ung–tsu Ch’ü, Han Social Structure, Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 1972, 13.
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This succession principle can be traced to the Zhou Dynasty145 and was followed by later
major dynasties. Among the twenty crown princes of the Han Dynasty, twelve of them
were the eldest sons of empresses; although four were adopted by empresses as they had
borne no sons.146
When the empress had neither a son nor adopted son, the crown prince was
chosen from the sons of the emperor’s concubines. Five among the twenty crown princes
were the sons of concubines in the Han Dynasty.147 On that occasion, according to
Gongyang zhuan

, “Sons of concubines are ranked by nobility and not seniority;”

and “the son is noble because the mother is noble; the mother is noble because the son is
noble.”148 In practice, however, the crown prince could be the eldest one, such as Liu
Rong

, the first crown prince of Emperor Jingdi

. Meanwhile, “nobility” (gui

) was associated with the personal attachment of the emperor to his concubines and
their sons; this was true of the first crown prince of Emperor Zhangdi

, who was

appointed because of his mother. If the emperor had no son, the heir apparent would be
chosen from the imperial lineage.149 Since the crown prince was appointed mostly by the
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For example, in Gongyang zhuan
, when talking about picking the heir apparent for the kings, it
is said “while sons of the legal wife are ranked by seniority and not worthiness, sons of concubines are
ranked by nobility and not seniority. (
)” In the Zhou
Dynasty, the eldest son of the king from the principal wife was called “zongzi
.” The translation is
from Harry Miller, The Gongyang Commentary on The Spring and Autumn Annals: A full translation, New
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, 8. For more detail of the succession system in the Zhou Dynasty, see
T’ung-tsu Ch’ü
, Zhongguo fengjian shehui
, Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe,
2005, 92.
146
Su Xin
, Handai huangtaizi zhidu kaoshu
. Master’s thesis, Jilin University,
2007, 6–11.
147
Ibid.
148
Harry Miller, 2015, 8.
149
There were three crown princes who were not the sons of the former emperors, but other members of the
imperial lineage. Su Xin, 2007, 6–11; T’ung-tsu Ch’ü, 2005, 98-99.
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birthright, as soon as he was appointed, the position could not be changed even by the
emperor. When Emperor Gaozu, Liu Bang

, and Emperor Yuandi both wanted to

remove their crown prince and appoint a new one, the officials strongly objected, and
eventually both emperors gave up the idea.150
A crown prince in the Han Dynasty received special treatment in many ways.
First of all, a ceremony was performed to demonstrate the new status of the heir apparent
to the nobles, officials, commoners, and also his imperial ancestors. The proceedings
accompanying the celebration included granting amnesty and bestowing wealth or rank
on nobility.151 After the ceremony, the crown prince received all the trappings appropriate
for the heir apparent—a palace, royal clothing, a special carriage, and the rituals he was
allowed to conduct. Also changed was the now formal greeting offered to him by his
brothers and other nobles.152 Besides participating in special rituals, the crown prince’s
main responsibility was to be educated and trained by the mentors (fu
the emperor.153 As Jia Yi

) appointed by

from the Western Han argued,

The fate of all under heaven depends on the crown prince. The virtue of
the crown prince lies in early education and picking the right
attendants …… So I say picking the right attendants and early
education are most urgent. If the education was applied and the
attendants were righteous, the crown prince will be righteous. If the
crown prince is righteous, all under heaven will be settled firmly.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
150

T’ung-tsu Ch’ü, 2005, 92.
Su Xin, 2007, 30–59.
152
Ibid.
153
There was a Grand Mentor (taifu
Han Dynasty. Su Xin, 2007, 30-59.
151

) and Junior Mentor (shaofu
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) for the crown prince in the

……
154

According to Jia Yi, the purpose of education for the crown prince was moral cultivation.
Through this education, the crown prince was expected to become a “virtuous (shan
and “righteous (zheng

)”

)” person, which is significant for “all under heaven (tianxia

)”. For this purpose, he was schooled in the Confucian classics, such as Shangshu
Chunqiu

, Analects and so forth.155 The crown prince also received instruction in

legal matters to make him aware the “method (shu

)” of being an emperor besides

being virtuous.156
According to Zuozhuan

, the crown prince had another responsibility of

being the temporary “inspector of the state (jianguo
(fujun

)” or “soother of the troops

) if the emperor went to war.157 During the Han Dynasty, however, there was

no case of the crown prince having to assume this role, as the Han emperors had little
opportunity to personally go to war. The exception was the founder of the Western Han,
Emperor Gaozu

. There were only four crown princes in the Han Dynasty who

were replaced as heir apparent by their brothers.
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Hanshu, juan 48, 2251.
Su Xin, 2007, 30–59.
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Ibid.
157
In Zuozhuan
, the second year of Mingong
, it is recorded that “When the ruler goes for a war,
he (crown prince) guards the state; and if another be appointed to guard it, he attends upon his father. When
he attends upon him, he is called ‘Soother of the troops;’ when he stays behind on guard, he is called
‘Inspector of the State’ (
).” The translation is based on The
Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen translated by James Legge, 1872, with my own revising.
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The focus of the succession institution during the Han Dynasty was the crown
prince, who was usually the eldest son of the empress and was appointed during the
emperor’s lifetime. The qualification of the crown prince as the legitimate successor was
largely decided by his birth instead of his ability. The personal attachment of the emperor
sometimes played an important role when he could select his successor from the
concubines’ sons. The crown prince system, however, largely restricted the emperor’s
power on choosing his successor. By following the system, the emperor’s appointment
actually was not decisive since the crown prince usually qualified by his birth. The major
responsibility of being the crown prince during the Han Dynasty was being educated and
trained to be a “virtuous” future emperor, although he had little chances to practice his
skill of ruling and administrating by serving the government as “inspector of the state” or
anything else. The restriction of the crown prince’s role inside the government, which
prevented the potential conflict between him and the emperor, and also obviated any
mistakes made by the heir apparent, was actually a way of protection.

3.1.3 Questions Proposed
The above discussion shows the major differences, mainly in the qualification of
the successor and his role in the government, between the Inner Asian and the Han
Dynasty succession traditions. When the Inner Asian rulers built up their own states
during the Sixteen Kingdoms Period and Northern Dynasties, they also confronted these
differences. It is important to understand how these two conflicting customs were
integrated during the later periods.
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3.2 Crown Princes during the Sixteen Kingdoms Period

The name of the Sixteen Kingdoms period derives from the book Spring and
Autumn Annals of the Sixteen Kingdoms (Shiliuguo Chunqiu

) by Cui Hong

(478-525); the author included sixteen polities in his book, and its title was adopted
as the name of this period. According to Cui Hong, after the collapse of the Western Jin,
there was no ruler in the Central Plain (Zhongyuan

), i.e., the lower area of the

Yellow River,158 and a number of polities were formed during this time. The territory
covered by the polities included in Cui Hong’s book, however, was much larger than the
so-called Central Plain. The territory included Gansu, Inner Mongolia and part of Sichuan
area, such as Western Liang, Northern Liang, Southern Liang, Xia and Cheng Shu
regimes. During this period, however, there were definitely more than the sixteen polities
listed in Cui Hong’s book. The main reason he selected these sixteen polities is, as he
said,
Since the Yongning
Reign period of Jin, although wars were
started everywhere, and many royalty were set up by themselves, but
those who able to build states to become warring states, were only
sixteen.
159
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Hanyu dacidian
, vol. 1, p. 600.
Weishu
, juan 67, 1503. Here “jianbang

” and “mingshi
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” share the same meaning.

Apparently, “building their own states” was the main rationale for including
polities for his book.160 In these “warring states” described by Cui Hong,161 building a
new state includes activities such as using the title of “emperor (huangdi

),” starting

a new reign title, reestablishing the calendar, and setting up a whole imperial family by
bestowing new titles on family members— the emperor’s mother became dowager
empress, his principal wife, the empress, all his sons and daughters, princes and
princesses. Meanwhile, during this time, the heir apparent, who usually was the eldest
son of the empress, was also appointed.
Seven polities of the Sixteen Kingdoms period located in the Central Plain—
Former Zhao, Later Zhao, Ran Wei (

), Former Yan, Former Qin, Later Yan and

Later Qin—are analyzed below. In these Central Plain kingdoms during this period, there
were 27 heirs apparent appointed.

Table 3.1 List of the 27 Heir Apparents in Seven Kingdoms during the Sixteen Kingdoms
Period162

Name
of the
Kingdo

Name of
the Heirs

If the father
was the

If the mother
was the

Seniority
among his
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It has been pointed out, however, that “building their own states” was not the only or decisive standard.
Another significant factor for Cui Hong to pick these polities is the historical records written mostly during
the time these polities still existed, and Cui Hong finished the Spring and Autumn of the Sixteen Kingdoms
by following those records to a large extent. Hu Hong
, “Shiliuguo de Huaxiahua: shishi yu shixiang
zhijian
:
,” Zhongguoshi yanjiu
, 2015, no.1, 135–162.
161
By calling these polities “warring states,” he compared them to the states during the Warring States
period, and also considered his writing the history of the sixteen kingdoms for the Northern Wei is the same
as Sima Tan
and Sima Qian
writing the Warring State Period history for Western Han court.
162
All the information in this table is from Jinshu, Shiliuguo Chunqiu and Zizhi tongjian.
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ms

Apparent

emperor

empress

brothers

Former
Zhao

Liu He

Yes, Liu
Yuan

Yes, Empress
163
Huyan

Empress
Huyan’s
eldest son.

Liu Yi

No, Liu Yi’s
father was Liu
Yuan, and he
was appointed
by Liu Cong
, fourth
son of Liu
Yuan.

No, Liu Yi’s
mother was
Empress Dan
of Liu
Yuan. She was
Empress
Dowager
during Liu
Cong’s reign.

Eldest son
of Empress
Dowager
Dan.

Liu Can

Yes, Liu
Cong

Yes, but Liu
Cong had four
empresses.164

Uncertain,
but not the
eldest son
of Liu
Cong’s
empress(es
).

Liu
Yuangon
g

Yes, Liu Can.

Yes, Empress
Jin .

Uncertain,
but
probably
not the
eldest son
of Empress
Jin.

Liu Xi

Yes, Liu Yao
.

Yes, Empress
Yang .

Eldest son
of Empress
Yang.

Shi Hong

Yes, Shi Le
.

No, Shi
Hong’s mother

Second
eldest son

Later
Zhao
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Empress Huyan probably passed away in the first year after Liu Yuan’s enthronement. Later, Liu
Yuan’s empress was from the Dan
family.
164
In a conversation between Liu Can and Guo Yi
, Guo Yi called Liu Can “Gaozu Emperor’s shisun
(grandson of Gaozu Emperor by his son’s empress), emperor’s ditong
(son of the emperor by
his empress). (
,
)” Jinshu, juan 102, 2669.
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is from Cheng
family.

of Shi
Le.165

Shi Sui

Yes, Shi Hu
.

Yes, Empress
Zheng Yingtao
.

Eldest son
of Shi Hu
and Zheng.

Shi Xuan

Yes, Shi Hu.

Yes, Empress
Du Zhu
.166

Uncertain,
son of
Empress
Du.

Shi Shi

Yes, Shi Hu.

Yes, Empress
Liu .167

Eldest son
of Empress
Liu.

Shi Yan

No, Shi Yan’s
father was Shi
Bin
,
brother of the
emperor, Shi
Zun
.

No.

Nephew of
the
emperor.

Ran
Wei

Ran Zhi

Yes, Ran Min
.168

Uncertain. Ran Uncertain,
Min’s empress son of Ran
was from Dong Min.
family.

Former
Yan

Murong
Jun

Yes, Murong
Huang
.

Uncertain,
probably son
of empress
Duan .

Second son
of Murong
Huang.

Murong
Ye

Yes, Murong
Jun.

Yes, son of
Empress
Kezuhun
.

Eldest son
of Empress
Kezuhun.
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Shi Hong was appointed because the eldest son of Shi Le, Shi Xing
was dead. Jinshu, juan 105,
2739.
166
Shi Hu changed his empress after the changing of crown prince.
167
Empress Liu was the daughter of Liu Yao
. So one reason that Shi Shi was picked as heir apparent
is the nobility of his mother. Jinshu, juan 107, 2785.
168
Ran Min was the adopted grandson of Shi Hu, and was given the family name Shi . He changed back
to his original name Ran after his enthronement. Jinshu, juan 107, 2793.
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Former
Qin

Murong
Wei

Yes, Murong
Jun.

Yes, son of
Empress
Kezuhun.

Third son
of Murong
Jun.

Fu Chang

Yes, Fu Jian
.

Yes, son of
Empress Qiang
.

Possible
eldest son
of Empress
Qiang.

Fu Sheng

Yes, Fu Jian
.

Yes, son of
Empress
Qiang.169

Third son
of Fu
Jian.170

Fu Hong

Yes, Fu Jian
.

Uncertain,
possible son of
Empress Gou
.

Possible
eldest son
of Empress
Gou.

Fu Ning

Yes, Fu Pi
.

Uncertain,
possible son of
Empress Yang
.

Possible
eldest son
of Empress
Yang.

Fu Yi

No, Fu Yi’s
father was Fu
Pi, but he was
appointed as
crown
younger
brother by Fu
Deng
.

No.

Not son of
Fu Deng,
the
emperor.

Fu Chong

Yes, Fu
Deng.171

Uncertain.

Uncertain.

Fu Xuan

Yes, Fu
Chong.172

Uncertain

Uncertain.
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Empress Qiang was respected as Dowager Empress Qiang after Fu Sheng’s enthronement. Jinshu, juan
112, 2872.
170
Fu Chang was killed during a battle with Huan Wen
, so Fu Sheng was appointed. Jinshu, juan 112,
2872.
171
Fu Yi passed away in 388 CE according to Zizhi tongjian. Zizhi tongjian, juan 107, 3384.
172
Zhizhi tongjian, juan 108, 3418.

73!
!

Later
Qin

Later
Yan

Yao Xing

Yes, Yao
Chang

.

No, Yao
Xing’s mother
wasn’t
empress.173

Eldest son
of Yao
Chang.

Yao Hong Yes, Yao
Xing
.

Yes, son of
Empress Qi

Murong
Bao

Yes, Murong
Chui
.

Yes, son of the
former
Empress Duan
(not the Later
Empress
Duan).174

Fourth son
of Murong
Chui.

Murong
Ce

Yes, Murong
Bao
.

Yes, son of
Empress Duan.

Eldest son
of the
empress.

Murong
Ding

Yes, Murong
Sheng
.

Uncertain.

Probably
the only
son of
Murong
Sheng.

Gao
Pengchen
g

Yes, Gao Yun

Uncertain.

Probably
the only
son of Gao
Yuan.

176

175

Eldest son
. of Yao
Xing.
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Yao Chang’s Empress was from the She
family. Jinshu, juan 116, 2967.
Murong Bao was the son of former Empress Duan, who used to be Murong Cui’s principal wife, but she
was killed before Murong Chui’s enthronement. She was bestowed the title of Empress Chengzhao
after Murong Chui’s enthronement, while the later Empress Duan was also appointed. Zizhi tongjian, juan
107, 3383.
175
Gao Pengcheng was recorded in Zizhi tongjian, but it was recorded as Gao Peng in Jinshu. Jinshu, juan
124, 3108; Zizhi tongjian, juan 114, 3605.
176
Gao Yuan was from Goguryeo, so Gao
was his original family name. He was bestowed with the
family name Murong by Murong Bao. Gao Yuan was also the adopted son of Murong Bao. Jinshu, juan
124, 3108.
174
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The appointment of crown princes during the Sixteen Kingdoms period followed
the crown prince system of the Han tradition to a large extent. In the seven kingdoms,
among the 27 heir apparents who were appointed during the emperors’ lifetime, 24 were
the sons of the emperors and appointed by their fathers. Some of them already were
considered heirs apparent (

, heir apparent) before their fathers’ enthronement

because their fathers were kings or dukes and had needed a legitimate successor, such as
Shi Hong (son of Shi Le) and Murong Jun (son of Murong Huang). Of the three heirs
apparent who were not the sons of the emperors, Liu Yi
the a younger brother (huangtaidi
Shi Yan

, the son of Shi Bin

brother of Shi Bing, Fu Yi

) chosen by Liu Cong

, was

, brother of Liu Yi.

, was appointed as crown prince by Shi Zun,

, the son of Fu Pi

brother by Fu Yi’s brother Fu Deng

, son of Liu Yuan

, was appointed as crown younger

.

All three cases, however, can be understood in terms of Han succession tradition.
Liu Yi was appointed as the crown younger brother by Liu Cong mainly because Liu Yi
was the eldest son of Liu Yuan’s principal wife, Empress Dan, which made him the
legitimate successor after Liu He.177 Fu Yi was appointed as the crown younger brother
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In an article by Chen Yong
, he argues that the reason that Liu Yi was appointed as Liu Cong’s
successor is because Liu Cong tried to unite the Di
people to gain their military support. This argument,
however, is not well based for several reasons. First of all, Chen’s argument heavily relies on his different
reading of a historical record. In the biography of Liu Yuan at Jinshu, there is a record about “Di chief
great Chanyu Zheng (Diqiu da chanyu zheng
).” Meanwhile, the same record appears in
Zizhi tongjian as “Di chief Dan Zheng (Diqiu dan zheng
),” and Chen considers Zizhi tongjian’s
record is the right one so the Di chief shared the same family name with Liu Yi’s mother Empress Dan and
may possibly be the father of Empress Dan, even though Zizhi tongjian was compiled much later than
Jinshu. There was also no other example of Di people obtaining the family name of Dan . Second, there
was no direct evidence showing the relationship between the Di and Qiang people and Liu Yi, and the
15,000 people killed during the cancellation of Liu Yi’s identity as heir apparent could be Liu Yi’s
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by Fu Deng since Fu Yi was the oldest of the surviving sons of Fu Pi, the former emperor.
Shi Zun

probably had no son, and that is why he promised Ran Min (

/Shi Min

) to be his heir apparent before his rebellion. Shi Zun, however, eventually appointed
his nephew, Shi Yan

, son of his brother Shi Bin

, as the crown prince. This was

probably because Ran Min (Shi Min) was the adopted grandson of Shi Hu, and Shi Zun
wanted to keep the imperial power within his family lineage.
Of the 24 crown princes who were appointed by their fathers as emperors, 14
were evidently the sons of contemporary empresses. Six were eldest sons; and of the
remaining eight, their birth position was uncertain due to lack of evidence. It is possible
that four of them were sons of the contemporary empresses. Apparently, only 2 of the 24
were not the sons of contemporary empresses: Shi Hong, son of Shi Le, and Yao Xing,
son of Yao Chang. They possibly were appointed because Empresses Liu and She

had

no son,178 and both Shi Hong and Yao Xing were the eldest sons among the surviving
sons of Shi Le and Yao Chang. It is also necessary to point out that there were 4 cases in
which the heir apparent was changed under the same emperor. Murong Ye
Fu Chang

and

died from illness and wounds. Liu Yi, Liu Cong’s younger brother, was

replaced by Liu Cong’s son Liu Can. Shi Hu changed his crown prince twice, as the first
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
guardians and troops, rather than the Di and Qiang people. In a conversation between Liu Yi and his
officials, it was mentioned that he could easily receive the support of 20,000 soldiers. Finally, the rebellion
of Di and Qiang people actually did not cause the collapse of the Former Zhao Kingdom. Later During Liu
Yao’s reign, he again conquered and united the Qiang people. Chen Yong, Hanzhao shi lungao: Xiongnu
Tuge jianguo de zhengzhizhi kaocha
:
, Beijing: Shangwu
yinshuguan, 2009, 163–188; Jinshu, juan 102, 2675.
178
Empress Liu might have no more sons to be choose, since Shi Xing
, the eldest son of Shi Le, could
be her son, and was considered as the heir apparent by Shi Le. But Shi Xing passed away later, which made
Shi Hong, the second eldest son of Shi Le, became the heir apparent.
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two were sentenced to death by him. By appointing a new crown prince, Shi Hu
appointed a new empress at the same time to follow the Han tradition.
In sum, almost all the rulers appointed their heir apparents, mostly known as
crown prince, along with their enthronement or later. All the heirs apparent were chosen
from the imperial family, and the eldest sons of the empresses usually were the primary
choice. When the empress had no son, the heir apparent was picked among the sons of
consorts. Here the sons of concubines were mainly ranked by seniority, such as Shi Hong
and Yao Xing. When the emperor had no son, the heir apparent was picked from the
imperial lineage, and nephews, adopted sons or grandsons were always excluded by the
emperors, such as Liu Yao, Shi Hu and Shi Min/Ran Min. In addition, some emperors
also appointed the mentors, guardians and preceptors to educate and assist their heirs
apparent by following the Western Jin institution.179 For instance, Liu Yi as the crown
younger brother had his own Grand Mentor (taifu
) and Grand Guardian (taibao
Grand Mentor (taifu

), the Grand Preceptor (taishi

).180 Shi Hu also appointed two officials as the

) and Junior Mentor (shaofu

) for Shi Shi, and specifically

asked them to educated him and make him change.181 All this shows that in the seven
kingdoms during the Sixteen Kingdoms period, the principles of the Han succession
system were followed by the rulers to a large extent.
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3.2.1 Heirs Apparent Who Did Not Succeed to the Throne
By following the Han tradition, the succession system in these seven kingdoms,
however, did not work very well. For the eleven of the 27 heirs apparent who succeeded
to the throne, four were soon deposed or killed by their competitors at the imperial courts,
and one was soon killed by an enemy from another kingdom.182 Therefore, only six of the
heirs apparent successfully succeeded to the throne and ruled for more than one year.
Both Fu Sheng and Murong Bao were deposed almost two years after their enthronement
by imperial family members, Fu Jian and Lan Han

. A third heir, Yao Hong,

surrendered to the Eastern Jin after a military defeat.183 Among the 27 heirs apparent,
however, the remaining sixteen were banished or died either before or shortly after
enthronement. Of these, six were deposed or killed by their enemies from other
kingdoms,184 thirteen were deposed by competitors from the imperial court, and three
died from disease or battle wounds from battle before their enthronement.185
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Fate of Heirs Apparent
Sucessfully succeeded and
ruled
Deposed or died before
enthronement
Succefully succeeded but
soon deposed

Based on the numbers mentioned above, and compared to the 38 rulers who
appeared in the seven kingdoms,186 during Sixteen Kingdoms period, succession in these
kingdoms was such that the majority of the heirs apparent were banished or passed away
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before their enthronement. Those who managed to ascend to the throne lost power soon
afterwards.. Therefore, the succession system in these seven kingdoms did not
successfully secure the transition of power. That there were various reasons for the failure
of the heir apparent certainly was a major factor. The constant war between different
kingdoms during this period created an insecure environment for the stable power
transition. In these circumstances, the heir apparent, as well as the emperor, often were
deposed or killed after the collapse of a kingdom. Liu Xi
, Fu Ning

, Fu Chong

, Fu Xuan

, Ran Zhi

, Fu Hong

and Yao Hong are examples. The

challenges to the heirs apparent from inside the ruling class in these kingdoms, however,
also had a negative effect on the heir apparent succession system.

3.2.2 Strong Competitors
Even though the Han succession system was applied by the seven kingdoms, the
heirs apparent still faced challenges from other imperial clan male members who
considered themselves legitimate or even more qualified successors. For instance, after
Shi Hu assisted his uncle Shi Le to the throne by military means, he was disappointed
that Shi Le bestowed the post of “Great Chanyu (
Shi Hong.
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)” on his own son, crown prince

During the Sixteen Kingdoms period, the “Great Chanyu” led all Yi
including the Xianbei

, Di

, and others.187 The core of the military

and Qiang

power, the five units of Xiongnu (Xiongnu wubu
Jiehu (Jiehu

peoples

) in the Former Zhao, and the

) in the Later Zhao, were omitted as they were led directly by the

emperors.188 In the Former Zhao and Later Zhao, the position of Great Chanyu usually
was taken by the crown prince, and Shi Hu
willingness to be the successor of Shi Le

’s disappointment actually implied his
. He complained to his son, and said,

The one who accomplished the achievement of Great Zhao is I. People
all actually expected me to be the Great Chanyu, but [Shi Le] granted to
that maidservant’s kid. I couldn’t sleep or eat whenever I thought about
this. After the emperor passing away, I will not leave any of his
descendants.
189

After Shi Hu successfully usurped the emperorship, he bestowed the post of Great
Chanyu on his crown prince, Shi Xuan, just as Shi Le had done.190 Ran Min is another
example of usurpation. He was disappointed after Shi Zun appointed his nephew Shi Yan
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as the heir apparent, even though Ran Min was the adopted son of Shi Hu, and he also
considered himself as the better candidate for heir apparent.191
Considering themselves as legitimate successors, these imperial clan members
were allowed to compete with the heir apparent appointed by the emperor because of
their political and military power. In the polities like the Former and Later Han, the royal
family members often were granted certain military authority, which served to
decentralize the military. Some of the nobles were sent to local cities to serve as military
governors.192 For example, after Liu Cong’s enthronement, he placed each of his
seventeen sons in command of a troop of 2000 soldiers.193 Some of Shi Le’s sons, such as
Shi Hong

and Shi Kan

, led armies in local cities.194 With this distribution of

military power, some imperial clan members showed their martial capability and
accumulated their military experience. For example, Liu Cong

and Liu Yao

led an army of 50,000 troups to plunder Luoyang.195 Shi Hu and Ran Min were also very
experienced generals. With their military achievements, the emperor bestowed a high
rank and official post on them,196 thus giving them a marked advantage in competition
with other possible heirs apparent.
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3.2.3 Powerful Assistant Ministers
Some court officials warned the emperor about dangerous situations among the
heirs apparent. For instance, Cheng Xia

and Xu Guang

advised Shi Le to

remove Shi Hu from power, or even kill him, to secure Shi Hong’s role as heir apparent.
The emperor, Shi Le, answered that,
The tianxia has not yet been pacified, and the disasters of war were not
over. Daya (Shi Hong’s style name) is still young, and should have
powerful assistants appointed [for him]. Zhongshan (Shi Hu, King of
Zhongshan) is a meritorious general in founding the kingdom, and is as
close to me as Lu to Wei.197 So I assign him with the tasks of Yi Yin
and Huo Guang. How can it become what you said? It must be because
you are worried that in future days of assisting the young lord, you
would not be able to monopolize the power of the emperor’s maternal
uncle. I will also appoint you as an assisting minister. Do not worry too
much.

198

Shi Le’s words show that he, however, did not consider the powerful royal clan member
Shi Hu as a danger to his chosen successor. He did, nonetheless, think that they would
make powerful assistants (qiangfu

) to support his successor in the future because of

the ongoing warfare., The emperor compared Shi Hu to Yi Yin

and Huo Guang
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, who were also assistant ministers during the Shang and Han adding Cheng Xia, as the
crown prince’s uncle (his mother’s brother), to the group. Meanwhile, in his last decree,
Shi Le reminded Shi Hu to “think over Duke Zhou and Huo Guang, and not become the
subject of critics in the future.”199
All three, Yi Yin, Due Zhou and Huo Guang, are famous for being faithful
assistant ministers, but also became controversial because of some of their actions. Yi
Yin and Huo Guang were known as bad examples for restricting or replacing the
emperor.200 In the Shang Dynasty, while assisting Tai Jia

, the Shang ruler, Yi Yin

punished him because of mistakes he made during his rule and because he ignored Yi
Yin’s advice. After confining Tai Jia to the Tong

Palace for three years to reflect on

his mistakes, Yi Yin let Tai Jia rule again.201 In the Western Zhou Dynasty, after King
Wu of Zhou’s death, Duke Zhou assisted King Wu’s son, King Cheng of Zhou. Some
materials show that Duke Zhou also made himself king while assisting King Cheng.202
Huo Guang was from the Western Han Dynasty. When he was serving as the main
assistant minister, he deposed Prince He
Afterwards, he installed Liu Bingyi
emperor, later Emperor Xuan

as emperor, and exiled him from the capital.
, who then was a commoner, as the new

.203 When Shi Le brought up the three ministers, he tried

to praise their faithfulness and loyalty to the imperial family in keeping the ruling house
in power.
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, Wenshi, vol.23, 1984.

Shi Le, however, also put his heir apparent, Shi Hong, in danger by claiming that
Shi Hu’s role was as significant as the three ministers. Although Shi Hu did not depose
Shi Hong after the death of Shi Le, he took control of the court. Eventually he deposed
and killed Shi Hong by claiming Hong was not competent enough to succeed to imperial
power.204 When Liu Yuan and Shi Hu made similar arrangements for assistant ministers
for their crown prince Liu He, so that he might also share this idea about powerful
assistants with Shi Le, it did not work out as they had assumed.205
A rare example of a powerful assistant minister serving a young and
inexperienced emperor is Murong Ke

, who was the younger brother of Murong

Jun. He supported Jun’s young son, Murong Wei, until his death. It is said that Murong
Ke “acted as Duke Zhou” (xing Zhougong shi

)” in the Jinshu.206 Due to its

rareness, a comparison was made to Duke Zhou and Yi Yin from the Confucian
perspective by Murong Sheng. He argued that Murong Ke was better than they had been,
because Duke Zhou and Yi Yin intervened too often in the emperor’s affairs and
influenced the emperor’s own decision. By stating this point, Murong Sheng warned his
own officials not to try to justify their deeds by using the example of Duke Zhou or Yi
Yin.207
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3.2.4 Election Criteria
At the same time, the inexperienced young heir apparent was also not favored by
the ruling group, whose opinions also played an important role during the succession
process. The enthronement of Shi Zun
his crown prince, Shi Shi
Chai

is a typical example.208 After Shi Hu’s death,

, succeeded with the help of Empress Liu

and Zhang

, who probably was the foster father of Empress Liu.209 Because Shi Shi was

too young, Empress Liu and Zhang Chai seized imperial power, and Zhang Chai’s role
was like “Huo Guang assisting the Han.”210 Other members in the ruling group, however,
were not pleased with the arrangement and refused to follow the orders of Liu and Zhang.
Then the ruling elite, including Shi Hu’s generals and sons, Yao Yizhong
was the father of Yao Chang
(Ran Min)

, Liu Ning

, and Duan Qin

, later Emperor of Later Qin, Fu Hong
, Shi Luan

, Shi Wu

, Shi Rong

, who
, Shi Min
, Wang Tie

, agreed to enthrone Shi Zun, Shi Hu’s older son, probably

through election. They persuaded Shi Zun by stating,
Your majesty is not just older but more virtuous. The former emperor
also was well disposed to your majesty. But because his bewilderment
and confusion in his last years, he was misled by Zhang Chai. Now the
confrontation with Shangbai is lasting, and the capital’s defense is
weak. If we denounce the guilt of Zhang Chai, and beat the drums for a
punitive expedition against him, who would not change sides, open the
gate and welcome your majesty?
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211

After Shi Zun and his supporters gained control of the capital, in the name of
Empress Liu, Shi Zun sent out the decree, in which he said,
The successor is very young, and he was appointed because of the
personal grace from the former emperor. The imperial undertaking is
the heaviest one, which cannot be taken upon (by the successor).
Therefore, I will make Shi Zun the successor.
212

From the above two statements it is clear that age was a significant factor in
deposing and enthroning rulers. Shi Zun was older and Shi Shi younger; their ages were
an advantage and disadvantage during the competition. Before Shi Hu appointed Shi Shi
as his crown prince, his official, Cao Mo

, already had told Shi Hu that “The

undertaking of tianxia is too heavy, so it is improper to appoint the young one (as heir
apparent).”213 Similar points can be also found in other cases of imperial power transition.
For instance, in Fu Deng’s

and Murong Xi

’s enthronement, the young

candidates also were excluded by the ruling group.
In the historical record, the preference for the older candidate sometimes was
justified by a similar case from that in one of the Confucian classics, Spring and
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Autumn.214 In the year 621 BCE after the death of Duke Xiang
successor Duke Ling
Zhao Dun
the Qin

of Jin

, his

was young, and the Jin, mainly the leading officials such as

, wanted to select older ruler especially because of their constant war with
and Di

.215 Ironically, even though this case was used to justify the

preference for older candidates during the Sixteen Kingdoms Period, Duke Ling still
succeeded on the insistence of his mother Mu Ying

.216 Although the older age was

emphasized in these cases, the criteria in the decisions was actually not seniority but the
competence and strength that came with seniority. Before Shi Zun was elected as the
successor, he was one of the three major assistant ministers appointed by Shi Hu. Later
he was excluded from imperial power by Zhang Chai and Empress Liu. Besides his high
rank, he also had military experience. Eventually he was appointed as Great General
(Dajiangjun

) to defend the west of Later Zhao Kingdom.217 The other successors,

probably chosen also through elections, such as Liu Yao

, Fu Deng and Murong Xi,

also held important posts and had military experiences.
Besides the age element emphasized above, these examples also illustrate the
direct confrontation with the former emperor’s will about the heir apparent. The former
emperor, Shi Hu, was accused of being bewildered and confused in his last years, and he
was misled by Zhang Chai. His appointment of Shi Shi as crown prince was criticized as
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a “personal favor” (si’en

). The personal favor suggests the appointment of an heir

apparent by Shi Hu based on his personal relationship with Zhang Chai rather than for the
good of the regime. This criticism implies the appointment of the heir apparent should
not be made based on the personal preference of the emperor but should be based on the
opinions of the whole ruling group. The ruling class not only included the emperor and
other powerful male elites, but also female members, such as the empress and dowager
empress were included.218 Their opinion on the successor was sometimes revealed
through election. This point can be used to object to any heir apparent appointed by the
emperor if the majority of the ruling class disagreed.

3.2.5 Securing Heirs Apparent
Because of all these disadvantages, the heirs apparent appointed by the emperors
often lost out to their competitors. The crown prince of Liu Yuan, Liu He, is a good
example to demonstrate the disadvantages of the heir apparent during the competition.
After his father Liu Yuan’s death and his enthronement, Liu He found himself in a
dangerous situation. He felt threatened by his three brothers, who controlled almost all
the troops of the kingdom, especially Liu Cong. He then tried to obtain military power by
attacking his brothers, and killed two of them. Liu Cong, however, eventually defeated
Liu He, and became the next emperor.219 To secure the heir apparent’s position and
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stabilize the transition after the emperor’s death, some emperors applied certain measures
to enhance the competitiveness of their heirs apparent.

3.2.5.1 Participating in the management of state affairs
Before being appointed as the crown prince, some candidates already had held
other posts and titles. For instance, Liu He was the Commander-in-chief (Dasima
and King of Liang

.220 After being appointed as heir apparent, some special

arrangements were made by some emperors. After Shi Le appointed the crown prince Shi
Hong, his official Xu Guang

suggested to him that,

The crown prince is kindhearted, filial, gentle and respectful, and the
King of Zhongshan (Shi Hu) is heroic, violent and deceitful. If your
majesty passed away in one day, I am afraid that the state would be in
danger. So it is necessary to gradually remove the authority and power
of King Zhongshan, and let the crown prince participate in state affairs
early.
221

With this knowledge, Shi Le asked the crown prince Shi Hong to take care of certain
state affairs by consulting with an official, Yan Zhen

. Only major military affairs

and important sentences had to be reported to the emperor. This arrangement allowed Shi
Hong to strip away Shi Hu’s political power as the Director of the Department of State
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Affairs (Shangshu ling

), and he became more powerful than the prime

minister.222
Similar arrangements also can be found in other cases. After becoming crown
prince, Liu Can

was made prime minister and Great Chanyu, and managed state

affairs.223 Shi Hu’s crown princes, Shi Sui and Shi Xuan, Yao Xing’s crown prince Yao
Hong, and Murong Cui’s heir apparent Murong Bao also played similar roles in the
government.224 This position is similar to the “Inspector of the State (jianguo

)” that

also appeared in the Northern Wei dynasty(see below). Similar to the Inspector of the
State in the Han Dynasty, when the emperor left the kingdom for war or any other reason,
the crown princes sometimes stayed in the capital to manage state affairs.225
Martial ability and military experience was a contrasty aspect in gaining an
advantage as the heir apparent during the transition process. As argued earlier, in this
period, the royal family members, including the heir apparent usually were granted
certain military powers as a way to decentralize the military. Meanwhile, the heirs
apparent were sometimes sent into battle to gain experience. In one case, when Yao
Chang wanted to lead troops to attack Fu Jian’s general Dou Chong
official Yi Wei

by himself, his

said,

The crown prince’s reputation for purity and honesty is famous near
and far. But his resourcefulness and astuteness in leading the troops are
not known by the people. So it is necessary to send the crown prince to
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lead by himself, which can gradually spread his power, and guard
against covetousness of the crown.
226

Yao Chang followed Yin Wei’s advice and sent Yao Xing into battle. Murong Cui sent
his sons, including the crown prince Murong Bao, to go on an expedition against
Northern Wei.227 Similar cases, however, did not often occur, since the heir apparent’s
safety also was significant for the regime. Fu Jian’s
died in battle; and his second option, Fu Sheng

first crown prince Fu Chang
, was considered not as good as

Fu Chang.228

3.2.6 Threats to the Emperor
When an heir apparent was weak, he needed the emperor’s protection. The
existence of the emperor as his father is justification for his position as the crown prince,
and the arrangement made by the emperor could secure his enthronement to some extent.
If he became powerful, such an heir apparent who manages state affairs, and has military
experience, however, he could be beyond the emperor’s control. He might seek to
eliminate all the threats to his role as heir apparent by himself. For instance, when Yao
Chang left the capital Chang’an for war against Fu Deng, his crown prince Yao Xing
stayed behind to manage state affairs. When Yao Chang was seriously ill and asked Yao
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Xing to leave Chang’an to meet him, Yao Xing killed five powerful generals before he
left because all these generals had their own troops and were a potential threat to Yao
Xing’s succession. The elimination of these important military figures might well have
caused severe damage to the military strength of Later Qin and distrust among the ruling
group. Yao Chang was furious about it but could do nothing.229
Sometimes a powerful crown prince could even become a serious threat to the
emperor himself. Shi Hu’s first crown prince, Shi Sui

, is a good example. Shi Sui

was authorized to manage state affairs, including choosing officials and performing
rituals. As usual, only the major military affairs and important sentences were reported to
the emperor.230 Two supreme leaders in one regime unavoidably caused conflict. In the
beginning, Shi Sui reported everything to his father out of respect and fear. Shi Hu
blamed him for presenting him with issues that were too minor. Then when Shi Sui
omitted a report, Shi Hu was so furious at his crown prince he was punished physically.
Soon Shi Sui hated the emperor. He tried to do what Modu (

) of the Xiongnu Empire

did to his father, for which see above.231 Shi Hu eventually discovered Shi Sui’s plan and
sentenced him to death.
Because of the possibility of threats by a powerful heir apparent, the restriction of
crown prince’s power became another issue for the emperor. In the Han and Jin dynasties,
the identity of a crown prince was shown in everything related to the heir apparent
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including his palace, clothes, carriage, etc. .232 When Murong Jun’s
Yin

official Shen

pointed out that the crown prince Murong Ye did not enjoy privileges over

other officials and princes, especially in apparel and accessories, Murong Jun refused to
accept Shen Yin’s suggestion, claiming that such privileges would influence the authority
of the emperor.233 To preserve and restrict the power of the crown prince at the same time,
the usual method was to balance the power of the crown prince by raising up a competitor
for him from the other princes.
After sentencing his first crown prince, Shi Sui, to death, Shi Hu realized the
problem of the existence of a powerful heir apparent. The second crown prince was Shi
Xuan

, and he enjoyed the same powers over state affairs as Shi Sui once had. This

time, however, Shi Xuan had to share the power with his brother Shi Tao

. They

dealt with state affairs by turns, and Shi Hu also made sure that Shi Tao received the
same treatment as Shi Xuan.234
Maybe because of his own experience as an heir apparent, Yao Xing also made
similar arrangements for his crown prince, Yao Hong
Yao Bi

, by appointing another son,

, as the the Director of the Department of State Affairs. Thus, he set him up

to compete with Yao Hong.235 Although in these cases the emperors intended to restrict
and balance the power of the crown princes by making such arrangements, the fierce
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competition that resulted between the rival princes might not have been expected by the
emperor. Shi Tao was eventually killed by Shi Xuan, and Shi Xuan was sentenced to
death by Shi Hu because of the murder.236 Yao Bi also made several attempts to kill the
crown prince, and he was forced to commit suicide by Yao Xing before the emperor’s
death.237 This arrangement of promoting another son to compete with the crown prince
could endanger the heir apparent. The emperor might be willing to take the risk since
whatever the result of the competition, the winner was still one of his sons.

3.2.7 Conclusion and Discussion
During the Sixteen Kingdoms period, although the Han crown prince system was
nominally applied by the rulers in the seven states located on the Central Plain, the Inner
Asian ruler many times manipulated the system by choosing the heir apparent first, and
then appointing his mother as empress to follow the crown prince system. In doing so,
one of the functions of crown prince system, that is to restrict the emperor’s power on
choosing his successor, disappeared. To some extent, the emperor monopolized the
power of choosing and appointing the crown prince.
The crown prince system, however, did not dominate the actual succession in this
period. The decentralization of military power among the ruling elite brought potential
powerful rivals to compete against the heir apparent. The emperor needed these rivals,
some of whom were appointed as the assistant ministers, in wartime. This rival service
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was a disadvantage for the heir apparent, especially when he was young and
inexperienced. To deal with this situation, some emperors intentionally arranged for their
heirs apparent to manage state affairs as a representative of the emperor, and of course
they sent them to the front lines whenever possible. If the heir apparent was too powerful,
however, he could present a severe threat to the emperor himself. In that case, some
emperors promoted another son to share the power with and compete against the crown
prince.
The Han crown prince system aimed to stabilize the transition of power. To
achieve stability, an heir apparent was appointed before the death of the emperor based
on the birthright of the eldest son of the empress. A consequence was the possible low
quality of the heir apparent/crown prince, who might be not the best one, or even a
suitable one.
Therefore, the Han system emphasized the education of the crown prince. Once
the position of heir apparent was secured, even the emperor could not change it. The heir
apparent usually did participate in the management of civil state affairs in order to avoid
conflict with the emperor. In the seven kingdoms, discussed above, without changing the
power structure inside the ruling class, bestowing the title of crown prince did not change
the actual succession. Compared to the Han Dynasty, the emperor’s role was more
decisive in the choosing and appointing the heir apparent.
The Inner Asian tradition, however, still had great impact on the succession of
these kingdoms. The idea of election tradition in the power transition is found in several
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occasions; and the competence, experience and power of the candidate played a decisive
role in the election.238 Some Inner Asian rulers adjusted this crown prince system by
having their heir apparent in charge of state affairs, which can be considered a remnant of
the Inner Asian tradition, such as the Xiongnu tradition of appointing the eldest son as the
Left Wise King discussed earlier in this chapter.

3.3 Institution of the Crown Prince in the Northern Dynasties
Unlike the Former and Later Zhao, and Former and Later Qin, which were
established inside the Central Plain, the Northern Wei started outside the Central Plain
and gradually moved from north to south. According to the historical record, the
institution of crown prince was new to the Tuoba Xianbei, and they adopted it at the
suggestion of Cui Hao

. The Northern Zhou and Northern Qi Dynasties were built

on the foundation of Northern Wei. Therefore, the Northern Wei will be examined first,
followed by a discussion of the Northern Zhou and Northern Qi.

3.3.1 Early Succession Tradition
Before the establishment of Northern Wei and Tuoba Gui’s
at Pingcheng

enthronement

in 398 CE, the Tuoba Xianbei already had established their own polity,
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which was initially interpreted as a tribal confederation and later became the Dai
kingdom

. Throughout that period, the Inner Asian tradition dominated the

succession: a certain form of election was used during the peaceful or tanistric process
with the result of lateral or patrilineal succession. In the records of this period in Weishu,
the term “taizi

,” however, appears several times; it refers to the eldest son of the

ruler.239 In the first juan of the Weishu, it is recorded,

In the 42nd year, [Emperor Shenyuan
] sent his son Emperor Wen
to Wei, also to learn natural conditions and social customs. It was the
second year of Jingyuan Reign (261 CE) of Wei.
Emperor Wen’s name was Shamohan. He stayed in Luoyang as the
crown prince, and headed the list of all the Wei guests.

240

In 261 CE, Liwei

sent his son Shamohan (

) to the Cao Wei (

hostage, and he stayed in Luoyang as the state crown prince (guo taizi

) as a
). The

reason that Shamohan was sent as a hostage was perhaps because he was the oldest son of
Liwei. Thus he was recognized as the crown prince by the Wei court. He, however, did
not have the title of crown prince given by the Xianbei ruler Liwei. It is also because the
crown prince system did not yet exist among the Tuoba Xianbei people as yet. Later,
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when Shamohan returned from the Wei capital, he was called “crown prince” by the
chiefs (

) but with the implication of eldest son (zhangzi

).241 Shamohan

apparently did not have privileges over his brothers, and was even disliked by the chiefs
because he was influenced by the Han culture.242
The Tuoba Xianbei polity and the Cao Wei

dynasty had already tried to

make peace through marriage in 258 CE.243 In this case of Shamohan, the Cao Wei court
required a “unilateral hostage” 244 from the Tuoba Xianbei polity and initially might have
asked for the crown prince as the hostage. The Xianbei could not meet this requirement
as they had no system of a crown prince. Later, the Wei required the eldest son as
someone who would be comparable to the crown prince in the Han system. As a hostage,
Shamohan was treated as the crown prince by the Cao Wei government. This treatment
created a negative impression about Shamohan among the Xianbei people once he was
returned home. According to the historical record, the chiefs demanded that Shamohan be
killed because they worried that Shamohan would exchange their customs for those of
Han culture.245 But in fact, the chiefs worried that the support of the Jin court behind
Shamohan might interfere with the Xianbei polity.246 The death of Shamohan shows that
diplomatic communication through hostages giving did not successfully establish the
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crown prince system in the Xianbei polity. On the contrary, the special treatment by the
Wei might even have resulted in his death. Through this diplomatic relationship, the
Tuoba Xianbei regime might have learned about the institution of crown prince but did
not adopt it.247

3.3.2 Seeking Change
In 398 CE after formally founding the Northern Wei Dynasty and Tuoba Gui’s
enthronement at Pingcheng

, the succession of imperial power concerned

Tuoba Gui, who wanted to change the succession tradition in his kingdom. Instead of
creating a crown prince system based on the Han tradition, Tuoba Gui tried to kill his
son’s mother as a way of appointing him as successor. In Weishu, it is recorded that,

In the beginning, the emperor (Emperor Taizong, Tuoba Si
)’s
mother, Lady Liu was forced to commit suicide [by Emperor Taizu
(Tuoba Gui
)]. Emperor Taizu told the emperor (Tuoba Si)
that, “Once, Emperor Wu of Han intended to appoint his son [as heir
apparent] and [therefore] put his mother to death. He did not [wish to]
allow his consorts subsequently to interfere with state affairs and
[thereby] cause outside families [i.e., distaff families] to create troubles.
You ought to succeed to the throne. That is why I have farsightedly
emulated Emperor Wu of the Han, and carried out this long-term
plan.”248
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249

This was Tuoba Gui’s first attempt to appoint his eldest son Tuoba Si as his heir
apparent by killing the successor’s mother. Because of his mother’s death, the young
Tuoba Si, who was eighteen at that time,250 remained inconsolable, which irritated his
father. In the end, Tuoba Si had to flee the capital and failed to become Tuoba Gui’s heir
apparent.251 Then, Emperor Taizu made his second attempt to make Qinghe
Tuoba Shao

was his successor, so he also tried to kill Shao’s

King,

mother, Lady He

. This time, Tuoba Gui was hesitant to kill Lady He,252 maybe because of the earlier
case. He also had to consider the family background of Lady He; she was the younger
sister of his mother and from the powerful Helan

unite (bu

).253 Tuoba Gui’s

hesitancy eventually caused his own death. Lady He asked her son to rescue her, and
Tuoba Shao led several attendants and eunuchs into the palace and killed Emperor
Taizu.254
Even though the tradition of appointing the heir apparent and killing his mother
caused Tuoba Gui’s death, this tradition was kept and practiced throughout most of the
Northern Wei dynasty. The origin of this practice still is controversial. Tuoba Gui himself
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claimed that he adopted this practice from Emperor Wu of the Han, but some scholars
argue that this practice was Tuoba Gui’s own invention or a relic of steppe culture.255 The
origin of the practice may have been that maternal relatives in the early Tuoba history
were powerful and often interfered in the Tuoba succession. Even Tuoba Gui himself
came to power because of the support from his maternal relatives.256 To prevent the
interference of maternal relatives, Tuoba Gui also forcibly dispersed the Helan
Dugu

and

lineages (tribes) to weaken them. In this way, Tuoba Gui tried to eliminate

the threats to himself and his descendants. Although Emperor Taizu never used the crown
prince as a means of hand over power, he already had set up a political environment for
using the heir apparent system of Han tradition in the future.
After Tuoba Gui’s death, the process of power transition shows the continuing
dominance of Inner Asian tradition. The day after the death of Emperor Shizu, King
Qinghe summoned all the officials (bailiao

) to the palace, and asked whom they

wanted to rule them. This meeting can be understood based on the “election” tradition of
Inner Asian succession. Here is the record from Weishu,

The next day, the palace gate did not open till noon. [Tuoba] Shao
announced the imperial edit, and summoned the officials facing the
north in front of the Duan gate of the Western Palace. Shao talked to
the officials between the door leaves, “I have a father, I also have an
elder brother. Whom do you want to follow?” From the kings and
dukes on, they were all surprised and frightened; nobody replied to him.
After a while, Zhangsun Song as Duke Nanping said: “We wish to
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follow your majesty.” The officials only then knew the passing away of
the emperor but were unaware how the emperor had died. Only Yuan
Lie as Duke Yinping left crying. So both the court and country were
agitated, and people were all disloyal [to Shao]. He Hu as Marquis
Feiru (
) raised a beacon fire in the north of Anyang city, so the
people of the Helan unite all went to join; the other old unites also led
their juniors to assemble the clansmen, and often gathered together.

257

At that time, King Qinghe already had the palace under his control. During the
meeting, King Qinghe did not come out of the palace to meet them, and but only opened
the gate slightly, and asked the officials “I have a father, I also have an elder brother.
Whom do you want to follow?” The father was referring to Tuoba Gui (Tuoba Shao’s
father), and the elder brother was Tuoba Si, the one who ran away from his father.258 At
that time, the officials and nobles did not know the emperor already had been killed.
They thought there might have been a coup inside the palace, which was led by Tuoba
Shao’s elder brother. So Tuoba Shao asked them to pick sides between Tuoba Gui and
him, as to who would be their ruler. Then the officials were ignorant of the actual
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situation inside the palace, and which side should they pick. They were scared and
remained silent. In the end, Zhangsun Song

, whose opinion was valued since he

was one of the Xianbei high rank nobles, came up and gave the absolute right answer,
“We wish to follow your majesty.” That is because Tuoba Shao was the one asking the
question, for the officials and nobles, Tuoba Shao should have the palace under his
control or at least he was the one in charge of their safety. Through the meeting, Qinghe
King received support from the nobles and officials. It is reasonable to argue that Tuoba
Shao tried to legitimize his succession through an election at the meeting.
Besides the support from the meeting, He Hu

, who was from the Helan unit,

summoned Helan people to gather in Anyang city. There were also other gatherings of
the Helan people. They supposedly gathered to support King Qinghe, Tuoba Shao,
because his mother was from the Helan tribe. King Qinghe, however, did not prepare for
the guards inside the palace, who had followed Tuoba Gui for years, and eventually
turned against him and seized him. Then, the nobles elected Tuoba Si as the next ruler.
The military played a role in the transition, but the election process was more
significant. Tuoba Shao led several people to the palace. They killed the emperor. Tuoba
Shao then attempted to make himself the lawful successor. Tuoba Shao asked the
participants of the meeting to choose the new leader. He received the support of all the
nobles participating in the meeting although some of them secretly were of another mind.
Yuan Lie

(Tuoba Lie

), who had journeyed out of the capital and brought

Emperor Taizong back to confront Yuan Shao. At that time, Emperor Taizong was not in
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control of the major military power, and his success was brought about by the coup of
some of his palace guards. Another consensus was reached right after that. The transition
process is full of compromise, default and murder,259 and the decisive factor in the Inner
Asian succession system was consensus rather than violence.260

3.3.3 First Crown Prince and Inspector of the State
Maybe because of his own experience, Tuoba Si, Emperor Taizong of Wei, did
not follow his father’s way of appointing the heir apparent by killing his mother.261 While
facing the problem of succession, he secretly turned to Cui Hao

, a Han literatus, for

advice. In Weishu, it is recorded that,
Emperor Taizong constantly had indispositions, and unusual
manifestations repeatedly appeared. So he secretly sent a eunuch to ask
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Cui Hao, and said, “ …… I have been ill for years, yet treatment has
not reduce my illness. I am afraid that if I suddenly died, all my sons
are young. What is to be done? Please make a posthumous plan for
me.”
……
262

Like his father and all the emperors mentioned in this chapter, Tuoba Si wanted one
of his sons to succeed to his throne, but worried that it would not happen if he died
suddenly. The reason given by Tuoba Si was that his sons were young. Apparently,
Tuoba Si knew that the youthful and inexperienced candidate was not favored in the
Inner Asian succession system, and other nobles in the Tuoba clan would covet the
throne.
Therefore, he tried to confront the Inner Asian succession tradition by turning to a
Han literatus for suggestions without informing other members of the ruling family of his
intentions. Cui Hao first assured the emperor that his health would not be affected by
strange astronomical phenomena and then gave his suggestion on the succession. Cui
Hao understood Emperor Taizong’s conflict about the succession issue. He first pointed
out that, since the beginning of the dynasty, there was no established tradition for
appointing the heir apparent. This had placed the regime in danger since the beginning of
the Yongxing

reign (the first reign of Emperor Taizong, 409–413 CE). He

suggested that the Emperor appoint an heir apparent, and appoint some trustworthy
nobles and officials as his tutors, assistants, guests and friends. Cui Hao emphasized the
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benefit of the crown prince system for the emperor. The crown prince could deal with the
civil and military issues, and control the supreme power for the emperor. The emperor
could rebuild his heath by rest and taking medicine. Anyone who coveted the throne after
the emperor’s death would desist because there was an already experienced lord as crown
prince.263 After introducing the crown prince system, Cui Hao suggested how to choose
the heir apparent, and who should be chosen, saying,
Now the eldest prince Tao (Tuoba Tao) is almost one year old. He is
wise and gentle, and is cared for by everybody. If he became the heir
apparent at that time, it will be the fortune of all under heaven.
Appointing the eldest one as the crown prince is the great principle of
the ritual. If (your majesty) waits untill all the sons become grown-up
and then picks from them, it would violate the heavenly ethic of (family
relationship), which will lead to the disaster of stepping on the thin ice.
264

265

Cui Hao suggested that Emperor Taizong appoints his eldest son, Tuoba Tao. A
major characteristic of the Han crown prince institution was to appoint the crown prince
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at an early age because of his birthright. Cui Hao specifically pointed out that the
emperor should not wait until all his sons were grown and then choose among them,
which might violate the heavenly ethical family relationship and be disastrous. The
principle of “appointing the eldest one as heir apparent” introduced by Cui Hao, however,
differs from the usual Han principle of choosing the empress’ eldest son as heir apparent.
He adjusted this principle because, according to the historical records, there was no
empress in the inner court of Empress Taizong.
Tuoba Si, however, did not accept Cui Hao’s suggestion immediately, but adopted
part of it with some adjustment. First of all, he waited until his eldest son Tuoba Tao was
fifteen, an age one was considered to be a grown man in ancient China,266 to appoint him
as heir apparent. The decision probably was made without consulting Cui Hao, but rather
with Zhangsun Song, a high-ranking Xianbei noble. In the Weishu, it is recorded that
when Emperor Taizong turned to Zhangsun Song for advice, he was seriously ill,
different from the indisposition that Taizong had mentioned earlier. He did not ask about
his heir apparent but about his successor. Zhangsun Song recommended Tuoba Tao as the
successor because he was the oldest and was virtuous according to both Song and the
emperor.267 Then Tuoba Tao was appointed both as the crown prince268 and inspector of
the state.
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The record in Weishu shows the heir apparent Tuoba Tao sat in the main hall
dealing with state affairs with six assistant ministers. The emperor intentionally avoided
the heir apparent in the court and was happy with Tuoba Tao’s capability. He told his
attendants that with the crown prince in the court they could travel around the state and
launch expeditions against his enemies.269 When the officials sometimes sent him
problems in the court, he even replied, “I don’t know about it. It should be decided by the
ruler of the state (guozhu

).”270 It seems that the emperor passed all the state affairs

on to the crown prince. Emperor Taizong still controlled the martial affairs and dealt with
some major civil issues,271 and, apparently not affected by his heath condition, he
travelled around the states and even launched several expeditions against his enemies.272
Later, after Tuoba Tao’s enthronement, he also arranged that his crown prince Tuoba
Huang

play a similar role as inspector of the state for almost eight years.273
Cui Hao tried to use the Confucian classics to justify the crown prince’s role, and

he named it the “inspector of the state.” It is clear that this “inspector of the state” was
very different from the inspector of the state in Han tradition discussed earlier in this
chapter. In the Han tradition, the crown prince only plays the temporary role of “inspector
of the state (jianguo

)” during the absence of the emperor from the capital. While

Tuoba Tao dealt with state affairs as the inspector of the state, however, Emperor
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Taizong was often in the capital but intentionally avoided him. Through the role of
“inspector of the state,” Emperor Taizong transferred, in advance, the supreme power to
his crown prince while he maintained control of the military and some other key issues.
In this sense, the inspector of the state in the Northern Wei dynasty essentially is similar
to the role played by the crown princes, such as Shi Hong, Liu Can, Shi Sui and so forth.
in the Sixteen Kingdoms period discussed above They all managed the state affairs for
the emperors, and only the major military affairs and important sentences were decided
by the emperors. Meanwhile, similar to the Sixteen Kingdoms period, a powerful crown
prince could escape the emperor’s control and become a threat to the emperor. The
inspector of the state, Tuoba Huang, crown prince of Emperor Shizu (Tuoba Tao),
probably was sentenced to death by his father because of the conflicts between them.274
After Emperor Shizu, the crown prince in the Northern Wei did not ever play the role of
“inspector of the state” again.275

3.3.4 The Distorted Crown Prince Institution
After the appointment of the first crown prince by Emperor Taizong in the
Northern Wei dynasty, the next five emperors—Emperor Shizu Tuoba Tao, Emperor
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Gaozong Tuoba Jun
Tuoba Hong

, Emperor Xianzu Tuoba Hong
(later Yuan Hong

, Emperor Gaozu

), Emperor Shizong Yuan Ke (

)— all

appointed their own heirs apparent, six in total, and four of them successfully succeeded
to the throne and became emperors. However, after the death of Emperor Suzong Yuan
Xu

, and especially after Erzhu Rong

controlled Luoyang, the supreme

power was no longer held by the Tuoba imperial family. During that time, the succession,
or literally changing of the emperors, came to be manipulated by the warlords, such as
the Erzhu, Yuwen

and Gao

families, so an heir apparent usually was not

appointed. Before that, it seems the crown prince institution played an important and
effective role during the imperial succession. Compared to the Han tradition, the crown
prince in Northern Wei, however, was distorted from the beginning and caused some
unexpected results.
The distortion was caused mainly by the tradition of appointing the crown prince
and killing his mother at the same time created by Tuoba Tao. While Tuoba Gui created
this tradition, his intention was to assure that supreme power was in the hands of his
successors and to exclude the maternal relatives. In the Han tradition, the crown prince
was the eldest son of the empress, and the heir apparent was interlocked with the empress
both biologically and politically. So the emperor was not able to remove one of them
without doing the same to the other.276 In other words, the Han crown prince system
severely restricted the emperor’s power in choosing and removing his successor. With the
Northern Wei custom, the mothers of the heirs apparent usually were not empresses when
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they gave birth, and they also were killed soon after their son was selected as crown
princes, usually the eldest son. In this circumstance, the role of crown prince was not
interlocked with that of the empress; therefore he easily could be removed by a powerful
emperor. Among the six crown princes, two, Tuoba Huang
(Yuan Xuan

and Tuoba Xun

) were not able to succeed the throne, but rather were removed by

their powerful fathers, Emperors Shizu and Gaozu.
After his mother’s death, the crown prince was usually assigned to a wet nurse or
stepmother, who usually came from regimes conquered by Northern Wei and had no
political base in the court.277 The stepmother or wet nurse raised the crown prince and
also provided protection for him.278 When the crown prince succeeded to the throne, she
often was proclaimed as the dowager empress who took over the power of the inner court,
such as Empress Dowager Chang

. Later, however, the custom of killing the crown

prince’s mother was manipulated by the dominant female in the inner court, especially
Dowager Empress Feng

. She insisted on applying this custom, so that she could then

raise and control the heir apparent. Both Emperor Gaozu and Yuan Xun

were raised

by her. The succession of Emperor Gaozu was also supported by her. While the emperor
was young and under the protection of the dowager empress, the supreme power was not
controlled by the emperor but by the dowager empress. Only when the emperor grew up
and was powerful enough to confront the dowager empress, might he be able to take back
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his power, such as happened with Emperor Gaozu. In some occasions, the emperor was
killed and replaced by the dowager empress with a younger one who could be easily
manipulated, such as how Dowager Empress Feng

enthroned Emperor Xianzu.279

Therefore, one may argue that the custom of killing the crown prince’s mother actually
assured the role of the crown prince and his succession.
Later during Emperor Shizong’s reign, because of this custom, the imperial
concubines did not want to give birth to boys. This may be why Shizong only had one
son, Yuan Xu

. 280 Dowager Empress Hu was the biological mother of Yuan Xu; she

was not killed perhaps because of Emperor Shizong’s protection.281 While Yuan Xu
succeeded to the throne, he was too young, so Dowager Empress Hu dealt with the state
affairs as the regent. Not having a son, the adult Yuan Xu eventually was killed by his
mother because of the conflict between them while the warlord Erzhu Rong threatened
the court.282 The crown prince institution, therefore, was no longer applied in the
Northern Wei.
Although the Northern Wei crown prince institution was differed from that of the
Han tradition, the Northern Wei ruler still tried to immutate certain aspects of the Han
tradition under the influence of the Han literati in the court, especially during Emperor
Gaozu’s reign. Confucian literatus Li Biao

suggested to Gaozu that the education of
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the crown prince should be taken seriously for the sake of the state.283 Gaozu valued his
opinion and assigned tutors to Yuan Xun

to make him study during the day.284 The

education, however, was not successful. Yuan Xun did not like reading the classics, and
even escaped from Luoyang to Pingcheng, which directly caused him to be stripped of
his role as heir apparent.285 Emperor Gaozu also applied Han rituals to the crown prince,
such as the capping ceremony (guanli

), to highlight Yuan Xun’s role. Yet the ritual

also was applied wrongly.286

3.3.5 Chaotic Succession Again: Northern Qi and Northern Zhou
The power structure of renewed military decentralization inside the ruling group
of Northern Qi and Northern Zhou was similar to events in the Sixteen Kingdoms
discussed above, which caused a similar development of the institution of crown prince.
In the early stage of Northern Qi and Northern Zhou, the lateral succession was applied.
The early emperors in Northern Zhou, Yuwen Jue

and Yuwen Yu

failed to appoint successors. The early emperors in Northern Qi, Gao Yang
Yan

, both appointed their successors; but their heirs apparent, Gao Yin

Gao Bainian

, both
and Gao
and

, failed to succeed to the throne. The third emperors in Northern Qi

and Northern Zhou, Gao Zhan

and Yuwen Yong

, respectively appointed
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their crown princes, Gao Wei

and Yuwen Yun

, who successfully succeeded

to the throne. During Gao Wei’s reign, however, Northern Qi was conquered by Northern
Zhou. After the death of Yuwen Yun, the supreme power of Northern Zhou was taken
over by the assistant minister Yang Jian

, who later became Emperor Wen of Sui.

To secure their crown prince’s role as their successors, some emperors let their
heirs apparent play the role of “inspector of the state” (jianguo),287 or even abdicated and
handed over the throne to the heir apparent in advance to secure the process of the
transition of power.288

3.3.6 Conclusion and Discussion
After the establishment of Northern Wei, Tuoba Gui tried to appoint his
successor by killing his son’s mother to exclude the maternal relatives’ intervention in the
succession. This later was treated as a Xianbei custom in the inner court, and was
manipulated by the female leaders of the inner court. During the Northern Wei dynasty,
the custom of killing the crown prince’s mother served to distort the crown prince
institution of Han tradition. On the other hand, however, it secured the succession of
some crown princes because they were under the protection of the dowager empress. In
the late period of Northern Wei, the imperial concubines did not want to give birth to
sons because of this custom. This helped to cause its abolition in some way. After this
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
287

Gao Yang’s crown prince, Gao Yin, and Yuwen Yong’s heir apparent, Yunwen Yun, both played the
role of inspector of the state.
288
Both Gao Zhan and Yunwen Yun abdicated and handed over the throne to their crown prince to secure
the process of power transition. Gao Zhan’s successor, Gao Wei, also did the same thing but it was because
of the military pressure from Northern Zhou.

115!
!

system was abolished, the Northern Wei also collapsed and a chaotic succession similar
to the Sixteen Kingdoms period reappeared in Northern Qi and Northern Zhou.

3.4 Conclusion and Discussion
The ideology behind the crown prince mode of succession as part of the Han
enthronement package was a culture of ancestor worship. As Li Biao argued in his
memorial to the throne, “Yi (Book of Changes) says ‘Nobody but the eldest son can take
charge of the sacrificial vessel.’ Zhuan (Commentary of Zuo) records ‘The crown prince
should bear the vessel of millet in the great sacrifice.’289 If the sacrifice has no host, the
imperial ancestral temple would enjoy no food; if the crown prince was removed, then
the sacrificial vessel can be handed over to no one.”290 So the crown prince succession
was the embodiment of this ancestral worship culture. Even for Inner Asian rulers, when
someone seized the throne and claimed himselve the emperor, it was expected that he
would follow the emperorship custom in the Han tradition; there were no other options.
This was different from rulership in the Inner Asian tradition. All the states in the Sixteen
Kingdoms Period and Northern Dynasties applied the crown prince system easily as part
of the Han enthronement package. This was especially true for rulers in the Sixteen
Kingdoms period who lived and studied in the Central Plain for a long time before
becoming rulers, such as Liu Yuan and Shi Hu. The Tuoba Xianbei rulers, however, took
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two generations to adopt formally the crown prince institution since the establishment of
Northern Wei. Perhaps this was because these rulers were not originally based in the
Central Plain but in Inner Mongolia.
The research in this chapter shows that these Inner Asian rulers soon found that,
unlike other Han institutions, it was almost impossible to successfully apply the crown
prince system because the decentralization of military power among the ruling class
brought potential powerful competitors to confront the heir apparent. Only six of the
sixteen heirs apparent in the seven states during the Sixteen Kingdoms period succeeded
to the throne and ruled for more than one year, although two of them were deposed about
two years after their enthronement by imperial family members. The early emperors in
Northern Wei, Northern Qi and Northern Zhou also faced similar problems. These
difficulties can be interpreted in the Inner Asian tradition of the rulership and succession.
The decentralization of military and political power among the ruling class determined
the way of succession to some extent. So even when the emperor appointed his successor
as the heir apparent, his heir apparent still had to face challenges from other powerful
competitors among the ruling group.
During this period, emperors applied several measures to solve the problem. One
of them was to appoint some of the powerful competitors as assistant ministers for the
new emperors; they were the key military figures and needed during wartime. Meanwhile,
when the crown prince was old enough, the emperor intentionally arranged for the heir
apparent to manage state affairs, and sometimes even sent him to the front lines of war. In
these ways, the heir apparent could accumulate experience and power in these affairs.
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Some emperors even abdicated and handed over the throne to their heir apparent during
their lifetime to secure the process of transition in advance.
In the Han tradition, the political status of the crown prince as the only legitimate
successor and the importance of his proper education were both emphasized by Jia Yi,
and applied in the Han political system. This description of the crown prince tradition left
room in its actual application. For instance, should the crown prince participate in policy
making, political administrative activity, and even military activity? How deeply should
he be involved? Should the crown prince hold any other positions and titles, and even
lead his own army? Divergent answers to these questions with justification from the
classics is not necessarily a violation of the principles of the Han tradition of succession.
Inner Asian rulers usually had different answers to these questions compared to
the emperors from native dynasties, such as Han, Song and Ming.291 With the Inner Asian
succession tradition, they worried more about the competence of the crown prince. Even
when the crown prince had the title, he could still be challenged after the death of the
ruler. Therefore, Inner Asian rulers applied those measures mentioned above to let their
heirs apparent build up their political competence, military power and personal influence.
These activities prepared them to compete with other nobles. Besides the Sixteen
Kingdoms period and Northern dynasties, this practice also can be found in almost all the
so-called conquest dynasties, such as Liao, Jin and Yuan and Qing.
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These measures, however, did not essentially eliminate the threat to the heir
apparent since the powerful competitors still existed. Also, a too powerful heir apparent
sometimes became a severe threat to the emperor. With these measures, the crown prince
was greatly empowered compared to both the Inner Asian and Han tradition, and actually
became a bigger threat to the emperor himself, one comparable to the other nobles in the
imperial lineage. Therefore, some emperors promoted another son to compete with the
crown prince, or sometimes the heir apparent was removed.
Another more straightforward measure for successfully applying the crown prince
system was to eliminate all potential competitors for the heir apparent and even the
emperor. Removing or killing the powerful figures in the ruling group, which frequently
happened during this period, altered the power structure; more specifically, the
decentralization of military and political power among the ruling groups. This measure,
however, could weaken the state in terms of military force, which was crucial during
wartime. War was practically an ongoing event in the Sixteen Kingdoms period and
Northern Dynasties.
Part of the reason for the collapse of Former Zhao, Later Zhao, Former Yan and
Northern Qi was this measure of eliminating the powerful military figures inside the elite.
On the other hand, these measures also distorted the crown prince system. The Inner
Asian rulers noticed that the power structure influenced the application of the crown
prince system, but what they may not have realize was that in the Han tradition this
application was actually also a restriction on the emperor’s power. The Han crown prince
system aimed to stabilize the process of power transition. To achieve stability, an heir
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apparent was appointed, based basically on birthright. The emperor usually could not
violate this principle. When the Inner Asian rulers were able to break away from the
restraints of a decentralized power structure, they also did not have the restrictions of the
Han tradition. So many times they manipulated the crown prince system by choosing the
heir apparent first, and then appointing his mother as the empress to follow the system, or
even chose whomever they wanted. In doing this, one of the functions of the crown
prince system in the Han tradition, which restricted the emperor’s power in choosing his
successor, disappeared. To some extent, the emperor monopolized the power of choosing
and appointing the crown prince. Therefore, through applying the crown prince system,
the Inner Asian rulers achieved the centralization of authority, which was different from,
and even more centralized, than the Han tradition.292
The succession problem, however, really was not solved till the end of the
Northern Dynasties. In the Sui and early Tang, the succession struggles inside the ruling
class were still one of the main issues regarding the stability of the regimes.293
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CHAPTER 4 From “Tribe” to Village?
Unlike the succession system, which usually only directly involves the upper
ruling members and is largely controlled by the central power structure, the local political
structure has direct impact on a majority of the population. Because of the differences
between the local political structures in Inner Asian tradition. and the tradition in the Han
and Jin dynasties, after the migration of the Inner Asian groups into the Central Plain,
their original local political structure was changed unavoidably either by them or by the
Han style government.
The first question about this change is to ask how they lived after the migration.
Were they isolated from the Han people, or did they mix with them? Then, the second
question is how were they organized after the migration? Was their local political
structure changed? If not, why? If so, how? What was the dynamic behind the change?
The final question for this transition is about its impact on the polity and the future
dynasties. In this chapter, I will examine the transition of Inner Asian people from the
perspective of local community and institution, and try to answer these questions.

4.1 Local Political Structure in Han and Inner Asian Tradition
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Before reaching the transition of the Inner Asian people in the Central Plain, the
local political structures in the Han and Inner Asian traditions must be compared to show
their similarities and differences. The local political structure discussed here essentially is
the administrative way government controlled the people. One of the main purposes of
ancient government administration was to extract human and material resources from the
people while maintaining social stability.294 Different local institutions were imposed on
the people by the state to achieve this goal.

4.1.1 Local Institution/Community in Han Tradition
Local communities can be formed on different principles. Without the
intervention of the state, people can be organized based on bloodline; e.g., the village as a
clan in modern Fujian Province in Southern China; or religious belief, e.g., a Buddhist
monastery. In early Medieval China, local communities formed on different principles.
Starting in 1936, Yang Lien-sheng studied the “magnate clans (haozu

),” a powerful

element in local and central government from the Han Dynasty to the Northern
Dynasties.295 Meanwhile, the impact of Buddhism on local society during the Northern
Dynasties has been examined by Hou Xudong, who also pointed out the difference
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between the local communities as natural units, “villa hamlet (qiu
chuan

, zhuang

)” and as administrative units “village (li

, cun

, ju

,

)” in early Medieval

China.296 Both types of units simultaneously existed in early Medieval China.297
The natural unit hamlet refers to an inhabited plot of land. The households
gathered in a hamlet might have kinship ties to each other. In early Medieval China,
however, such gatherings of households were usually not a single clan, but with a
combination of different clans (people with different family names).298 These hamlets as
natural units arose mainly because of suitability of the environment. For instance, they
might be located close to a water source, farmland, or were convenient for transportation.
During this period the size of these units vary. Yūichi Ikeda showed that there were only
a dozen households in one hamlet.299 Rrtifacts and recently excavated remains also
indicate that the scale of population in a hamlet (cun

or qiu

) was usually less than

one hundred inhabitants.300
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Administrative unit villages group natural unit hamlets into larger or smaller units
into order to extract human and material resources from the populace for the government.
For effective administration of the administrative unit, census and population registration
is necessary. With the information from the population registration, the village was then
allotted a set number of households, usually one hundred, 301 but it was not associated
directly with a plot of land like the hamlet. So individuals in one village could come from
different hamlets, and people in the same hamlet could also belong to different
villages.302 The head of the village, called lili (
higher authority, usually the county (xian

, village official), was sent by the a

).303 In Jinshu, it is recorded that,

The county appoints a village official for every hundred households. If
the land is vast but sparsely populated, let [the county] appoint the
village officials according to circumstances, but they should not be less
than [one for every] fifty households.
304

Under the village were smaller administrative units, “ten (shi

)” and “five (wu

),”

which consisted of ten and five households. A village usually comprised a “ten.”305 The
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
these are household registration documents. See Li Mingzhao, 2013, 320–356. The other type of material
having the information of population is the inscription from the Buddhist statues. See Hou Xudong, 2005,
27–32.
301
“Leader of the li (Likui
) is in charge of one li including one hundred household,” in Hou Hanshu,
juan 118, 3625.
302
Hou Xudong, 2005, 13.
303
Yan Gengwang
, Zhongguo difang xingzheng zhidu shi: Weijin Nanbeichao difang xingzheng
zhidu (
:
Chinese history of local political administrative
institution: Wei, Jin, Northern and Southern Dynasties local political administrative institutions) (Shanghai:
Shanghai guji press, 2007), 347–349.
304
Jinshu, juan 24, 746-747.

124!
!

heads of “ten” and “five” usually were selected from one of the members inside the
households. Above the village, there were also several layers of higher authorities
including town (xiang

), county (xian

) and others towards the central

government.306 The major officials in the town were sent by the county to collect taxes,
conscript labor, and exercise jurisdiction, among other assignments.307
Besides maintaining social stability, one major purpose of these local
administrative units was to use the population as needed for conscript labor (for armies
and corvée) and taxation. The administrative units controlled the population, involved in
agriculture, and strictly constrained the migration of population, which was also
beneficial for social stability.

4.1.2 Local Institute/Community in Inner Asian Tradition
How the pre-modern Inner Asian polity was organized is a question still under
debate, especially as to the characteristics of the local community. The Xiongnu polity
was no exception. The confrontational theories on the Xiongnu polity can be described as
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“Stateless Empire” versus “Headless State.”308 By describing the Xiongnu empire as
“Stateless Empire,” scholars such as Thomas Barfield and Nikolai N. Kradin argue that
the Xiongnu polity was a supratribal confederation, in which the power of the Chanyu
was limited by internal and indigenous tribal leaders whose power derived from his own
people from the conical tribes basing on the principle of seniority.309 Here the tribe refers
to “an extensive patrilineal kinship organization in which members of a common descent
group were ranked and segmented along genealogical lines.”310 The tribal leaders largely
retained autonomy at the local level partly because of the steppe ecology and pastoral
lifestyle.311 The main reason that these autonomous tribes united and formed a centralized
confederation is that they were confronting a common, centralized, powerful Han polity
in the south. While confronting the Han Empire, the gifts from the Han court played a
key role in supporting the supratribal confederation, since the extensive pastoral economy
alone could not maintain it.312
In the “Headless State” argument, the Xiongnu polity was described as a system
of territorial fiefs which were managed by the Xiongnu aristocratic family in a largely
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autonomous manner.313 A military-civil decimal hierarchical official system was
established to centralize the power on the aristocrat family. So, at the local level, the
commoners or soldiers were not in the autonomous tribal unit or kin group, but rather
under the rule of the aristocrats through a bureaucratic and military system. The local
administrative units were organized in ten, hundred and thousand, and each level had its
own head—“head of ten (shizhang
“head of a thousand(qianzhang

),” “head of a hundred (baizhang

)” and

),” who were appointed by the aristocrats.314 When

appointing these local officials to maintain their authority over the local people, , the
aristocrats might avoid the local kin group leader or clan head to break the bond between
them, similar to the Han government’s attitude to the local magnate clans.315
For the two opposing theories on the Xiongnu polity, although it has already been
pointed out that the “stateless empire” argument is heavily influenced by early
anthropology,316 the “headless state” argument is also criticized by some scholars.317
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Therefore, a discussion about this topic is necessary to illustrate my opinion on these
theories. I will review both theories based on a close reading of the textual evidence
related to the Xiongnu polity, and then give my conclusions about the characteristics of
Xiongnu polity.

4.1.2.1 The Political Structure of the Xiongnu Ruling group
First I examine the textual evidence related to the political structure in the ruling
group of the Xiongnu polity. Here the political structure refers to how the power was
distributed among the ruling class, and how Chanyu managed and centralized his power.
The most important textual evidence for this is from the Biography of the Xiongnu in
Shiji, it is said,

They establish Worthy (xian ) Kings (wang ) of the Left and Right,
Guli (
) Kings of the Left and Right, Grand Commanders (dajiang
) of the Left and Right, Grand Commandants (duwei
) of the
Left and Right, Grand Household Managers (da danghu
) of the
Left and Right, and Gudu (
) Marquises (hou ) of the Left and
Right. The Xiongnu call a worthy a tuqi (
). Therefore, they usually
take the Heir-Apparent to be the Tuqi [i.e., the Worthy] King of the
Left. From the likes of the Worthy Kings to the Left and Right down to
the Household Managers, the great ones have ten thousand horsemen
[and] the small ones have several thousand, all twenty-four leaders
(zhang ) are appointed with the title of “[Commander of] Ten
Thousand Horsemen”. All great ministers
have hereditary
positions (shiguan
). The three surnames of the Huyan lineage (shi
), the Lan lineage, and later the Xubu lineage constitute their nobility
(guizhong
). All Kings and Commanders (jiang ) of the Left
direction reside in the Eastern region facing Shanggu and beyond,
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border in the east on the Weimo and Chaoxian. The Kings and Leaders
of the Right direction reside in the Western region facing Shangjun,
border in the west on the Yuezhi, the Di and the Qiang. Chanyu’s court
faces Dai and Yunzhong. Each of them has its own area, within which
it migrates in search of water and grassland. As to the Worthy Kings to
the Left and Right and the Guli Kings to the Left and Right, these are
the greatest. The Gudu Marquises of the Left and Right assist in the
government.

318

A similar reference can be found in the Hanshu.319 It is likely that all twenty-four
leaders were from the four royal lineages—the Chanyu lineage Luandi (

) and other

three royal lineage Huyan, Lan and Xubu.320 Members of the three other lineages often
intermarried with the Chanyu lineage.321 The Chanyu had his own territory in the north of
Dai and Yunzhong with his court; all twenty-four leaders also had their own territories.
The four kings’ kingdoms were bigger than the others. These kings and generals normally
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320
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remained in their own area with their own court. One exception was the Gudu [
Marquises [hou

]

] of the Left and Right,322 who remained in the court instead in their

own area because they assisted Chanyu in the court.
Among the four titles of king listed in the cited text, the Worthy King of the Left as
the heir apparent, was surely of the Chanyu Lineage, and so should have been the other
three kings. In Hou Hanshu, it is recorded that the four kings, which were called “four
corners (sijiao

),” are all from the Chanyu lineage.323 When a new Chanyu was

elected, he usually appointed his own heir apparent and other kings to help him secure the
central power. An example is Huhanye Chanyu who appointed his older brother as Left
King of Guli.324 Besides the four kings, there are also other kings mentioned in Hanshu,
such as King of Xiutu
of Xiuxun

, King of Kunye

, King of Rizhu

and King

. The latter two were clearly also of Chanyu lineage according to the

Hanshu.325
Besides the kings, one Grand Commander of the Left was also of the Chanyu
Lineage, and was even appointed as Chanyu later.326 Other key information, such as other
titles of the twenty-four leaders or the existence of other lineages inside the Xiongnu
polity, however, was not in the Shiji or Hanshu. Some of the missing information,
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fortunately, was included in the biography of Southern Xiongnu in Hou Hanshu and the
biography of Xiongnu in Jinshu. Although in the later period, there was more impact
from the Central Plain on the political structure of the Xiongnu, especially after they
migrated to the South and were close to the Han people, the Southern Xiongnu still
maintained their independence from the Han court for a long time. Meanwhile, because
of a closer relationship between the Xiongnu and Han court, the officials of the Eastern
Han were able to obtain more accurate information about the Xiongnu polity. In Hou
Hanshu, it is recorded that,
The noblest ones among the great ministers are Worthy King of the
Left, then the lower one Luli King of the Left, then Worthy King of the
Right, then Luli King of the Right, who were collectively called four
corners (sijiao
); then Rizhu (
) King of the Left and Right,
then Wenyudi (
) King of the Left and Right, then Jianjiang (
) King of the Left and Right, who were together called six corners
(liujiao
). These are all the descendants of the Chanyu family, and
they could be Chanyu in sequence. The great ministers with different
surnames were the Gudu Marquises of the Left and Right, then Shizhu
Gudu Marquises of the Left and Right. The other official titles such as
Rizhu, Qiequ (
), and Household Manager were all ranked by their
power and number of subordinates. The Chanyu’s surname is Xulianti
(
). The lineages with different surnames are Huyan, Xubu,
Qiulin and Lan, all of which were the famous lineages of the state and
intermarried with the Chanyu. The Huyan lineage are the left, Lan and
the Xubu lineages are the right. They hear and pass judgment on the
cases, and decide the degree of the crimes. Then verbally report to
Chanyu without official documents and written confessions.
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327

In the Southern Xiongnu, the four kings recorded in Shiji also were listed as “four
corners (sijiao

).” Like the other six kings listed above as “six corners (liujiao

they were all of the Chanyu lineage (Chanyu zidi

),

).

Besides the three lineages mentioned in Shiji, another lineage recorded as Qiulin
became part of the nobility in the Southern Xiongnu during the Eastern Han
dynasty.328 These four lineages intermarried with the Chanyu lineage, and also served in
the Chanyu court as judicial officers. Therefore, there was an expansion of both the
Chanyu royal lineage and the bureaucratic system, which also is indicated in the
biography of Xiongnu in Jinshu where sixteen kings are listed, and all of them are of the
Chanyu lineage.329
Based on the description of the central political structure of the Chanyu polity in
Shiji and Hou Hanshu, all 24 leaders (zhang

), most of who were from the Chanyu

lineage, were appointed by the Chanyu. Each of these leaders had his own territory ruled
by his court. At least the authority of the Chanyu lineage members among the 24 leaders
was from the top instead of from the bottom, which is the so-called local “autonomous
tribal units.” In Thomas Barfield’s argument, he considers the 24 leaders as tribal leaders,
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who can command loyalty from their own tribal people.330 This argument is not in
accordance with the textual evidence. Barfield’s argument, however, does correctly note
the loose control of the Chanyu over the fief-holders.
Despite the fact that a large number of the leaders in the Xiongnu ruling group
were from the Chanyu lineage, which indicates the power structure of “feudalism,” there
were still other kings in the historical record. It is unclear if these kings were also from
the Chanyu lineage or were local leader integrated into the Xiongnu polity. Barfield
argues that the King of Xiutu

, King of Kunye

and King of Aojian

were

all local tribal leaders, who led people and easily walked away from the Chanyu’s rule.331
The King of Xiutu’s and King of Kunye’s case happened during the reign of Emperor
Wu

of Han. After they were defeated by the Han army, it is recorded that,
The Chanyu was angry at the King of Xiutu and King of Hunye, who
lived in the western part of his domain, because they allowed the Han
to capture or kill twenty or thirty thousand of their men; he wanted to
send them a summons, intending to execute them. The Hunye and
Xiutu kings, terrified, planned to surrender to the Han. The Han
dispatched General Piaoqi to go and meet them, but on the way the
Hunye king murdered the Xiutu king and combined the latter’s forces
with his own.

332
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Because of their military failure, which irritated the Chanyu, the Xiutu and Hunye
kings wanted to break away from the control of the Chanyu. After surrendering to the
Han, the Hunye king resettled inside Han territory with 40,000 of his people. The Han
Emperor bestowed the title of Luoyin Marquis
the Xiutu king, Midi

on Hunye.333 One of the sons of

, later became a significant official in the Han court; Emperor

Wu of Han gave him the surname of Jin

.334 Although they lived under the control of

and served the Han court, there is no record showing that the Hunye or Xiutu king’s
family were of the Chanyu lineage.
The case of the Aojian king happened during Woyanquti Chanyu’s rule. It is
recorded that,
The next year, the Chanyu also killed two younger brothers of
Xianxianshan. Wushanmu remonstrated, but was not accepted. Then he
became angry. Later, the Left King of Aojian died, and Chanyu
appointed his own young son as the King of Aojian, who was retained
in the Chanyu’s court. The Aojian nobles all elected the son of the
deceased King of Aojian as the new king, and migrated to the east with
him. The Chanyu sent the Right Prime Minister to attack them with ten
thousand horsemen, but was defeated with the loss of several thousand
people.

335
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In this case, after the death of the Left King of Aojian, the Chanyu wanted to
expand his power over the local populace by appointing his own son as the Aojian king,
who would remain in the Chanyu court. The Aojian nobles, however, rejected this
proposal and instead elected the son of the deceased Aojian King as their next king; then
they migrated to the east. The Chanyu tried to attack them for their disobedience, but was
defeated. In both cases, the local kings chose not to obey the order of the Chanyu and
severed their ties with him. As with the other kings, there was no evidence showing that
they were of Chanyu lineage.
What was the origin of these kings in the Xiongnu polity? The case of Mushanmu
might shed some light on this question. In the biography of Xiongnu in Hanshu,
Wushanmu, as a name of the small state and its leader, was recorded.
Wushanmu originally was a small state between Wusun and Kangqu
, and was often invaded and looted. He led his a few thousand people
to surrender to the Xiongnu. The Hulugu
Chanyu married him
to the elder sister of the Rizhu King, and had him lead his people,
staying in the western area.

336

After the invasion of the powerful neighboring states, Wushanmu decided to surrender
voluntarily to the Xiongnu, a dominant group in the area. After placing his people under
the protection of the Xiongnu polity, Wushanmu still was able to be a relatively
independent leader of his own people; he also married members of his family into the
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Chanyu lineage. He himself wed the elder sister of Rizhu King and married his daughter
to the son of Xulüquanqu

Chanyu, Jihoushan

.337

The Aojian king, Xiutu king and Kunye king also were group leaders who
submitted to the Chanyu voluntarily or forcibly, and were integrated into the Xiongnu
polity. Although they joined the Xiongnu and lived inside the Xiongnu territory, they too
still led their own people and could be given the title of “king” by the Chanyu.
Besides the groups and their leaders inside the Xiongnu territory, there were other
polities along the Xiongnu border who were controlled by the Xiongnu polities. This was
true of the states in the Western Regions before falling under the influence of the Han
court. In the beginning of the Biography of Western Region in Hanshu, it says,
The various kingdoms of the Western Regions are mostly sedentary,
and have cities, villages, cultivated fields and domestic animals. The
inhabitants differ in their customs from the Xiongnu and Wu-sun
people. They all used to be enslaved by the Xiongnu. The Rizhu King,
on the western border of the Xiongnu territory, appointed a
Commandant of Boy Servants (putong duwei) to rule the Western
regions, and he always dwelt between Yanqi (Karasahr), Weixu and
Yuli. He levied taxes on these kingdoms, and took wealth from them.

338

According to Hanshu, in the early period of the Western Han Dynasty, the Western
Region states, including Wusun and Kangqu,339 were all controlled and “enslaved” by the
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Xiongnu through the instructions of the Rizhu king. They had to pay “taxes” to the
Xiongnu. Later, along with the rising Han military power, however, the states in the
Western Regions had to start dealing with both Han and Xiongnu, and gradually changed
their attitude toward the Xiongnu. When the Han court wanted to unite the Wusun to
fight against the Xiongnu, in the beginning the Wusun ruler showed his interest by
marrying a Han princess. At the same time, however, he also married a Xiongnu
princess.340
A similar situation happened in the Loulan state, which sent princes to both Han
and Xiongnu as hostages.341 Under pressure from both the Han and Xiongnu, the Western
Regions states usually chose to cooperate with both sides, but also kept a distance from
the two powers to maintain their security. During the Western Han Dynasty, one of the
Han commanders of the Western Regions (Xiyu duhu

), Guo Xun, mentioned

above, in his memorial to the throne said, “When the Xiongnu was powerful, it did not
annex the Wusun and Kangqu in the first place. When the Xiongnu submitted to us, it
also did not lose the two states because of this.”342 The Eastern Han historian Ban Gu
also discussed the relationship between the Western Region states and Xiongnu, saying,
The states in the Western Regions all have their own rulers. Their
troops were divided and weak, and not unified. Although they
submitted to the Xiongnu, there is no mutual attachment. The Xiongnu
could get their horses and cattle, felts, and rugs from them, but the
Xiongnu couldn’t lead them to attack or withdraw.
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.343

Both statements describe the loose control over the Western Regions by the Xiongnu.
Although the Xiongnu received “tax” from the Western Regions, their control easily
could have been overthrown by another power, largely because these were small
scattered states with a sedentary populace and far from the Xiongnu court.
Three different groups inside the Xiongnu ruling group have been discussed to
show its political structure. In the first group, the core of the Xiongnu ruling group is the
Chanyu and the other three or four lineages. The Kings in major positions at the
Chanyu’s court were all from these lineages, which were appointed by the Chanyu. In the
second group, there were other group leaders around the core group, such as the Xiutu
King and Wushanmu, who submitted to the Xiongnu polity forcibly or voluntarily and
stayed inside the Xiongnu territory. Besides these two groups, outside the Xiongnu
territory were leaders associated with the Xiongnu polity. The earlier discussion of the
three groups shows that the Chanyu had limited control over them, and the relationship
between the Chanyu court and the three groups was fragile. Whether the kings in the
ruling group were from the Chanyu lineage or not, they could decide to sever ties with
the Chanyu court if they were dissatisfied with decisions made by Chanyu, or with the
Chanyu himself.
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The core of the Xiongnu ruling group, such as the Chanyu lineage members,
usually chose to break away from the control of the Chanyu’s court during the process of
succession. In the Xiongnu succession institution, all the Chanyu lineage members could
participate in the competition for the position of Chanyu. When they were considering the
selection of the new Chanyu, a candidate could decide to break ties with the Chanyu
court if he or his chosen candidate were deemed unworthy to serve as the Chanyu. This
demonstrates the interaction between the central political structure and the succession
tradition of Inner Asia, in which the successor should be competent and able to unite all
the leaders within the polity. If the new Chanyu were able to do that, the central authority
would be reestablished.
So the central power structure (core) of the Xiongnu ruling group can be defined
as “authoritative feudalism,” in which in the maintenance of the feudalistic centralization
is largely decided by the authoritativeness of Chanyu. The other kings or group leaders
from the second group had more reasons to leave the Chanyu’s court.
In the case of the Aojian king, the Aojian nobles decided to migrate to the east
because the Chanyu wanted to appoint his own son as the Aojian king instead of letting
the descendant of the Aojian King succeed, since “all great ministers
hereditary positions [shiguan

have

].”344 When the Chanyu broke the rule and caused an

imbalance of power between the Chanyu and the local kings, the kings could decide to
detach from the polity.
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The Hunye king and Xiutu king decided to break their connections with the
Chanyu court because they were defeated by the Han army. Because they realized the
strong military power of the Han, they decided to switch sides in the battle between Han
and Xiongnu. 345 As for the other polity leaders not inside the Xiongnu territory but
controlled by the Xiongnu, such as the Western Region states, they could be more easily
separated from the Xiongnu polity by another power. So the relationship between the
other two groups and the Chanyu court can be defined as “authoritative dependency.”
The discussions on the three groups show the significance of the authority of the
Chanyu to maintain the Xiongnu polity. An authoritative Chanyu can not only unite the
core of the ruling group, but also maintain the stability of the whole ruling mandate of the
Chanyu. How did the Chanyu control the other members of the ruling group with his
authority? This question will be discussed in the next section.

4.1.2.2. Authoritative Institutions in the Xiongnu Ruling Group
Since all the leaders usually stayed in their own territory and had their own court,
yet the three ruling classes accepted the authority of the Chanyu, how could he efficiently
control these ruling members? Although the historical records did not directly discuss this
question, some hints can be found. For instance, the use of intermarriage and hostages
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giving, regular meetings of the Chanyu with other elites, and the imposition of taxes. All
these institutions, however, could only be effective under the authority of Chanyu.
Using intermarriage was a very common way to build blood relationships
between the Chanyu lineage and other lineages. As the nobles of the Xiongnu polity, the
other three lineages inside the core of the Xiongnu ruling group usually intermarried with
the Chanyu himself.346 For the nobles from the second group, the Chanyu could marry
them with one of the female or male members of his lineage. After Wushanmu
surrendered to the Xiongnu, the Hulugu Chanyu married him to the elder sister of Rizhu
King, and one of his daughters married Jihoushan

, son of Xulüquanqu (

Chanyu.347 As for the third Xiongnu ruling group, there are records about their
intermarriage relationship with the Xiongnu, specifically the Jushi (

) king and

Wusun.348 It is, however, unclear which lineage from the Xiongnu polity had the
intermarriage relationship with the third ruling group members.
Compared to intermarriage, which was used by all the three groups, the Chanyu,
based on historical documentation, seemed to only require the crown prince as a hostage
from the third class to assure its loyalty. During Emperor Zhao

of Han’s reign,

because the Jushi Kingdom built diplomatic relationship with the Han, the Xiongnu
summoned the crown prince of the Jushi Kingdom as a hostage to the Xiongnu court. The
crown prince, however, refused to act as a hostage and escaped.349 Certain states
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
346

Hou Hanshu, juan 89, 2945.
Hanshu, juan 94, vol.1, 3790.
348
Hanshu, juan 96, vol.2, 3903, 3922.
349
Hanshu, juan 96, vol.2, 3922.
347

141!
!

)

sometimes sent hostages to both the Han and Xiongnu, which shows the struggle between
the two powers to control the Western Regions.350 The hostage would remain friendly to
the court where he once lived as a hostage, and they would support him in his quest to
attain power on his return home. This would help to solidify the relationship between the
Xiongnu and these satellites kingdoms.
Regular meetings with all the elite affiliates in the Chanyu court was another way
to secure effective rule. In Hanshu and Hou Hanshu, it is recorded that,
In the first month of each year, all the leaders have a small meeting in
the Chanyu court, and offer sacrifice. In the fifth month, [they] have a
mass meeting in Longcheng (
Dragon City),351 offer sacrifice to
their ancestors, heaven and earth, spirits and gods. In the autumn, when
the horses are sleek, [they] have another mass meeting in Dailin (
)
[the place for sacrifice by going around the tree], then examine and
check the number of the people and their cattle.
352

In the Xiongnu custom, there were three yearly sacrifices. Usually,
these sacrifices to the heavenly deity were on the wu ( ) day of the
first, fifth and ninth months of each year.353 Since the Southern Chanyu
submitted [to the authority of Han], they also offer sacrifice to the Han
emperor. During the meeting, Chanyu meets all the groups to discuss
the state affairs, and they all enjoy themselves by galloping on
horseback or camel.
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354

It is recorded that there were three meetings per year; they usually convened in
the first, fifth and ninth month. The autumn (ninth month) meeting was the largest.355
During the these meetings, besides offering sacrifice to the ancestors and deities, the
participants discussed important state affairs (guoshi

), such as war or peace with

the Han. At the autumn meeting, the population and the number of cattle were calculated
and checked. Although it is mentioned that the attendees at these meetings were “all the
leaders (zhuzhang

)” from “all the units (zhubu

),” it is unclear who they were

and which groups they represented.
Among the three groups of the Xiongnu ruling members, the core definitely
attended these meetings. In the Hanshu, there are two cases in which the appanageholders from the core of the Xiongnu group, decided to not participate in the meetings.
This was to demonstrate their disobedience to the Chanyu. Both events happened during
the process of the Chanyu’s succession, and they were not willing to accept the authority
of the new Chanyu.356.
As for the other two groups, it seems that attending the meetings was necessary to
confirm their submission and loyalty to the Chanyu. In the biography of the Western
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Regions, it is recorded that, along with the rise of Wusun power, the king decided not to
attend the meeting at the Xiongnu court,357 which implies the second and third ruling
groups also regularly attended the meetings.
It is usually argued that the financial system of the Xiongnu polity heavily relied
on the exploitation of surrounding agrarian societies, such as the Han Dynasty. It is
questionable if a taxation system existed inside the Xiongnu polity. In the biography of
Xiongnu in Shiji, Sima Qian recorded the story of Zhonghang Yue

, who was a

defector from the Han to the Xiongnu. He reminded the Laoshang Chanyu that, for the
Xiongnu people to maintain their strength, they should keep their own customs, which
were suited to their terrain and lifestyle, and refuse the temptations of Han luxuries. Then
it is recorded that he “taught the Chanyu’s assistants writing and recording, to record and
),”358

examine the populace and the cattle (

as was done during the autumn meeting. This record indicates that the Xiongnu court was
taught to calculate and record their properties. But it is still questionable if a taxation
system was developed since no more specific documentation exists.
Nevertheless, it is recorded that the Xiongnu court imposed a “tax” on the third
ruling group, such as the Western Regions kingdoms and Wuhuan. The reason the term
“tax” was used is because the character “shui

” appeared in the records regarding the

imposition of tax by the Xiongnu. As quoted above, the Rizhu king of the Xiongnu
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appointed a Commandant of Boy Servants (putong

) to levy the “tax” (shui

) on

the kingdoms in the Western Regions, and he took the wealth from them. 359 But what are
the “taxes”? Later in Ban Gu’s discussion, he states that the Xiongnu received “the horses
and cattle, felt and rugs” from these kingdoms. 360 So these probably were the “taxes”
paid by the Western Region kingdoms to the Xiongnu.
There is another record in the Hanshu regarding the “tax” imposed by the
Xiongnu on the Wuhuan

people. It is recorded that the Han court asked the Wuhuan

to no longer pay “leather and cloth tax (pibushui

)” to the Xiongnu.361 Despite this,

the Xiongnu still sent an envoy to the Wuhuan to require the “tax” because it was an
established practice (gushi

).362 The Wuhuan refused to pay, which angered the

Xiongnu envoy. The envoy punished the Wuhuan leader, which also enraged the leader’s
brothers. They killed the Xiongnu envoy and other people along with him. Eventually,
the Xiongnu received their tax of horses, cattle, leathers and cloth from the Wuhuan by
waging war against them.363
In both cases, the Xiongnu court only sent their envoy (commandant and envoy)
to collect the “tax” from the Western Region kingdoms and Wuhuan. In other words, the
Xiongnu court did not build a taxation system inside the Western Region kingdoms and
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Wuhuan. The rulers of the Western region kingdoms and Wuhuan belonged to the third
group of ruling members, and their relationship with the Chanyu court was precarious.
Therefore, the “tax” paid by the Western Region kingdoms and Wuhuan to the Xiongnu
was more like tribute instead of tax. The Hanshu used the term “tax (shui

) because the

Western Region kingdoms and Wuhuan already had a taxation system within their states.
These kingdoms and Wuhuan had to pay part of the government income to the Xiongnu.
The third ruling group paid tribute for their dependency to the Xiongnu polity, and the
Chanyu then would provide “protection” for them, which is another means of
exploitation.

4.1.2.3 “Non-Uniform” Institutional Complexity of the Xiongnu Polity
In the last two sections, three different groups of the Xiongnu ruling members,
and how they were controlled by the Chanyu court have been discussed. As the core of
the Xiongnu ruling class, the first group refers to the Chanyu and the other three or four
lineages, which were the nobles and famous lineage (

) inside Xiongnu. The majority

of the Kings and high ranking officials of the Chanyu polity were all from these lineages.
The distribution of power among the first group is defined as “authoritative feudalism.”
The second group was composed of the leaders who submitted to the Xiongnu polity
forcibly or voluntarily, and stayed inside the Xiongnu territory, keeping their autonomy.
Besides the two groups, outside the Xiongnu territory, there were polity leaders
associated with the Xiongnu polity. The latter two groups’ relationship with the Chanyu
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is described as “authoritative dependency.” As research shows, the control over the three
ruling groups by the Chanyu, however, was limited. The intermarriage with the Chanyu
lineage, sending hostages to the Chanyu court and regular meetings were the three major
institutional measures to link and control the three ruling groups. The limited means of
control over the ruling groups indicates the significance of the Chanyu’s authority for
maintaining the stability of the Xiongnu polity.
Neither the “stateless empire” nor “headless state” theories can explain fully the
political complexity of the Xiongnu polity. The “stateless empire” theory overlooked the
“authoritative feudalism” inside the core group of the Xiongnu polity. It is possible that
part of the Xiongnu ruling group derived their power from conical tribes instead of the
Chanyu. As the earlier discussion shows, the authority of the Chanyu still played a
significant role in incorporating them into the Xiongnu polity. As for the “headless state”
theory, it also downplayed the Chanyu’s authority inside the Xiongnu polity.
Meanwhile, although the military-civil hierarchical official system might be
applied to centralize the power, it is questionable how widely the system was applied.
According to Sima Qian, at least inside the core ruling group, the decimal hierarchical
official system existed.364 Whether the system was applied by the second and third ruling
groups is hard to answer because of a lack of evidence. For instance, in the third ruling
group, it is recorded that there were similar official titles in the Western Region states,365
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which might be imposed by or adopted from Xiongnu. Among the Wuhuan people, the
political system was more close to the conical tribal system.366
As for the second ruling group, after they were included in the Xiongnu polity,
their original political institutions still remained and could be the decimal administrative
system or tribal system. Although some scholars argue that in the Xiongnu polity the
decimal administrative system was developed based on the tribal system,367 it is still
reasonable to speculate that both institutional systems existed in the Xiongnu polity.
Therefore, the political structure of the Xiongnu polity can be defined as an authoritative
system with non-uniform institutional complexity.368 With the authority of the Chanyu,
this system can incorporate the groups with different complexities into the Xiongnu
polity. Characteristic of the Xiongnu polity will be helpful understanding the discussion
of the transition of the local institution of the Inner Asian peoples below.

4.2 Local Institutions of Inner Asian peoples in the Central Plain during the Sixteen
Kingdoms Period

Beginning with the discussion on the accommodation of the Inner Asian peoples
by the Han and Jin government, this section examines the influence of the way of
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accommodation in the Sixteen Kingdoms Period, and how the Inner Asian tradition of
local organization changed during that time.

4.2.1 Accommodating of the “Barbarians”
For the Han and Jin government, accommodating the Inner Asian groups, who
submitted to the Han and Jin court for various reasons, was a common task. These groups
not only included the Xiongnu people, who confronted the Han for a long time, but also
the Qiang

, Wuhuan and other groups living along the northern border of the Han.

After they submitted to the Han or Jin governments, the leaders were given different titles
depending on the size of their groups, and they were assigned certain areas for living.
Meanwhile, the Han and Jin governments also needed to supervise these groups by
putting them under the supervision of officials inside the civil or martial administrative
system.
After submitting to the Han and Jin court, different titles were bestowed on the
leaders of the Inner Asian groups by the court ranked according to their original titles and
the sizes of their groups. The titles included four ranks: king (wang
lord (jun

) and chief (zhang

), marquis (hou

).369 The difference between the latter two was the size

of the groups they led.370 For the assigned living area, the Inner Asian peoples can be
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),

assigned inside or outside the borders of the Han Dynasty. For instance, during the reign
of Emperor Wu

of Han, the Wuhuan people were moved to a contiguous area of the

northeastern border in order to spy on the Xiongnu, and also to stop them allying with the
Xiongnu.371 To manage the Inner Asian peoples more effectively, the most common way
was to move them inside the territory of the Han Dynasty. The Inner Asian groups were
administered depending on the number in their group. If the size was big, they could be
divided into smaller groups settled in different areas and enjoying autonomy. For
example, the group of more than 10,000 people led by the Hunye king that surrendered to
the Han court were divided into five groups and became five “affiliated states (shuguo
)” of the Han Empire.
To supervise these Inner Asian groups, the Han or Jin government usually placed
them under the supervision of the officials from the civil or martial administrative system.
The civil administrative system refers to the local governments of the counties and
prefectures. The groups placed under the civil administrative system were usually small.
Thus, they could not become a threat to the local government. For instance, after the
Yuezhi people surrendered during the Emperor Wu of Han’s reign, they lived with the
Han people and were controlled by the local county officials.372 If the group was
originally large, it would be divided into smaller groups, which were separately governed
by local counties or prefectures. After the Southern Xiongnu led by the Huhanye Chanyu
surrendered to the Han, although Huhanye still held the title of Chanyu and was treated as
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a nobleman, his people lived in the counties or prefectures and were administrated by the
head of local governments. They “were almost the same as the registered households, but
did not pay tax [to the local government] ”(

)373 When the

original group surrendering to the Han was small, they were usually also under the
administration of the local government. A martial administrative system was sometimes
created refering to the local military institutions. For instance, for the Wuhuan people, the
Han and Jin government both set up the position of Protector Commandant of the
Wuhuan (Hu wuhuan xiaowei

).374 Under the lead of the military officials,

these groups usually were required to provide military service for the Han and Jin
government.
With the officials appointed by the Han or Jin court after the move inside the Han
border, did the Inner Asian group still keep its autonomy within the original local
political structure? In other words, did they became registered households organized the
same as the Han local administrative way? This answer is clear from the number of
registered households in the prefectures at the north and northwest borders of the Western
Han and Eastern Han Dynasties. Compared to the Western Han, the number of registered
households in Sili

, Bingzhou

, Liangzhou

and Youzhou

administrative units during the Eastern Han Dynasty decreased dramatically and was less
than half of the number in the Western Han.375 The dramatic decrease of registered
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household is best explained by the resettlement of the Inner Asian group into this area,
which caused the original residents to move away from there. The Inner Asian groups,
such as the Southern Xiongnu, “did not pay tax (bushu gongfu

)” for each

registered household, so they were not part of the registration system of the Han
government.376 If the Han government did not enroll the Inner Asian units into the
household registration system, then the original local political structure should have
remained after their migration.
Meanwhile, the maintainance of some form of seperate local political structure
was shown by the large number of titles given to the local Inner Asian leaders by the Han
and Jin government. These titles were not the same as the Han domestic official titles in
the administrative bureaucratic system. This type of title usually started with “Han” or
“Jin;” followed by the group name, like Xiongnu or Qiang
(zhang

)” or “lord (jun

),” which signified the rank of their leaders. In the Jin

Dynasty, there were different ranks inside the “zhang
number “hundred (bai

; and ended with “chief

)” and “thousand (qian

” title, which were marked with a

).” This could also indicate the

existence of the decimal administrative system inside the Inner Asian groups. In front of
the “zhang” or “jun,” there usually was a decorative term to praise the local leaders, such
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as qinhan

(Pro-Han), shuaishan

(Leading to Goodness); or to mark their

achievement including military deeds, such as polu

(Destroy the Enemy).377

These titles have been found not only in historical records but also on many seals
unearthed in Northern China. These seals usually were found in the tombs of the local
leaders. Unlike the noble titles (king or duke) bestowed on the high ranking members of
the ruling class of the Inner Asian groups, who also enjoyed privileges but were isolated
from the populace after migrating to the Han and Jin territory, bestowing this type of title
Implied that these local leaders remained in power. The Han and Jin government needed
them to oversee their Inner Asian subjects since the high ranking members were not in
charge, and county and prefecture governments were unable to intervene very much in
the affairs of local non-Han. Meanwhile, accepting the titles and keeping the seals even
after death demonstrated that the local leaders of the Inner Asian groups tried to
emphasize that their authority derived from the Han and Jin government, which replaced
the original status of the authority of Chanyu.
In sum, for the Han and Jin governments, after the Inner Asian group migrated
within the Han and Jin borders, they were either divided into smaller groups
administrated by the local county or prefecture, or they became “affiliated states” after
being divided and were supervised by the officials sent by the Han and Jin governments.
In both cases, the local political structure was largely kept intact. The local leaders were
given titles by the Han and Jin governments, which helped them to continue to manage
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their people. The existence of a large group of Inner Asian people inside the Han and Jin
borders was the foundation of the Inner Asian polities in the Central Plain during the
Sixteen Kingdoms period.

4.2.2 Local Organization of the Inner Asian Peoples during the Sixteen Kingdoms Period
The intact local political structure of the Inner Asian groups greatly accelerated
the process of the establishing a constellation of polities in the Central Plain. The Jin
officials, such as Guo Qin

and Jiang Tong

, already noticed the threat from the

Inner Asian groups to the Jin court before its collapse. They suggested to the emperor that
the Inner Asian groups be moved far from the capital or even outside the border.378 The
Inner Asian groups living in the Central Plain were not controlled directly by the Jin
government, and they easily could have been convinced to turn against the Jin. The
history of the Sixteen Kingdoms verified Guo and Jiang’s forebodings, and several Inner
Asian groups built their own polities. In these polities, the Inner Asian groups, either as
the core ruling group or as a dependency group, still maintained their political
organization at the local level.
The founding of the Former Han relied on the five units of Xiongnu (Wubu
Xiongnu

) who lived in the Southern Shanxi

area at that time.379 After the

establishment of the regime during Liu Cong’s reign, he divided the core group—five
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)”

units of Xiongnu into seventeen subunits stationed in different locations. Each subunits
had 2,000 soldiers and was led by Liu Cong’s lineage members as generals. Besides the
Xiongnu people, he separated the population inside the original household registration
system from the Inner Asian groups. For the population inside the household registration
system, Liu Cong appointed an official called clerk (neishi (

) for 10,000 registered

households; there were 43 clerks in total. On top of the clers, two Metropolitan
Commandants (sili

) were appointed to manage the two groups of more than 20,000

people. For the people who were not inside the household registration system and were
usually called “yi

,” Liu Cong kept and used the Inner Asian administrative system to

manage them. A Chanyu, who was not Liu Cong himself but his crown prince Liu Yi,
was appointed to oversee them.
For these Inner Asian groups, every 10,000 tents (luo
(duwei

) had a commandant

) appointed, and two assistants of the Chanyu were over the commandants.

Each assistant was in charge of 100,000 people.380 This was usually called the “Hu-Han
(

-

)” dual ruling system.381 This system, in which the “Chanyu” was the “Hu” and the

“emperor” was the “Han”, however, did not accurately describe the political structure of
the Former Han. The main reason is that the five groups of Xiongnu people were not part
of either the “Hu” or “Han” system. Here, the concept of the Inner Asian authoritative
system with non-uniform institutional complexity fits in the context better. There were
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three major groups inside the Former Han: five groups of Xiongnu as the core group, the
group originally inside the Jin household registration system, and the Inner Asian group
“six yi

” except for the Xiongnu. The political structure inside the core group, which

was divided into small subgroups that were led by the Liu lineage members, was similar
to the “authoritative feudalism”. Under the ruling of the core group, five groups of
Xiongnu, both the Inner Asian groups of “six yi” and the population inside the household
registration system, were integrated into the polity, keeping their original institutional
complexity, which here refers to the local political structure. In other words, the Inner
Asian tradition of the local political structure remained in the Inner Asian groups of the
Former Zhao.
This system with non-uniform institutional complexity also can be found in other
succeeding kingdoms. In the Former Qin, after conquering Luoyang, Fu Jian divided the
core group, the Di (

) people of 150,000 households, and sent the subgroups into

different major cities to be stationed.382 In the Later Zhao, the “six yi” were also under the
lead of Shi Le’s crown prince, Shi Hong.383 Besides the commandant (duwei) from the
Former Han, there was another title for the commander of the Inner Asian groups,
).384 The Inner Asian groups under the lead of Hujun was

Military Protector (Hujun

sometimes called miscellaneous households (zahu
miscellaneous Hu (zahu

), which were comprised of

). For instance, in the inscription from the hall stele of
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Grand Commandant Deng (Deng taiwei ci bei
Protector of Army in Fengyi (
twelve kinds of Yi (

), it is recorded that under the

) were 7,000 miscellaneous households including

), such as the Sogdian, Qiang, etc..385 Although because of war, the

defeated groups were often divided or exiled to other places, the original local political
structure was retained. For instance, after Fu Jian pacified a mutiny of Xiongnu people
led by Cao Gu

, he moved more than 6,000 households of the Xiongnu elites to

Chang’an. The majority of the Xiongnu, however, still remained in their original places.
After Cao’s death they were divided into only two groups, which still were led by Cao’s
sons.386 In 391 CE, after He Ne (

) was defeated by Murong Chui’s army, he even

sent the captured groups back to He Ne.387

4.2.3 Transition to Household Registration System (bianhu

)?

As discussed above, during the Sixteen Kingdoms period, the Inner Asian groups
in the Central Plain kept maintained some form of distinctive local political structure with
non-uniform institutional complexity. In the system, the Inner Asian groups usually were
excluded from the household registration system of the central government. Based on the
inscription from the stele of Grand Commandant Deng (Deng taiwei ci bei), Ma
Changshou argued that in the Former Qin Qiang people were inside the household
registration system. The major evidence is the recorded Qiang names attached to place
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names (cities and towns). Because these Qiang people were associated with an
administrative unit of the government, they were registered as household (bianhu

)

members.388 This argument, however, is not convincing because since the Han Dynasty,
some of the Inner Asian groups in the Central Plain were administrated by the head of the
local prefectures or counties and still were not inside the household registration system.
Were the Inner Asian groups then always excluded from the household registration
system? There were two cases, which are worth discussing.
In 394 CE, after Yao Xing defeated Fu Deng, he “dissolved Deng’s troops, who
)389 It is argued by scholars that

went back to agricultural work.” (

since Fu Deng’s troops were mostly Di, Yao Xing reorganized the Di people and
incorporated them into the household registration system to practice agriculture.390 There
was, however, one flaw in this argument. Because these people went “back” to the
agricultural work, it means they originally belonged to an agricultural population. At this
time, it is reasonable to speculate that the majority of Fu Deng’s troops were from the
agricultural population. It could be because some Di started to practice agriculture after
they migrated into the Central Plain, or were levied from the registered households.
The other example concerned the Former Qin and Dai (

) Kingdom. After Fu

Jian defeated the Dai Kingdom in 376 CE, he dissolved the Dai people in southern Inner
Mongolia, “appointed military officers and supervisors to deal with them, and officers to
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lead and restrain them.”391 These people were taxed on their income and levied based on
household size. He also gave them land tax exemptions for three years to encourage them
to practice agriculture. Meanwhile, he required the local chiefs (qushuai

) among

them to send tribute at the end of every year and restricted their social interaction with
others.392 This case clearly shows that Fu Jian changed the local political structure of the
Xianbei by incorporating them into the household registration system.393 The Xianbei of
the Dai Kingdom were administrated by the officials appointed by Fu Jian, and their
original local leaders were removed from power. Although they might still enjoy some
privileges, they had lost control over their people. The requirement for them to send
tribute to the capital was a way to monitor them. Meanwhile, the tax and levy on the
Xianbei also indicates the application of a household registration system.
Both cases imply that there were Inner Asian groups incorporated into the
household registration system in the Sixteen Kingdoms period. Both instances happened
after the leaders of these groups were defeated, and they were the core groups of both
polities. They were dissolved by the winning side and became registered household
members to control them more effectively inside the household registration system,
especially when the Former Qin and Dai Kingdom were the strong enemies, such as Yao
Xing and Fu Jian. To increase the revenue of the government was the other reason.
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4.2.4 Conclusion and Discussion
Since the Han and Jin Dynasties, after the Inner Asian group moved inside the
Han and Jin borders, they were either divided into smaller groups which were
administrated by the local county or prefecture, or, after being divided became “affiliated
states”, which were supervised by the officials sent by the Han and Jin government. In
both cases, the local political structure was largely kept intact. The existence of the large
group of Inner Asian people inside the Han and Jin borders with their autonomous local
political structure greatly accelerated the process of polity building by the Inner Asian
rulers in the Central Plain. These polities can be described as the Inner Asian authority
system with non-uniform institutional complexity. In the system, the majority of the Inner
Asian groups still kept some form of autonomous local political structure, and were not
incorporated into the household registration system. A few cases show some Inner Asian
groups as the core ruling group, however, who were incorporated into the system after the
polity collapsed following their military defeat. They were dissolved by the winning side
and became registered household members.

4.3 Local Institutions of Inner Asian Peoples in the Central Plain during the
Northern Dynasties
This section examines the policies regarding the local institution towards the
Inner Asian people in the Central Plain and the changes throughout the Northern
Dynasties. Beginning with the discussion on the “scattering the buzu (lisan buzu
)” polity by Tuoba Gui, Emperor Taizu of Northern Wei, this section continues
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discussing the accommodating of the Inner Asian groups by the Northern Wei
government. Then, this section examines the transition of the local institution of the Inner
Asian groups during the Northern Dynasties.

4.3.1 “Scattering the units (lisan zhubu

)”

The specific content of scattering the units applied by Emperor Taizu of Northern
Wei has always been debated, and the major controversial issue is whether the
“scattering” reached the local level; in other words, if the people in the units were
incorporated into the household registration system during the application of the
policy.394 The implication of “units” should be examined first. The literal translation of
“bu” could be “tribe” if the “bu” were understood as “buluo

(tribe)”. As Christopher

Atwood’s research shows, however, the polities along the border of China would not be
the primary tribes but the “secondary tribes,” which were created by the strong political
powers in both China and Mongolia.395
Meanwhile, one major buzu, which was scattered by Emperor Taizu, was the
Helan

. According to the Weishu, the Helan ancestors used to be rulers with more

than ten units (bu

) under their control.396 It indicates the buzu is not a kin-based

primary tribe but rather refers to all the armed units under the lead of the group leader. In
Helan’s case, it was He Ne (

). In his biography, it records that as the eldest brother
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of the empress, He Ne was highly respected but without commanding any groups until
his death;397 this was because of the policy of scattering the units.
There are only three historical records that refer directly to the policy of scattering
the units by Emperor Taizu, and the most important one was in the biography of He Ne.
After pacifying the Central Plain with Emperor Taizu, He Ne was given the title of
Anyuan (

Settling the Distant) General. Later, Emperor Taizu started to “scatter the

units, settling them in assigned area, and not allowing them to migrate. The leaders and
Great Men (daren

) were the same as registered household members (
).”398 A similar description also can

be found in the biography of state officials in Weishu, it says, “Early in the Dengguo era,
Emperor Taizu scattered the units,399 and they first started to become the same as
)”400 Because of

registered household members. (

these records, even with a different interpretation of “bu/buluo” in this article, scholars
like Tang Zhangru and Tian Yuqing argue that all the members inside the units were
incorporated into the registered household system of the Northern Wei, and the original
local political structure was removed because of the change.401 Hou Xudong further
supports this argument with evidence from a stele inscription, which records two people
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with the surname Helan who lived with other people and had their own farmland.402
Some scholars disagree with this point because they find some “units” still existed during
and after Emperor Taizu’s reign; the most famous example is the Erzhu Rong
case.403 The grandfather of Erzhu Rong had led his own unit since Emperor Taizu’s reign;
Erzhu Rong’s father inherited the title and unit, and then passed it down to his son.404
Therefore, they argue that the “scattering the units,” policy only broke up the stronger
units, and the local-level structure of these units remained. These Inner Asian unit
members were not incorporated into the household registration system. Then how can the
conflicting evidence be explained?
It is very likely that the policy of scattering the units only targeted the units from
the core ruling groups. These two units became members of the eight lineages for the
meritorious generals (xunchen

).405 Meanwhile, the Helan and Dugu lineages had an

intermarriage relationship with the Tuoba lineage. The maternal relative in the early
Tuoba history was powerful and always interfered with the Tuoba succession. Even
Tuoba Gui himself succeeded because of the support from his maternal relatives.406 So
the purpose of this policy was to eliminate the competing rivals inside the ruling group
for Tuoba lineage. For this purpose, in the Northern Wei, Emperor Taizu also started the
practice of appointing the heir apparent and killing his mother at the same time. By doing
this, Emperor Taizu tried to eliminate the threats to himself and his descendants. So it is
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plausible to assume that the policy of scattering the units only targeted the powerful units
that potentially threated the authority of the Tuoba lineage.
Emperor Taizu tried to incorporate the members of these units into the household
registration system to weaken and control them. Even though these unit members were
organized as “eight states (baguo

)” inside the Xianbei polity,407 within the

household registration system, they still were separate from the commoners who were
managed by the local prefectures and counties. 408 The eight states indicated a higher
status for their seperation. Meanwhile, Emperor Taizu did not scatter the remaining Inner
Asian units. Therefore, the conflicting part in the historical records mentioned earlier can
be explained. If there were Inner Asian units that still remained intact in the local level
inside the Northern Wei, how were they administrated by the Northern Wei government?
This question will be discussed below.

4.3.2 Accommodation of the Inner Asian Groups in the Northern Dynasties
Scholars already have indicated that there were Inner Asian groups that remained
as “units” inside the Tuoba Xianbei polity.409 The most obvious case is the High Carts
(Gaoche

) people. It is recorded that “During Taizu’s reign, he scattered the units.

Only the Gaoche, because of their rough and unmanageable character, were permitted to
separately remain as a group. (
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)” in the Weishu.410 This description by the Weishu compiler is not accurate,
however, because the Gaoche was not the only group that remained as a unit in Northern
Wei. The case of Erzhu Rong, discussed above, was another major example.
Besides the two, there were still many other Inner Asian groups that remained;
this is evident from the appearance of the unit leader titles in both historical records and
stele inscriptions. The titles include qiuzhang
, buda

, qiuhao

, qiuda

, qiushuai

,411 which indicate that these leaders were originally from the local

group leaders and were given these titles after being incorporated into the Xianbei polity.
But how were these groups administrated by the Northern Wei government? Were they
managed by following the Han and Jin traditions?
In the early period of Northern Wei, the method of managing the submitted
groups was recorded in the Biography of State Officials in Weishu, it says,
The miscellaneous peoples who came from everywherein submission,
were called “Wuwan (
)”. Their leader was called “chieftains
(qiuzhang )” or “militia leaders (shuzhang
)” based on the sizes
of the groups. They were divided into southern and northern groups,
which were managed by the appointed Great Men (daren
) of the
two units. At that time, the younger brother of the emperor Gu ( )
administrated the northern group, and the son Shijun (
) managed
the southern group. With managing the peoples by dividing them, the
two were like the two earls (bo ) of antiquity.412 In the first year of
the Dengguo Reign of Emperor Taizu, he followed it without any
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adjustment. The Great Men were still appointed for the south and north
to rule the two groups.

413

According to this record, in the early period of Northern Wei after the groups had
submitted to the Tuoba polity, their leaders were assigned titles based on the size of their
groups. All the people were divided into two big group: southern and northern, which
were administrated by the “Big Men.” The big men were usually from the core ruling
group, especially the Tuoba lineage. They were not only the Tuoba lineage, however.
There were Big Men also from the other major lineages that had an intermarriage
relationship with the Tuoba lineage. For instance, Liu Luochen (
Dugu Luochen), who was the elder brother of Empress Xuanmu (

, also known as
), was once the

southern unit big man. His father also had been the northern unit big man.
Later, along with the increasing number of the subordinate Inner Asian groups,
other Big Men appeared with similar titles, such as “Central Great Man (Zhongbu daren
) and “Heaven Great Man (Tianbu daren

).414 In year 417, the groups

for administering them expanded into six—Heaven, Earth, Eastern, Western, Southern
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and Northern —and every group had a Great Man as a leader.415 In the year 444, 5000
tents of the Northern Group (beibu

) revolted and tried to escape the control of

Northern Wei by migrating to the north.416 This incident shows that the people in the six
groups all remained in the units of the Inner Asian local institution.
Later, along with the conquest of Northern China, the Northern Wei started to
adopt the institutions and official titles from the conquered states. One of them, the
Military Protector (hujun

), was inherited from Later Yan around 396 CE.417 As

mentioned above, the Protector of the Army usually was appointed to supervise the Inner
Asian groups in certain areas. Initially, the Protectors of the Army could be under the
lead of the Big Men. In 401 CE, Emperor Taizu moved all the Protectors of Army under
the control of the Great General (Dajiangjun

).418 The Great General was the

highest rank in the military administrative system, and Tuoba Tao obtained this title when
he was the crown prince.419 Moving all the Protectors of Army to be under the lead of the
Great General indicates that Emperor Taizu intended to centralize the power . Meanwhile,
the military town (junzhen

) system was also gradually developed to coordinate the

ruling of Protectors of the Army. For instance, the Tujing (

, roughly today’s Shilou

County of Shanxi Province) Town was established in 434 after the Tujing Protector of the
Army already had existed for several years. The establishment of the Protector of the
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Army and the military town suggests the existence of a military administrative system for
the Inner Asian groups in the beginning of Northern Wei Dynasty. Under the Protector of
the Army and the military town, the Inner Asian local institution remained, and the
people were not incorporated into the household registration system.420
Because the groups organized within the Inner Asian local institution were not
incorporated into the household registration system, it was doubly important for them had
to serve the Northern Wei government militarily. For the groups regulated inside the
military administrative system, providing military service for the Northern Wei was a
common obligation. It is recorded in several cases that the High Cart people under the
military town tried to escape from the military obligation by rebelling or migrating.421
Besides providing military service for the Northern Wei,422 the Six Groups (liubu

)

people also had to pay tax to the government. In 421, Emperor Taizong imposed a
property tax on the Six Bu people, who had to pay one war-horse to the government if
they owned 100 sheep.423 This tax also indicates that the Six Groups people still kept
their pastoral way of life.

4.3.3 Transition to Household Registration System
The policy of scattering the units by Emperor Taizu targeted the powerful units to
eliminate the competing powers inside the core-ruling group for the Tuoba lineage. With
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this policy, Emperor Taizu broke up the Inner Asian local institutions among these units
and incorporated the members of these units into the household registration system to
weaken and control them. These unit members still were separated from the commoners,
who were managed by the local prefectures and counties, but they were organized as
“eight states (baguo

)” inside the Xianbei polity.424 Meanwhile, as discussed above,

there were other groups that kept the Inner Asian local institution inside Northern Wei,
such as the Six Group people and people under the administration of the military town.
These groups, however, also could be scattered and the people incorporated into the
household registration system of the local civil administration. This happened when these
groups tried to break away from the control of the Northern Wei, which was
demonstrated by several cases recorded in Weishu.
For the Six Groups, there were at least three cases of rebellion recorded, and two
of them were successful. In 471 and 472, the High Cart people in the Western Group and
Eastern Group revolted and successfully broke away from the control of the Northern
Wei.425 It was mainly because their settlements were in the borderland of the Northern
Wei. The revolt by the Northern Group people did not end well. In 444, 5,000 tents of the
Northern Group (beibu

) revolted and tried to escape from the control of Northern

Wei by migrating to the north. The group leader was executed, and the captured people
were moved to the Ji (

), Xiang (

) and Ding (
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) prefectures as members of camp

households (yinghu

).426 The camp households in the Sixteen Kingdom period and

early Northern Wei refer to the military households managed by the military
administrative system who provided military service hereditarily. In 427, to weaken the
military leaders, Emperor Shizu removed all the miscellaneous and camp households and
placed them under the lead of the local counties and prefectures.427 Therefore, the
captured people of the Northern Groups were put in camp households managed by the Ji,
Xiang and Ding prefectures. Meanwhile, moving them into the interior of the Northern
Wei territory made it more difficult for them to break away again.
The military town had the same problem of groups trying to escape. One early
case happened in 429. The Xiutu (

) leader Jin Ya (

) rebelled because of a

conflict with a military town general and the head of the local prefecture. After Jin’s
death in 433, however, the group still remained and continued being led by Jin’s younger
cousin.428 Later, in 471, the High Carts people were managed by the military town of
Woye (

) and Tongwan (

) in the borderland rebelled. They were defeated by the

Northern Wei army, and more than 30,000 people were executed. The rest were also
moved to the Ji, Xiang and Ding prefectures as camp households.
Another similar case regarding the High Cart people happened the next year.429
As the Weishu states, “because of their rough and unmanageable character,” the High

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
426

Weishu, juan 4, vol.2, 97.
Weishu, juan 110, 2851.
428
Weishu, juan 4, vol.1, 83.
429
Weishu, juan 7, vol.1, 136.
427

170!
!

Cart “separately remained as group.”430 When they were regulated by the local prefecture,
because the camp household still belonged to the military household, the original local
institution of the High Cart people still remained, even though the prefectures and
counties should have intervened in the local administration of these groups in some way.
In 445, when the revolt of Tujing Town was pacified, the revolutionaries were moved out
of the military town and allocated to the local prefectures and counties.431 The goal was
to weaken them and more effectively control them. It is, however, unclear if these
revolting people were incorporated into the household registration system of the local
government instead of still remaining as a military household.
Along with and after the unification of Northern China, there was a transition of
the military administrative system into the civil administrative system inside the Northern
Wei government. During peace time, the large number of military households was not
necessary, and it was also a threat when the Inner Asian groups stayed as a military
power inside the Northern Wei polity. Also, the Northern Wei government was able to
recruit troops from the registered households.432 Meanwhile, a military household did not
enjoy much privilege anymore when they had to stay in the military administrative
system and were not able to enjoy the booty from the Central Plain, but instead had to
face the ferocious enemy from the northern steppe. So the Inner Asian people, like the
High Cart, revolted because of their refusal to participate in the military service for the
Northern Wei. Therefore, it is recorded that in 457, all the protectors of the army (hujun
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), who regulated the Inner Asian groups were changed into prefecture chiefs (taishou
).433 This change indicates the establishment of the civil administrative system,
mainly the household registration system, inside the Inner Asian groups.
Later, in 524, Emperor Suzong of Northern Wei switched the military households
under the regulation of prefectures, such as the camp households and military towns, into
civil households, which were regulated by the household registration system.434
Meanwhile, the military towns also were changed into prefectures.435 This policy
incorporated a large number of people from the Inner Asian units, which used to be in the
military administrative system, into the civil administration of household registration
system. This policy also was largely followed by the Northern Zhou. The Di (
Jihu (

) and

) peoples inside the Northern Zhou polity were regulated under the prefectures

and counties as members of registered households.436

4.3.3 Conclusion
In the early stage of Northern Wei, around 398 CE, Emperor Taizu applied the
policy of scattering the units, thus targeting only the powerful units to eliminate the
competing powers inside the ruling group of the Tuoba lineage. With this policy,
Emperor Taizu tried to incorporate the members of these units into the household
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registration system to weaken and control them. The people from these powerful units,
however, were still separated from the commoners who were managed by the local
prefectures and counties, but organized as “eight states (baguo

)” inside the Xianbei

polity. The eight states still indicated the possible higher status of their members, which
makes them different from the local prefectures and counties.
Meanwhile, Inner Asian units existed inside the Northern Wei polity since its
establishment and had not been scattered by Emperor Taizu. These people were
organized as “Southern” and “Northern” Groups initially. Later, along with the increasing
number of subordinate Inner Asian groups, the group number grew bigger. In 417, the
groups for administrating them expanded into six—Heaven, Earth, Eastern, Western,
Southern and Northern— and every group had a Great Man as leader. The Northern Wei
government also fashioned a military administrative system, such as the protector of an
army and military town, to manage the Inner Asian peoples inside Northern Wei territory.
In this system, the Inner Asian local institution of these groups still remained.
Because of the frequent revolt of the Inner Asian groups regulated in the military
administrative system of Northern Wei, a certain number of the groups were moved out
from the military town or “Six Groups,” and regulated by the prefectures and counties as
military households. Along with the transition of the military administrative system into
the civil administrative system inside the Northern Wei government, the military
households, regulated either by the military town or prefectures and counties, all
transferred into registered households, and many military towns also became prefectures.
This process incorporated a large number of people from the Inner Asian units, that used
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to be in the military administrative system, into the civil administration of household
registration system.

4.4 Conclusion and Discussion

Concerning the tradition of the local institution in the Han and Jin Dynasties, the
gatherings of households were usually not a single clan but combined with different
clans.437 As natural units, the hamlets were generated mainly because of suitability of the
territories’ environment for peoples’ life. As an administrative unit of the government,
with the application of the household registration system, the village normally was
associated with a certain number of households, usually 100, instead of directly being
associated with a plot of land like the hamlet. So individuals in one village could be from
different hamlets, and people in the same hamlet could also belong to different
villages.438
There were several layers of authorities in the local institution of early medieval
China. The heads of the lowest “ten” and “five” were usually assigned to one of the
members inside the households. Above the village, there were also several layers of
higher authorities including town (xiang

), county (xian

) and others around the

central government. These administrative units all tended to maintain the population
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attached to the farmland to practice agriculture, and strictly limited the migration of
people, to weaken and control them.
To understand the local institution of Inner Asian tradition, I examined the
political complexity of the Xiongnu polity first. In the Xiongnu polity, there were three
different groups within the Xiongnu ruling class. As the core of the Xiongnu ruling class,
the first group refers to the Chanyu and another three or four lineages, which are the
nobles and renowned lineage (mingzu

) inside the Xiongnu. The power distribution

among the first group is defined as “authoritative feudalism.” The second group was the
group leaders who submitted to the Xiongnu polity either forcibly or voluntarily, and
stayed inside the Xiongnu territory while keeping their autonomy. Besides the two groups,
outside the Xiongnu territory, there were polity leaders associated with the Xiongnu
polity. The latter two groups’ relationship with the Chanyu is described as “authoritative
dependency.”
Control over the three ruling groups by the Chanyu was limited. The
intermarriage with the Chanyu lineage, sending hostages to the Chanyu court and regular
meetings were the three major institutional measures to link and control the three ruling
groups. The limited ways of control over the ruling groups indicate the significance of the
Chanyu’s authority for maintaining the stability of Xiongnu polity. Based on the
complexity of the Xiongnu polity, I define the political structure of the Xiongnu polity as
an authoritative system with non-uniform institutional complexity. With the authority of
the Chanyu, this system could incorporate the groups with different complexities into the
Xiongnu polity. Therefore, in the local level, both the decimal hierarchical administrative
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system and conical tribal system existed in different groups of the Xiongnu polity. The
decimal hierarchical official system existed inside the core ruling group. Whether the
system was applied by the second and third ruling groups is hard to answer because of
lack of evidence. Among the Wuhuan people, the political system was closer to the
conical tribal system.
Since the Han and Jin Dynasties, after the Inner Asian group migrated inside the
Han and Jin borders, they were either divided into smaller groups which were
administrated by the local county or prefecture, or became “affiliated states” after being
divided, which were supervised by the officials sent by the Han and Jin government. In
both cases, the local political structure of these groups was largely kept intact. The
existence of the large group of Inner Asian people inside the Han and Jin borders with
their intact local political structure greatly accelerated the process of polity building by
the Inner Asian rulers in the Central Plain. These polities can be described as Inner Asian
authoritative system with non-uniform institutional complexity. In the system, the
majority of the Inner Asian groups still kept their original local political structure and
were not incorporated into the household registration system. A few cases show some
Inner Asian groups as the core ruling group; they were incorporated into the system after
the polity collapsed because of their military defeat. They were dissolved by the winning
side and became registered household members mainly because they could be controlled
more effectively inside the household registration system since they were the major threat
of their old polity.
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As for the Northern Dynasties, early in the Northern Wei, around 398 CE,
Emperor Taizu applied the policy of scattering the units; he only targeted the powerful
units to eliminate the competing powers inside the ruling group for the Tuoba lineage.
With this policy, Emperor Taizu tried to incorporate the members of these units into the
household registration system to weaken and control them. The people from these
powerful units, however, still were separated from the commoners managed by the local
prefectures and counties, but organized as “eight states (baguo

)” inside the Xianbei

polity. The eight states could mark the possible higher status of their members, which
made them different from the local prefectures and counties.
Meanwhile, Inner Asian units existed inside the Northern Wei polity since its
establishment and were not scatted by Emperor Taizu. These people were organized as
Southern and Northern groups initially. Later, along with the increasing number of the
subordinate Inner Asian groups, the group number grew bigger. In 417, the groups for
administering them expanded to six—Heaven, Earth, Eastern, Western, Southern and
Northern— and every group had a Great Man as its leader. The Northern Wei
government also adopted the military administrative system, such as the protector of an
army and military town, to manage the Inner Asian groups inside Northern Wei territory.
In this system, the Inner Asian local institution of these groups still remained.
Because of the frequent revolt of the Inner Asian groups regulated in the military
administrative system of Northern Wei, a certain number of the groups were moved out
from the military town or Six Groups, and regulated by the prefectures and counties as
military households. Along with the transition of the military administrative system into
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the civil administrative system inside the Northern Wei government, the military
households were regulated either by the military town, or prefectures and counties. and
transferred into registered households; many military towns also became prefectures.
This process incorporated a large number of people from the Inner Asian units, which
used to be in the military administrative system, into the civil administration of household
registration system.
In general, the separation between the Inner Asian groups on the Central Plain and
the domestic groups, which were managed with the household registration system,
existed both in Han-style dynasties and in the polities mainly built by the Inner Asian
groups. The existence of the Inner Asian units in the Central Plain both threatened the
safety of the Han and Jin polities, and the polities in the Sixteen Kingdoms and Northern
Dynasties. When facing the threat, the suggestions given by the officials during the Wei
and Jin dynasties, like Jiang Tong, usually were further separation. According to them,
the Inner Asian people should be removed to the borderland or even outside the border
because the separation between the Hua and Yi should be maintained. Even when they
lived in and around the Central Plain, they still could not be trusted. The Jin government
was not able to handle the migration of the Inner Asian group because of the constant
internal turmoil, and also they needed the military services from them. Therefore, these
suggestions were not adopted in the Jin Dynasty.
The polities of the Sixteen Kingdoms Period and Northern Dynasties largely
followed the Inner Asian political tradition and the Inner Asian groups remained as units
inside the polities. The military service provided by these groups played a significant role
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in these policies. The imposition of the household registration system on some of the
Inner Asian groups happened when these groups were too powerful, especially when
these groups were led by the core ruling group members.
On the other hand, in the Northern Wei, when the military service provided by
these Inner Asian groups was no longer as significant as before, the military
administrative system gradually transferred into the civil administrative system. In this
process, the household registration system was imposed and three layers of authorities
were built in the local level of these Inner Asian groups to monitor and regulate them.439
The Inner Asian groups, however, did not disappear after this process. There were still a
certain number that remained.440 Once the peaceful situation was broken, they would be
ready to engage militarily. After all, the one who caused the decline and even collapse of
the Northern Wei, Erzhu Rong, was one of them.
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CHAPTER 5 Conclusion and Discussion

This dissertation began with an examination of the evolution of the Sinicization
(Hanhua

) theory. The research shows this theory in different contexts and

interpretations to engage in some criticism of the theory. Since the 1920s, the Sinicization
theory in the context of Chinese nationality has flourished in China. Later it re-appeared
in the West through the works of Jing-shen Tao and Ping-ti Ho. The basic conclusion of
Hanhua theory, that the Chinese absorbed the non-Chinese regardless of their status as
rulers, a belief that already was held by the early European Sinologists, received both
acceptance and criticism in Western academic writing. Scholars noted the broad and
vague content covered by Hanhua, so they tried to divide it and create distinct terms for
different parts of Hanhua’s content. For instance, the Hanhua in the context of Chinese
nationality covered many topics so that it failed to distinguish between different aspects,
such as politics and customs, inside the transition of the non-Chinese people. So as
Dardess and Bol suggested, the Hanhua theory in the context of Chinese nationality had
problematic analytic value, and should be applied with caution and clear restriction on its
content.
As discussed in the first chapter, the Hanhua theory has been adopted in the
construction of the history of Chinese Nationality since the early 20th century rather than
Han ethnicity in uniting all the peoples inside China. Therefore, the Hanhua in the
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context of Chinese Nationality tried to be inclusive and flexible, and to connect different
peoples with different cultural backgrounds inside Chinese territory. As Ping-ti Ho
suggested, culturalism behind the Hanhua theory would not “obliterate” the other patterns
of culture and forms of identity inside the Chinese Nationality.
Although the Hanhua theory plays an important role in the concept of Chinese
Nationality, it is of limited and problematic analytic value. By applying the Sinicization
or Hanhua theory to every dynasty, the historical interpretation becomes a deterministic
narrative. As a reaction to the flourishing of Hanhua theory in China and its adoption by
some Western scholars, with misinterpretations and criticism about the Hanhua, the
ethnicity of the non-Chinese peoples in Chinese history is emphasized more and more in
the works of Western scholars as represented by the New Qing historians. This research,
however, does not explain why and how the non-Chinese peoples adopted Chinese
culture after entering the Central Plain. Meanwhile, the Hanhua theory often makes
scholars focus on the result of the transition of the non-Chinese people and neglect the
process of that transition. Therefore, in the second and third chapters, I present two case
studies to explore the process of the transition of non-Chinese.
These case studies are about the transition of the institutions of the central and
local government during the Sixteen Kingdoms period and Northern Dynasties. The
example for the central government is the succession system, and that for the local
government is the local administrative system.
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In the first case study, I point out that there were diverse institutional traditions on
the succession system in the Inner Asia and the Central Plain. The institution of the
crown prince in the succession of the Han imperial family was the embodiment of this
ancestral worship culture. Meanwhile, the Inner Asian succession tradition usually
required a selection to legitimize the ruler’s leadership through a peaceful or tanistric
process, and the successor had to prove himself as the best-qualified candidate. The
qualification of the candidate can be enhanced by the designation of the former ruler, and
sometimes the former ruler appointed him to this high position. .
For the Inner Asian rulers, when they took the throne and claimed themselves as
emperor, it was expected that they would follow the emperorship in the Han although it
was different from the rulership in the Inner Asian tradition. All the states in the Sixteen
Kingdoms Period discussed in the second chapter and Northern Dynasties
unexceptionally applied the crown prince system that was attached to the emperorship.
The research shows that these Inner Asian rulers soon found that it was almost
impossible to successfully apply the crown prince system. The problem was that the
decentralization of military power among the ruling group brought potential powerful
competitors to the heir apparent. These difficulties can be attributed to the Inner Asian
tradition of rulership and succession. The decentralization of military and political power
among the ruling group determined the method of succession to some extent. The Inner
Asian rulers noticed that the power structure influenced the application of the crown
prince institution, so they applied different measures to let their heirs apparent acquire
political and military power and personal influence, and make them able to compete with
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other nobles. These measures sometimes even distorted the crown prince system. What
may not have been obvious, however, was that the crown prince institution in the Han
tradition was actually also restricted the emperor’s power.
The Han crown prince system aimed to stabilize the process of the transition of
supreme power. When the Inner Asian rulers were able to break out from the restraints of
the decentralized power structure, they also had no restrictions from the Han tradition.
One of the functions of the crown prince system in the Han tradition, which restricted the
emperor’s power in choosing his successor, had disappeared. To some extent, the
emperor monopolized the power of choosing and appointing the crown prince. Therefore,
through applying the crown prince system, the Inner Asian rulers attained a centralized
authority, which was different from and more centralized than the Han tradition. The
succession problem, however, really was not resolved until the end of the Northern
Dynasties. In the Sui and early Tang, the succession struggles inside the ruling group
were still one of the main issues regarding the stability of the regimes.
In the second case study in the third chapter, the transition of the local institution
of the Inner Asian groups in the Central Plain has been discussed. In the Han and Jin
Dynasties, the local administration was based on the application of a household
registration system. There were several layers of authorities in the local institution. These
administrative units were intended to maintain the population, attaching them to the
farmland to practice agriculture, and to constrain the migration of people/ Both these
were factors promoting social stability. As for the Inner Asian tradition, based on the
complexity of the Xiongnu polity, I define the political structure of the Xiongnu polity as
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an authoritative system with non-uniform institutional complexity. With the authority of
the Chanyu, this system could incorporate groups with different complexities into the
Xiongnu polity. Therefore, at the local level, both the decimal hierarchical administrative
system and conical tribal system existed in different groups of the Xiongnu polity. The
decimal hierarchical official system existed inside the core ruling group. Whether the
system was applied by the second and third ruling groups is hard to answer because of
lack of evidence.
Since the Han and Jin Dynasties, after the Inner Asian group migrated within the
Han and Jin borders, they were either divided into smaller groups that were administered
by the local county or prefecture; or became “affiliated states” after being divided, which
were supervised by the officials sent by the Han and Jin governments. In both instances,
the local political structure of these groups largely was kept intact. The polities of the
Sixteen Kingdoms Period and Northern Dynasties mainly followed the Inner Asian
political tradition, and the Inner Asian groups also remained as units inside the polities.
The military service provided by these groups played a significant role in these polities.
The imposition of the household registration system on some of the Inner Asian groups
happened when these groups became too powerful, especially when they were led by the
core ruling group members.
Meanwhile, in the Northern Wei, when the military service provided by these
Inner Asian groups was no longer as significant as before, the military administrative
system gradually transferred into the civil administrative system. In this process, the
household registration system was imposed, and three layers of authorities were built in
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the local level of these Inner Asian groups to monitor and regulate them. The Inner Asian
groups, however, did not disappear after this process. There were still a certain number of
them that remained. Once the peaceful situation was disrupted, they were prepared to
engage militarily. After all, the one who caused the decline and even collapse of the
Northern Wei, Erzhu Rong, was one of them.
The two case studies show the transition of the institutions of the Inner Asian
polity in the Central Plain. The transition is neither a one-way change from Inner Asian
institutions to Han and Jin institutions nor a simple hybrid. For different institutions, here
the succession system in the central government and the administrative system in the
local level, the dynamics for the transition were not the same. The power centralization
can be considered as one shared dynamic in both cases. As an important part of the
emperorship package from the Central Plain, the crown prince institution was associated
directly with the legitimacy of the ruling house and also labeled as the “Han-style”
institution.
Compared to the crown prince system, the local institutions—including the civil
and military administrative system—did not have a strong ideological package bound
with them. Therefore, unlike the succession institution case, in which the Inner Asian
rulers adopted the crown prince system when they started to practice emperorship in the
Han tradition, the Inner Asian rulers did not impose the household registration system on
the Inner Asian groups in the Central Plain right after the establishment of their polities.
The adoption of the household registration system as the local administrative system was
mainly for the practical purposes instead of ideological purposes along the transition from
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the military administrative system to civil administrative system. The household
registration system and the multiple layer of authority in the civil administrative system
maintained control more effectively over the population. At the same time, the Inner
Asian tradition of the succession institution and local administrative system never
disappeared in polities during the Sixteen Kingdoms period and Northern Dynasties. The
two cases show that the Inner Asian tradition was organically integrated into the
transitional process, imbedded into polities, and led to different and unexpected outcomes
that reshaped Chineseness since then.
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